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

Tarkovsky, Bergman, Sokurov, Kubrick, and Wong Kar-wai

FILMS AND DREAMS

THORSTEN BOTZ-BORNSTEIN

Films and Dreams

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Tarkovsky, Bergman, Sokurov, Kubrick, and Wong Kar-Wai

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Introduction

Dreamtense and the Art of Film

In his book *Visual Thinking*, Rudolf Arnheim points to the interest represented by a fundamental link between film and dream which becomes evident as soon as it is seen in relation with Freud's dreamwork:

> Freud raises the question of how the important logical links of reasoning can be represented in images. An analogous problem, he says, exists for the visual arts. There are indeed parallels between dream images and those created in art on the one hand, and the mental images serving as the vehicle of thought on the other; but by noting the resemblance one also becomes aware of the differences, and these can help to characterize thought imagery more precisely.[1]

To discuss dream theory in the context of film studies means moving from the original, clinical context within which dream theory was initially developed, to an environment established by primarily aesthetic concerns. For Freud, dream research was to be used as a technical means of discovering essential facts concerning the development of neuroses, mental diseases, and other phenomena diverging from "normal" mental life. In his *General Introduction to Psychoanalysis*, Freud presents the study of dreams as an explicit introduction to the *Neurosenlehre*. Aesthetic considerations have never been at the center of these elaborations just as they have never been central to psychoanalysis. Freud was aware of this but considered it rather as a general tendency linked to the psychoanalytical idea, and not as a methodological problem: "The psychoanalyst is only rarely motivated to undertake aesthetic examinations, not even when aesthetics is not restricted to the doctrine of beauty but defined as the doctrine of sentimental qualities."[2]

In film studies it has been demonstrated that dreams can be (aesthetically) fascinating not only because their linguistic or structural elements can be traced back to elements which exist in reality. On the contrary, in films, the language of dream is an object of interest as just "another language," in the same way as

one can be fascinated by language from another culture without having a particularly linguistic interest in it. Robert Curry writes that ". . . [dreams] show a vividness, originality, and insightfulness that quite escapes us in our waking life. If we compare our dreams to the fantasies of waking life, the latter reveal at a glance their stereotyped features and lowly origins in our desires and fears."[3]

If we use dream theory in film studies, we are interested in dreams as aesthetic expressions and in the ways these particular expressions can be obtained. In the chapters contained in this book, dreams will be dealt with as such "self-sufficient" phenomena that are interesting not because of their contents but because of a certain "dreamtense" through which they deploy their being.

Andrei Tarkovsky, whose work is repeatedly analyzed in various chapters of this book, elaborates the aesthetic phenomenon of dreams into a consistent version of anti-realism. For him, cinematic truth must be looked for in a new concept of cinematic time. Dreams take place in an intermediary domain of abstractness and concreteness, and dreamlike expressions neither represent the "real" nor do they symbolize the "unreal" but remain in the domain of the "improbable" between symbolization, representation and *verfremdete* expressions. Tarkovsky's way of overcoming cinematic metaphorism and symbolism is kindred to Walter Benjamin's thoughts on empathy (*Einfühlung*) as I explain in Chapter 9. Benjamin is convinced that we need empathy, but it should be a kind of empathy that experiences those images which just "flash." The world, at the moment it appears before our eyes in the form of dreamlike images, comes to us by surprise, without involving any curiosity on our part.

Tarkovsky requires that all expressiveness of the image be eliminated and that only "life itself" remain expressive. In Chapter 3, I show that the highly aestheticized images of Alexandr Sokurov's films also retain more than only a purely "aesthetic" status. Sokurov launches a subversive attack on the modern image ideology by elaborating an aesthetics of dreams.

In Chapter 2, which deals with Caspar David Friedrich and Tarkovsky, dreams in films become a matter of space. The dreamer's perception of space surpasses the "all too human" way of seeing the world, be it the objective or the subjective one, and perceives space like a Heideggerian thing. Space becomes here aesthetic through a dreamlike perception.

This accords well with what is said in the comparative study of Plotinus and Tarkovsky (Chapter 8). Both Plotinus and Tarkovsky overcome intellect not in order to reach a level of mysticism that creates blurred images and hazy ideas. Rather intellect itself becomes the origin of wisdom.

In the chapter on Ingmar Bergman (Chapter 4) as well as in the more technical Chapter 10, I explore the psychoanalytic dimension of filmdreams by taking up the discussion of the "mindscreen effect" that was current in the 1980s. A "dreaming mind" is present behind each screen and it invents an aesthetic structure which does not provide a narrative in the conventional sense of the word. In Bergman's *Persona*, for example, the film's self-consciousness appears to originate from within. In the same way, dreams are not produced by a process

that attempts to stylize the reality of waking life into a reality of dreams but what really "makes" the dream is the fact that reality and non-reality seem indistinguishable.

In Chapter 6, I examine these points with regard to the Austrian writer Arthur Schnitzler and show how the adoption of his *Dreamnovella* by Stanley Kubrick employs several important parameters of the production of film-dreams. Schnitzler employs complex strategies to show that dream and reality can never be clearly distinguished. The structural model valid for many of his works is that of *estrangement*, of the shifting of the familiar to the uncanny, and of the replacement of certitude by possibility, models widely neglected by Kubrick.

In Chapter 7, I show how Wong Kar-wai produces a dreamsphere of a similar kind. Wong's films represent a panorama of parodied capitalism in which reality gets absorbed in a dreamsphere cushioned in a kind of immature subjectivism. The dreamlike mode of existence that is shown in Wong's films is linked to a capitalist dreamworld of consumption.

All chapters point to the intrinsic affinity that films have with dreams. Dreams can deploy a "dreamtense" in various ways, some of which clearly transcend the typically psychoanalytical interest.

Notes

1. Rudolf Arnheim, *Visual Thinking* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 241.

2. Sigmund Freud, *Gesammelte Werke* (London: Imago), Vol. XII, 292.

3. Robert Curry, "Films and Dreams" in *Journal for Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 333:1, 1974, 85.

Chapter One

From Formalist *Ostranenie* to Tarkovsky's "Logic of Dreams"

In this chapter I intend to reflect upon the ways in which Andrei Tarkovsky has decided to represent "facts." I believe that for Tarkovsky this project involves questions about time and history in a way it does in few other contemporary artists. For Tarkovsky the approach of transforming facts into what is most commonly called "fiction" is based on sophisticated reflections upon the relationship between history and the present, and these reflections transcend, so I think, the playfulness of many classical and even "postmodern" approaches. Tarkovsky developed his ideas on time in cinema by overcoming the most important cinematic principle of modernity: the Formalist method of montage. Tarkovsky is opposed to modernism if we perceive the Formalist avant-gardism that has brought forward classical modern devices like montage, juxtaposition and alienation as typical manifestations of modern aesthetics. However, Tarkovsky's expressions are at the same time incompatible with those of "postmodern" attempts of overcoming modernity; and this is due to Tarkovsky's particular view on history, memory and time.

Empathy against Estrangement

The aesthetic phenomenon of "dream" is elaborated by Tarkovsky into a much more consistent version of anti-realism. In regard to dream become important the considerations of the formalists and of Tarkovsky concerning another notion that has also often crossed the field of the modern and postmodern problematics: the concept of empathy (*Einfühlung*).[1] In the middle of all Formalist film theory there is the idea that the montage of different scenes produces cinematic time. Montage creates a conflict between different shots and time, as a purely

functional relationship between shots, arises out of montage as an abstract element. The central figure in Formalist film theory is Sergei Eisenstein whose aim was to overcome "intuitive creativity" through "rational constructive composition of effective elements."[2] In a Futurist manner, Eisenstein designs artistic activity as the process of organizing raw material. A large part of this cinematic theory is based on the principle that represents the main theoretical notion for the philosophy of Russian Formalism, the notion of *ostranenie* (alienation, estrangement, German: *Verfremdung*). Within every shot there is, so says Eisenstein, a conflict between, for example, an object and its spatial nature or between an event and its temporal nature. To combat, as Eisenstein says, "intuitive creativity" by basing one's aesthetic strategy on the combination of raw cinematic material (for example, shots) is also in agreement with another main Futurist-Formalist project: to overcome an aesthetic theory of *Einfühlung*. We are here provided with a further aspect of the concept of time in Formalism. Cinematic time is no longer seen as an element that can be perceived through *Einfühlung* but time exists "as such" not as "real time" but as a quality that can only be experienced as an artistic-technical device. Accordingly, Eisenstein insists that the result of montage will never be represented by a certain "rhythm," by a certain regular pattern of series of shots. The reason for this is that such a cinematic "rhythm" as a temporal quality of film still relies too much on, in Eisenstein's expression, "artistic feeling." In "The Montage of Film Attraction" (1924) he writes:

> A rhythmic schema is arbitrary; it is established according to the whim or the "feeling" of the director and not according to mechanical periods dictated by mechanical conditions of the course of a particular motor process. . . . The audience of this kind of presentation is deprived of the emotional effect of perception, which is replaced by guesswork as to what is happening (48).

Eisenstein quotes even the German philosopher and psychologist Theodor Lipps, the foremost theoretician concerning the philosophy of empathy, to make clear the absurdity of one of Lipps's point, if we apply it to theory of cinema. Lipps's theory, so Eisenstein thinks, would rely only on the "emotional understanding of the alter ego through the imitation of the other" (49). Finally, this would lead to the "tendency to experience one's own emotion of the same kind" (ibid.). This means that the rhythm that we "feel" in cinematic time is an illusion insofar as it is the rhythm that we transfer from our own being into the films that we see. Eisenstein has moved away from Meyerhold's idea that film "is all a matter of the rhythm of movements and actions. This rhythm with a capital R is precisely what imposes responsibilities on the cameraman, on the director, on the artist, and on the actors."[3] However, for Eisenstein as for Formalist film theory in general, time is a matter of montage which creates not even rhythm. The images that are linked through montage provide no subject for *Einfühlung*. For Formalists, montage, like poetry, is not equivalent with "thinking in images." This Formalist idea of montage is inspired by Shklovsky who criticizes in his manifesto "Art as a Device" Potebnja's conception of poetry as a "thinking in images." Potebnja's conception, so Shklovsky finds, leads to the creation of

symbols as the main aesthetic occupation. For Formalism, however, artistic activity does not consist in the creation of symbols but in the reorganization of their constellations:

> The more you understand an age, the more convinced you become that the images a given poet used and which you thought his own were taken almost unchanged from another poet. The works of poets are classified or grouped according to the new techniques that poets discover and share, and according to their arrangement and development of the resources of language, poets are much more concerned with arranging images than with creating them. Images are given to poets; the ability to remember them is far more important than the ability to create them.[4]

An art, which consists only of symbols, will be artistically expressionless like algebra; the task of formalist artists is to "de-automatize" the fixed schemes of automatization. In the first place this means to retransform symbols into "things," into "material," and to capture then, by means of the artistic camera shot, original constellations of this material. The different shots will then be assembled through montage out of which time flows as a dynamic cinematic notion. This means that cinematic time is not "staged" like in theater, but grasped through unusual combinations of diverse material. It is worthwhile to show that, through this particular concept of time in cinema, formalist film theory undertakes the task to combat (exactly like formalist literary theory) naturalism and impressionism simultaneously. Formalist film theory finds that the "image" is always the photographic image, which is nothing other than a simple reproduction of reality. In this way it corresponds to both naturalism and impressionism because both of these artistic tendencies had their particular ways of seeing things as, generally speaking, "they really are." Formalist cinematography believes it has discovered a means to overcome the concept "image" of both schools. In this sense the theoretician B. Kazansky writes in "The Nature of Cinema":

> The naturalists severely limited the problem of art to the reproduction of reality. Impressionism was a definite, almost technical way of seeing things "as they are," eliminating the attraction toward any kind of personal feeling, evaluation or fantasy. And since for them the genuinely visible was the genuinely paintable "planar" phenomenon of the world, in drawing mere "naked reproduction" did not constitute an significant problem, since skillful hand motion did not enter into their aesthetic method. Thus, their artistic method was theoretically "photographic."[5]

The strong point of cinema is that it does not need to rely on "the mechanical copying of nature, [and on] the purely technical reproduction on the screen of some real object" (110) as does, in a Formalist view, photography. Cinema has the capacity to "transform nature" by relying on the *verfremdende* effect of montage. Here, for the first time in Formalist film theory, the motto "*ostranenie* against (impressionist or naturalist) *Einfühlung*" has become a matter of time. Eisenstein's and the Formalists' visions of an "intellectual film" developed into

the direction of a cinematic semiotics in which some critics miss a kind of original expressiveness. Having overcome symbolism, for Formalism shots are not symbols but signs. A shot cannot exist isolatedly as can a symbol but it exists only as a sign within the whole organism that is created by the director and his film montage. Consequently, an object in a film is not represented but denoted. Within Formalism, and in particular Eisenstein's cinematic structuralism, "meaning" is produced through the fact that every sign functions within a certain timely structure. Shots now become only functions.

It is well known that Andrei Tarkovsky combated several of Eisenstein's main ideas though it has rarely been examined how he proceeded with this project in particular. V. Ivanov states correctly that one of Tarkovsky's aims was to emphasize the significance of the shot as a means of representation of objects and not of their denotation and that he therewith overcame Eisenstein in a remarkably effective way.[6] Ivanov also points, however, to the immense difficulties that we meet when trying to describe Tarkovsky as being directly opposed to Eisenstein since Tarkovsky combats, like Eisenstein, symbolism in cinema (291). The truth must be looked for in a new concept of cinematic time that is proper to Tarkovsky. It is a concept of time that is in the truest sense of the word "post-modern," as I will develop in the further course of this chapter.

The concept of time in Formalism is that of a "non-staged" time that is produced exclusively through montage. This means that for Formalism cinematic reality is not staged nor does the director try to transfer reality on the screen by means of any kind of direct intuition (as it was intended, for example, by impressionism); at the same time, formalism does not adhere to naturalist concepts of representation. Also Tarkovsky rejects impressionism as an art which, as he writes in *Sculpting in Time*, "sets out to imprint the moment for its own sake"[7] and as an ideology which he finds artistically insufficient. He equally rejects the "staged," painterly, arrangement of shots, as is common, for example, in the films of Fellini. Mikhail Romadin wrote about Tarkovsky's relation to Fellini's aesthetics: "Fellini's method, where each scene is put together in the same way as a painting is on canvas, was . . . unacceptable for Tarkovsky. What will you have if, instead of a figure drawn on canvas by the artist we see a live actor? This is a surrogate painting, a live picture?"[8] The "live picture" remains a transfer of an idea to reality, which lacks reality, and, as we will see, which lacks time. To analyze Tarkovsky's artistic strategy of expressing reality and time (or a timely reality) through film we can look at one of his statements of an apparently simple kind:

> I once taped a casual dialogue. People were talking without knowing they were being recorded. Then I listened to the tape and thought how brilliant it was "written" and "acted." The logic of character's movements, the feeling the energy—how tangible it all was. How euphoric the voices were how beautiful the voices (*Sculpting*, 65).

There is "feeling" as well as "rhythm" in this conversation but this rhythm is not staged by the director. As a consequence, it cannot be duplicated through "imitation." Tarkovsky derives everything that he appreciates in this dialogue *from* this

dialogue by means of observation. This means that the circularity of an aesthetics of *Einfühlung* that Eisenstein mocked in regard to Lipps's aesthetic theory does not apply to Tarkovsky's taped conversation because the reality Tarkovsky captures is not "staged reality." It has neither been produced by an "artistic feeling" nor will it be perceived through the imitation of an empathic rhythm. In fact, Tarkovsky's procedure when taping this dialogue is neither realist nor impressionist. Would it then be right to say that what Tarkovsky did is similar to what Eisenstein and the Formalists propagated as the "capturing of raw material"? The temptation to say so is great because, obviously, Tarkovsky records the dialogue of the persons "as is," without altering it aesthetically in the slightest way. Everything is due to, as he says, pure "observation." Almost no violence destroys the intimacy of the scene and the tape recorder has not even the amount of presence that a voyeur would have. The "rape" of reality with which Derrida once reproached Levi-Strauss in *De la Grammatologie* when seeing him watching his object of research is reduced by Tarkovsky's discreet aesthetics of taping, to a minimal degree. Derrida says that already "the simple presence of the voyeur is a rape. First, pure rape: a silent, immobile stranger assists the little girl's game."[9] The game that is assisted by Tarkovsky, however, seems to remain, even while being observed, both innocent and a game. One of the reasons for this is that Tarkovsky does not capture "reality" in the way Eisenstein suggested to capture material. In other words, he does not try to "think the unique within a system" which would, once again according to Derrida, be another act of violence. Derrida writes: "Il y avait en effet une première violence a nommer . . . inscrire dans une différence, à classer, à suspendre le vocatif absolu. Penser l'unique dans le système, l'y inscrire, tel est le geste de l'archi-écriture" (ibid., 164).

However, reducing reality to systematizable material is an act that is much too violent to be committed by Tarkovsky. The reason for this is that his concept of cinematic time is fundamentally different. Formalist time exists only as and through the relationships between different shots: the shots themselves have no "inner" time. Consequently, a Formalist would condemn the dialogue taped by Tarkovsky because it represents for him a realistic, "naked reproduction" of reality which comes very close to the kind of aesthetics that Kazansky has attributed to photography. Photography, so Kazansky claims, is "stupid, dry, and boring, like statistics, because it has no choice and is incapable of generalization. It is obliged, like a mirror, to reflect everything that lies in the field of its lens" (in Eagle, 109). Also Tarkovsky's tape recorder undertakes no selection and no artistic "dynamization" of the matter that is provided by reality. However, Tarkovsky still perceives in this single scene, in this unique "little girls' game," a fascinating rhythm and a brilliantly "acted" scenario. For Formalists a single shot (of which photography seems to them a caricature) is static and mechanical because it contains no time. As we have seen, for Formalists a dynamical notion of time arises only through the montage of several shots. For Tarkovsky, on the other hand, a single shot also has time; it contains, as he says, a "dynamic of the mood." It is interesting to observe that Tarkovsky tends to define this kind of dynamic quality by using conceptions that are similar to those used by Formal-

ists. Eisenstein sees the cinematic quality of a shot in the fact that it contains an inner conflict "between an event and its temporal nature." This conflict was supposed to be produced through montage. It is slightly confusing that Tarkovsky also points to the importance of "unusual combinations of, and conflicts between, entirely real elements" (*Sculpting*, 72), since Eisenstein's conflict is also based on the principle of *ostranenie*, of the "making strange" of the filmed reality.

However, Tarkovsky "makes things strange" not by transferring a scene from "real time" to "abstract time." Tarkovsky refers to a domain, which he understands as an intermediary between abstractness and concreteness: dream. In principle this means that the impressions Tarkovsky wants to create do not follow the kind of abstract logic by means of which montage tried to produce cinematic time, but they are founded on what Tarkovsky calls the "logic of the dream." I will examine this by concentrating on the example of the taped dialogue. If the dialogue was "brilliantly acted" though obviously nobody really acted, does this not remind us of a dream? Also while we are dreaming, we do not act. Our action is no action: it is not guided by motives, nor are there any results materialized by consuming "real" energy. The action proceeds as if all alone, and through this aspect dream is quite reminiscent of a game.

The idea of dream as an action that implies no "real" action has since time immemorial fascinated philosophers. Hamann writes in his *Schriften*: "Mir scheint die Ansicht gewisser Philosophen, die der Menschenseele im Schlaf einen höheren Grad zuschreiben, von großer Bedeutung sein. Die Fähigkeit, die Zukunft zu entschleiern, ist nach ihrer Ansicht dann am stärksten, wenn die Seele nicht damit beschäftigt ist, sich in Bewegungen und Handlungen des Körpers umzusetzen."[10] Similarly, Bergson points to the special state of "indifference" of the dreamer by writing: "Veiller signifie vouloir. Cessez de vouloir, détachez-vous de la vie, désinteresez-vous: par la même vous passez du moi de la veille au moi des rêves, moins tendu mais plus étendu que l'autre."[11] (It is interesting that also Bergson insists that the dreamer's reasoning is not "illogical" but that it follows its "own logic," that the dreamer simply "raisonne trop.")

Also for Tarkovsky the (philosophical) problem of realism that we encounter in "staged" dialogues is solved not by simply refusing the process of staging and by working instead only with material, but by letting the actions be non-actions that no longer follow the logic of experience of everyday life. The kind of action that cannot be seen, from an exterior point of view, as an action because any neutral position outside the dream is non-existent confronts us with new problems in regard to the phenomenon of *ostranenie*. For Formalist theory, even of the later phase, the definition of an exterior point of view, from which the author can observe and redescribe reality, is immediately linked to the device of *ostranenie*. Boris Uspensky's definition of the interior and exterior points becomes important here. Uspensky writes: "The external point of view, as a compositional device, draws its significance from its affiliation with the problem of ostranenie or estrangement. The essence of the phenomenon resides primarily in the use of a new or estranged view point on a familiar thing . . ."[12]

The thing is "made strange" by looking at it from the outside. The object of everyday life becomes an object of aesthetic interest because an author looks at it. The distinction between inside and outside is a necessary precondition for "making a thing strange" through the device of *ostranenie*.

For Tarkovsky, however, dream is not simply everyday life that is made strange. The "logic of dream" is not anti-logic that an author has brought forward by "making strange" what he still recognizes clearly as "logical thinking," as a thinking that is proper to him and that is embedded into an intellectual framework of an authorial discourse. We should refer here for a moment to Freud and mention that Freud already rejected the view that the interior and exterior spheres of a dream could be linked, all by remaining clearly distinguished entities through direct interrelationships. It is the more interesting that Freud rejects this idea by making a case against Lipps. In *The Interpretation of Dreams* Freud declares that a convincing explanation for the fact why one dream motive has been selected by the dreamer rather than another one, could not be provided on the grounds of a redescription of exterior stimulations and their possible effects on the interior sphere of the dream. Freud quotes from Lipps's *Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens* to show the limited character of Lipps's (together with Wund's and Strümpell's) theory because what they do not consider is that the exterior stimulations themselves effectuate "oft genug bei ihrer reproduktiven Wirksamkeit" a "sonderbare Auswahl," a choice that is due already to the intrinsic logic of the dream itself. Freud writes: "Die Lehre von Strümpell und Wundt ist aber unfähig, irgend ein Motivanzugeben, welches die Beziehung zwischen dem äußeren Reiz und der zu seiner Deutung gewählten Traumvorstellung regelt, also die sonderbare Auswahl zu erklären, welche die Reize oft genug bei ihrer reproduktiven Wirksamkeit treffen" (Lipps, *Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens*, 170).[13]

Freud's interest in dreams derives, very generally speaking, from his conviction that the lack of logic and coherence that we observe in dreams should not be dismissed as a failure of intellectual achievements but that it contains its own form of intelligence which needs to be analyzed and understood (cf. 38ff). Tarkovsky also thinks (though, in principal, being as far away from psychoanalysis as possible) that the strangeness of the dream should not be measured by means of a logic that is different from the logic of the dream itself.

Another thinker who comes to mind here, when reflecting on forms of human imagination that can dispense with a centered, authorial position, is certainly Bakhtin; and indeed, Bakhtin's ideas about the non-distinction of interior and exterior points of view are very relevant in this context. This becomes particularly clear in a lecture that Bakhtin gave in the 1920s on the history of Russian literature (that has been noted by R. M. Mirkina) where Bakhtin alludes to the way that, in his opinion, Dostoevsky would produce dreamlike narrations (though he later rectified some of these points in his Dostoevsky book). Still, in the notes of Mirkina we can read: "The world of our fantasizing, when we think of ourselves, is quite distinctive: we are in the role of both author and hero, the one controlling the other we accompany the hero all the time, his inner experiences captivate and absorb us. We do not contemplate

the hero, we co-experience with him. Dostoevsky involves us into the world of the hero, and we do not see the hero from outside." And further on:

> That is why Dostoevsky's heroes on stage produce an entirely different impression from the one they produce when we are reading. It is in principle impossible to represent the specificity of Dostoevsky's world on stage . . . There is no independent and neutral place for us; an objective seeing of the hero is impossible. That is why the footlights destroy a proper apprehension of Dostoevsky's works. Their theoretical effect is—a dark stage with voices, and nothing more.[14]

It is interesting that Bakhtin sees the dreamlike fusion of several different points of view especially as an alternative to traditional narrative forms that are derived from the technique of "staging." Bakhtin accepted certain formalist anti-theatrical tendencies leading to reflections on *ostranenie*, but he did not develop these ideas into the direction of avant-garde experimentalism; rather prematurely, his initial idea was to develop them into the direction of Tarkovsky's "logic of the dream."

Tarkovsky's principle of "making things strange" is the most radical and therewith the most profound one. Tarkovsky designs a new concept of time that overcomes the "direct" forms of representation (for example those of realism and impressionism) and he also overcomes the "logic of traditional drama" (*Sculpting*, 20). What is remarkable, however, is that his solution is not the "modern," abstract time of Formalists. Tarkovsky's *ostranenie* is the *ostranenie* of the "absolutely strange." It is a new aesthetic quality, which has not simply turned over the logic of "real" everyday life by converting it into an "unreal," *verfremdete* world. Tarkovsky's expressions neither represent the "real" nor do they symbolize the "unreal." They remain in the domain of the "improbable" between symbolization, representation and *verfremdete* expressions and this is what gives them their "strange" character. Through this "device" Tarkovsky overcomes cinematic metaphorism and symbolism. The problem of "symbolism" and "metaphorism" has to be seen in the context of this strategy. The "zone" in Tarkovsky's Stalker does not "symbolize anything, any more than anything else does in my films; the zone is a zone, it's life, and as he makes his way across it man may break down or may come through" (*Stalker*, 200). However, the "zone" remains strange just because it claims, in such a tautological way, the absolutely self-sufficient state of being only what it is. The metonymical tendency of showing the detail only for the detail's sake that has so often been praised as an effective device of overcoming cinematic symbolism[15] is also used by Tarkovsky. However, we might say that with him it has permeated deeper levels of cinematic philosophy. One cannot insist enough that the "logic of dreams" is, like *ostranenie* in formalist film theory, a matter of time. This means that dream is not simply a matter of "form" in a rhetorical sense, as it has once been claimed by Roland Barthes by writing that "it is even probable that there exists a single rhetorical form, common, for example, to the dream . . ."[16] In Tarkovsky's films the "unexpected combinations" of real elements have their dreamlike effect not because they follow a certain characteristic, formal, rhetoric, but because they take place in the time of dream.

One can ask: what is the form or the structure of this time? It is better to say that this concept of time possesses a basically non-structural quality. The time of the dream is produced through experiences, which come to us through memory: this means in the first place that they come to us as experiences which have no temporal structure. We might remember a certain day in our life but, as Tarkovsky asks, "how did this day imprint itself on our memory?" he concludes that they come to us "as something amorphous, vague, with no skeleton or schema. Like a cloud" (*Sculpting*, 23). The vagueness of this kind of memories is a timely vagueness; they lack a "skeleton" in the form of an abstract temporal structure. Tarkovsky wants to grasp these "memories" by using the expression of dream. (One should mention that also for Freud the "forgetfulness" about time and its illogical distortion like confusion of years, time of the day, etc. was one of the main characteristics of dreams.) In films, "dream" is a matter of time but for Tarkovsky this does not imply to make a given piece of reality strange by shifting it from one timely level to another. This concept of dream existed in Formalism and it was understood as an *ostranenie*, which stylizes "normal" time into the "non-normal" time of dreams. "Stylization" has here a very limited character. The Formalist theoretician A. Piotrovsky, for example, writes about this kind of Stylization: "It is possible to produce a shift of normal time relations, motivated by a 'dream' or by 'intoxication,' but these stylized features . . . are always necessarily perceived as artificial and not organically cinematic, they soon become irritating."[17] Piotrovsky makes an interesting point concerning the importance of "organicalness" in Formalist film theory (an idea that can be traced also in modernist art). Formalism freely juxtaposed "raw material" up to a point that, being confronted with the result of *ostranenie* and montage, we are unable to perceive, as Eisenstein declared, a "feelable" rhythm. However, it seems that for Formalists there still remains a quality of timely "organicalness" that they are anxiously trying to perceive even in the most *verfremdete* kinds of films. A restricted logic of cinematic time reveals here also the limits of the concept of *ostranenie* as it has been used by the Formalists. This is the reason why Piotrovski finds that the "time of dream" that is produced through a dreamlike stylization on the time level of a film can soon become "irritating" for the spectator. This irritation is, clearly, a matter of feeling or *Einfühlung* into the logical organism of different time levels in film. Formalist film (in spite of its theoretical elaborations of the principle of contrast and juxtaposition) still clings to an organic concept of time that is based on the clear definition of ("normal") temporal levels and their respective deviations. Tarkovsky's innovation consists in a deconstruction of even this concept.

In the dialogue that Tarkovsky has recorded, the "logic of the character's movements," and "the feeling" do not exist in regard to an organic whole; the rhythm that Tarkovsky perceives so clearly in these dialogues does not exist in regard to any "normal" or "non-normal" time. It exists as such, all alone, creating its own rhythm and "feeling." In this sense Tarkovsky claims that "rhythm" as a temporal quality has not been produced through montage but that it is a kind of rhythm of non-rhythm that produces an original quality of cinematic time: "Rhythm, then, is not the metrical sequence of pieces; what

makes it is the time-thrust within frames. And I am convinced that it is rhythm, and not editing, as people tend to think, that is the main formative element of cinema" (*Sculpting*, 119).

It remains to say that the Formalist approach to the "strange" has survived up to modern semiotics' ambitions to undertake a systematical research into the "fantastical." Still Yuri Lotman, as a theoretician who depends, when it comes to the explanation of aesthetic phenomena, to a great extent on the concept of *ostranenie*, sees the "fantastical" as a case of "redistribution of the system" of the real world by means of unexpected combinations. For Lotman the semiotic web of the expression of the strange possesses a higher degree of complexity which provides us with the experience of the strange as the one of the "unexpected," representing like this a "transgression of a norm of convention."[18] However, Lotman is also tempted by the deeper insight of Todorov who depicts the fantastical as an intermediary between the logic of the real world and the non-logic of the supra-natural. So, also Lotman points to the timely character of the fantastical which for Todorov takes place within a "temporal space of undecidedness" between the logical language of the real world and its counterpart, the irrational. This means that within this temporal space is written the new logic of the fantastical.

Poetics of Dream

I have shown that the phenomenon of "dream" is not reached in its depth as long as it is only seen as an *ostranenie* of non-dreamed reality. It is well known that in twentieth century theory the definition of "poetic language" as opposed to a "non-poetic language" created enormous difficulties; it goes without saying that the definition of a "poetics of dreams" as a deviation from non-dreamlike expressions is even more problematical. Gérard Genette pointed once to the complexity (and insolvability) of this task when writing about the aesthetically self-sufficient state that we are confronted with when we encounter the phenomenon of dream and its particular strangeness: "Du langage poétique . . . , qu'il vaudrait peut-être mieux nommer le langage à l'état poétique, ou l'état poétique du langage, on dira sans trop forcer la métaphore, qu'il est le langage à l'état de rêve, et l'on sait bien que le rêve par rapport à la veille n'est pas un écart, mais au contraire . . . mais comment dire ce qu'est un écart?"[19] The dream creates its own laws which belong fully to the domain of neither man's conscious—nor his unconsciousness. They belong neither to reality nor to what man might call the sphere *verfremdete*, irrational non-logic. Strictly speaking, dream is not even "strange." Bergson has said that "c'est la veille, bien plus que le rêve, qui réclame une explication."[20] Compared to the chaotic everyday life of the waking, dreams are not strange but rather clear and candid; they are like the water that Tarkovsky, in his films, uses incessantly which reminds us some thoughts of Gaston Bachelard who is not at all the wrong person to quote here. Bachelard found that "les miroirs sont des objets trop civilisés, trop maniables, trop géométriques; ils sont avec trop d'évidence des outils de rêve pour

s'adapter d'eux-mêmes à la vie onirique."[21] This is why Bachelard finds that we need the even stranger reflection of the water. The mirror's reflection of our own face evokes, just because of its scientific clearness, our irritated skepticism and makes us disinclined to accept the mirror image as "real." However, it is remarkable how much more we are inclined to accept our face's image when it is reflected by water. Having been made "strange," our face appears suddenly less strange and we are ready to accept it as a representation of reality itself. In this sense, the reflection of water as a mirror without a tain, makes, like the dream, reality less strange by making it stranger. "The dream" is, as said Maurice Pinguet, "source of all lies," but dreamers like writers "feel guilty only of the lies of the others because their own lies have the innocence of a game."[22]

In this sense, Tarkovsky's use of water as an artistic device, which helps to transform reality into dream, appears also in accordance with the dream's concept of time. The liquid element expresses the flow of time, which becomes a dream itself. Also Bachelard writes that "the being given to water is a being in vertigo. It dies every minute" (op. cit., 9). We have seen that dream is unthinkable without its intimate time; dream is a temporal phenomenon. When Bachelard says, "one sees with aesthetic passion only those landscapes that one has first seen in dream," (6) this means that we can experience these landscapes now, after we have seen them in a dream, also as temporal phenomena. From the strangeness that is produced through the experience of dreams arises an aesthetic passion. Bachelard's idea about dreamed landscapes (which reads like a comment of Tarkovsky's work!) provides a decisive moment for cinematic aesthetics. Dreams tell us a landscape "in time"—and so does film. Bachelard's philosophy which recognizes only "earth, air, water and fire" as elements of imaginary experience, has once been opposed by Todorov to the structuralist "structure" which would reduce itself to "a disposition in space."[23]

Completely opposed to what the metaphysical tradition once thought, "time" is the element which imagination needs in order to leave the domain of the abstract! It finds this element in the sphere of dream. For Tarkovsky, the "logic of the dream" means that every scene produces its own temporal laws, its own time or, as he calls it, its own "time truth" (*Sculpting*, 120). A timely rhythm is not produced through a scene's logical relationship with other scenes. The temporal laws of the scene are absolutely "true" in the sense that they are absolutely "necessary" in regard to the material itself. Tarkovsky says that the artistic expression "has to come from inner necessity, from an organic process going on in the material as a whole" (ibid.). The organic whole of the material from which this necessity arises and which Tarkovsky puts forward in his argument is not the abstract, structural, organism of a film that has been produced by montage. It is an organic whole formed by artistic necessity, an "inner necessity" (121), which arises out of the "inner dynamic of the mood of the situation" (74). For Tarkovsky there is no "free" combination of raw material like in Formalism, whose *ostranenie* is, as we have seen, free and unfree at the same time because, in spite of its freedom in regard to any contents, it still follows the structural rules of an abstract organism. Being based on such a structural, abstract organicalness but lacking the inner timely organicalness,

cinematic action becomes unnatural. In this sense Tarkovsky finds that Eisenstein's combination of sconces in *Alexander Nevski* produces a formally perfect, abstract, quality of cinematic time. However, he thinks that "what is happening on the screen is sluggish and unnatural. This is because no time-truth exists in the separate frames" (120).

"Dreams" as phenomena of cinematic time arise out of this "inner," "temporal" necessity since any "time pressure must not be gained casually" (ibid.). Distortions of time as they appear in the cinematic dream must try to mold time according to this necessity; they should not be introduced as "technical" time shifts destined to underline, for example, the plot of a story. In this sense dreams are a matter of "sculpting in time." The belief that a director can make, "like a sculptor," from a "lump of time . . . an enormous, solid cluster of living facts" (63) lets Tarkovsky join the group of creators who have striven to transform the liquid and permanently flowing element of time into the paste-like material of dreams. Bachelard has much meditated upon a special kind of human creativity, which is nourished by the conviction that "dream" must be a kind of "paste." Bachelard writes: "Les objets du rêve mésomorphe prennent que difficilement leur force, et puis ils la perdent, ils s'affaissent comme une pâte. A l'objet gluant, mou, paresseux, phosphorescent parfois—et non lumineux—correspond croyons-nous, la densité ontologique la plus forte de la vie onirique. Ces rêves qui sont des rêves de pâte."[24] The organicalness of the paste is not represented by a stable and abstract structure. The paste is through and through concrete, in the same way that the "paste of dreams" has no abstract temporal frame: it is through and through time and also through and through real.

What is true for Tarkovsky's conception of time applies to his entire cinematic language. As we have seen already, Tarkovsky's strongly metonymical tendency, his use of close-ups of details and *pars pro toto* create neither signs nor symbols but only "reality." The (semantic-artistic) relevance of his shots does not flow out of its relationship with a larger semiotic web as do the shots of Eisenstein.[25] Nor do they symbolize or represent reality. They simply are the objects and are reality. The deconstruction of the process of presentation in Tarkovsky functions only because Tarkovsky's anti-symbolist and anti-realist concepts of the shot are accompanied by a theory of time that functions accordingly. Were his detailed shots that insist so much on their non-symbolical quality not supplemented by a parallel theory of time, Tarkovsky would have remained there where the Formalists had arrived: at a cinema of signs that are held together through the abstracting work of montage.

Cinema de la Cruauté

Tarkovsky's cinema relies on the principle that every scene can produce its own time. The "dream" is one of the means of carrying out this project. Being convinced that "sometimes the utterly unreal comes to express reality itself" (152), Tarkovsky designs an aesthetic of "making things strange" that develops and at the same time overcomes the principle of *ostranenie*. We could say that it

accomplishes Formalism in a way similar to that in which so-called post-structuralism accomplishes structuralism. The time of the dream communicates reality as something "unreal" which affects us nevertheless at least as harshly as could reality itself. Formalists, on the other hand, thought of dreamlike reproduction of reality as a reality that is "softened" and stylized into an image, which is vague and obscure. However, for Tarkovsky the reality that pervades the time of the dream speaks to us in a clear language. Its linguistic rules are even so clear and logical that they produce pictures of "cruelty." It is in cruelty especially that time gains the absolutely self-sufficient state that it usually has in dreams. In this context Tarkovsky refers to two scenes that appear to him model scenes for cinematic expression. The first one reads as follows:

> A group of soldiers is being shot for treason in front of the ranks. They are waiting among the puddles by a hospital wall. It's autumn. They are ordered to take off their coats and boots. One of them spends a long time walking about among the puddles, in his socks which are full of holes, looking for a dry place to put down the coat and boots which a minute later he will no longer need (26).

This scene is expressive because its action follows the impulses of a strong inner necessity. The necessity we feel here is not one created by a plot, nor has it anything to do with the montage of elements. Action seems here to create its own rules; no "exterior" power to dictate how the scene "must" be can be perceived. There is, in this scene, "fatality" or "irony of destiny" and this is why it appears to us as cruel. We can make the same observations (even more clearly) in the second scene:

> A man is run over by a tram and has his leg cut off. They prop him up against the wall of a house and he sits there, under the shameless gaze of a gaping crowd, and waits for the ambulance to arrive. Suddenly he can't bear it any longer, takes a handkerchief out of his pocket and lays it over the stump of his leg (ibid.).

Also here, what Tarkovsky terms the "absurdity of the 'mise en scene'" catches our imagination (24). However, it is pushed into a particular direction. Because of the utmost expressivity of the scene we could "sympathize" with the victim; but this makes the scene even crueler. Cruelty reposes here in the fact that we watch the scene as cold-blooded observers, as a scene—and not as a tragic event. The event becomes cruel because it has been turned into a scene. This means also that it is produced through the scene and not transferred from reality to the scene.

Since "in reality" the scene is tragico-dramatic, a dramatic staging would attempt to reproduce, within the scene, a certain amount of this tragic expression. It is also clear that here too much cruelty would be irritating. Tarkovsky's scene, however, functions through a paradox: the scene only evokes cruelty because it is freed from tragic expression through the director's cool observance. In Tarkovsky's films the motive of cruelty occurs often and, (especially in regard to Andrei Ryublev) has brought him the charge of being too naturalist; however,

as he says, there is never any "aesthetization for its own sake" (184). Tarkovsky's cruelty manifests itself especially at moments when he tries to purify the scenes of both tragic and symbolic elements, when he tries to let actions speak through an unpathetic realism. The peasant in Andrei Ryublev "who has made himself a pair of wings, climbs up on to the cathedral, jumps, and crashes on the ground" (79). Immediately Tarkovsky's "straightforward and basic" realism becomes cruel: "The scene had to show an ordinary, dirty peasant, then his fall, his crash, his death. This is a concrete happening" (80). We find this scene cruel, especially in Tarkovsky's realistic way of describing it. It is cruel because of what we see happening in the scene; also, we find it cruel because it is a *scene* (Tarkovsky's rhetoric helps reduce it to that). Cruelty is not produced through montage, nor does some other artistic device push us towards an *einfühlende* reexperiencing of what the director would imagine to be cruel. Tarkovsky's scene is a "concrete happening" in the sense that it is a "unique happening" (ibid.): and its expressive cruelty arises out of this hermetic state.

Some more considerations should be raised concerning the "point of view." The point from which the action is watched in the scenes mentioned is restricted to the experience of the agent. However, all associations are, as Tarkovsky insists, "perfectly familiar to us" (ibid.). There is only the "concrete" and "real" time of the scene since Tarkovsky wanted to answer the questions: "What would this man have seen or felt as he flew for the first time? . . . The most he could have known was the unexpected, terrifying fact of falling" (ibid.). We can only observe, but though we watch the event through this remarkably cool and unaffected distance, we are not "outside" the scene. Or, vice versa, we observe the scene from the "inside" without being affected in any way by the strategy of *Einfühlung*. The terms subjectivism or realism are both out of place. Cruelty is produced through the strangeness that we feel when we are "inside" an action by observing it at the same time from the outside. And this kind of cruelty is an effect produced by the logic of the dreams.

At this stage of our examination of the aesthetic value of cruelty, we almost inevitably turn to the thoughts of Antonin Artaud. In his well-known work *Le Théâtre et son double* Artaud suggests a "theater where violent physical images will hypnotize the spectator's sensitiveness,"[26] and whose idea of cruelty, once pushed to an extreme, will lead to a complete renewal of theatrical culture. In the first place, Artaud's "*Théâtre de la cruauté*" is supposed to produce a theatrical reality "in which one can believe." The central "representational" models for such a kind of reality are supposed to be cruelty and the dream. Certainly, in Artaud we are confronted with the problem of "representation" in a highly philosophical way. Derrida has postulated that Artaud's theater intends to transfer theatrical expression to a state where it has overcome all attempts to represent certain objects, life or the world. Derrida writes: "The theater of cruelty is not a representation. It is life itself, in the extent to which life is non-representable. Life is the non-representable origin of representation."[27]

We have seen that Tarkovsky's idea of cinema as an "immediate art form" which needs "no mediating language" (*Sculpting*, 176) is that of cruelty which is life, without trying to represent it. Artaud also declares in his first manifesto of

Le Théâtre et son double that he does not want to abolish "articulated speech" in theater (112) but that he intends to give words a new kind of "importance." This new kind of "importance," as he explains, is the one that words have in dreams: "Le théâtre ne pourra redevenir lui-même . . . qu'en fournissant au spectateur des précipites véridiques de rêves" (109). Both Tarkovsky and Artaud refer to an aesthetic means of expression that they call "dream." Dream is the artistic phenomenon within which (as Tarkovsky says about Bresson) all expressiveness of the image has been eliminated and where only "life itself" remains expressive. Artaud also asks the public to believe "in dreams on the condition that he really takes them for dreams and not for a copy of reality" (103). In this sense dreams are not an imprint of reality but an "imprint of terror and cruelty" (Artaud, ibid.).

Both Tarkovsky's and Artaud's aim is to produce a "non-perverted pantomime" where, as Artaud puts it, "gestures, instead of representing words . . . represent ideas, attitudes of spirit, aspects of nature" (48). This quotation shows that the gestures of aesthetic expression (for example, of actors) are to be seen as non-gestures which exist only in dreams; this means that they cannot be recognized as gestures from a point of view outside dream.

Artaud evokes other, stranger, parallels to characterize the particular, dreamlike quality that gestures can have in theater. One of these energies, which, like his non-representing gestures, function as intermediaries between dreams and waking, is the plague, "la peste." The plague, so Artaud says, "prend des images qui dorment . . . et les pousse tout a coup jusqu'aux gestes extrêmes; et le théâtre lui aussi prend les gestes et les pousse à bout" (34). Artaud's imagery is strange in the same way that it is cruel: the plague, which is not representative of something existent (in concrete life), creates images from an unordered, sleepy stock of "dream images" (109) by making them more extreme. The parallel with Tarkovsky is amazing, as we see in another of Tarkovsky's suggestions of what he considers to be a model scene. Being particularly fascinated by a scene from Buñuel's *Nazarin* in which "the plague" seems to have arisen out of "nowhere" or to have been produced by dreamlike imagery, Tarkovsky describes how, in the end, the plague should not be seen as a symbol but that it appears more with the harshness of a "medical fact." This is how Tarkovsky describes the scene:

> The street is completely empty. Along the middle of the road, from the depth of the frame, a child is walking straight towards the camera, dragging behind him a white—brilliantly white—sheet. The camera slowly pans. And at the very last moment, just before cutting to the next shot the field of the frame is suddenly covered over, again with a white cloth, which gleams in the sunlight. One wonders where it can have come from. Could it be a sheet drying on a line? And then, with astonishing intensity, you feel "the breath of the plague," captured in this extraordinary manner, like a medical fact (73).

The dreamlike realism of Tarkovsky (which is so closely linked to what was called in the sixties the Russian "documentary aesthetics," turns cinematic reality into "medical facts. For Tarkovsky it is based (as for Artaud) on a concept of artistic stylization that creates expressions with "inner necessity," and

this becomes obvious in regard to the scene quoted. As we have seen, Tarkovsky's "logic of the dream," that is produced through a "distortion of time" (121), is based on an artistic knowledge of "the material as a whole." "Inner necessity" means here giving the artistic expression the same degree of necessity that it usually has in reality. From this comes the idea of speaking of the plague as a "medical fact," arising from scientific necessity. Also for Artaud, the shift from reality to art takes place through a "profound stylization coming from a profound understanding of elements, of necessity" (303). He thinks "when I live I don't feel that I am living. But when I play, this is when I feel that I exist. What could prevent me from believing in the dream of theater when I believe in the dream of reality?" (181)

Here also, to be "necessary" means to be part of a reality within which manifestations of dream and "medical facts" cannot be distinguished. Tarkovsky expresses the same idea when writing that for him Chaplin "doesn't play. He lives those idiotic situations, is an organic part of it" (151). The non-distinction of facts and dreams finally is obtained through the device of "making things strange" and may remind us of a thought by Bergson, who made an interesting observation in an essay on the déjà-vu ("fausse reconnaissance"). A déjà-vu takes place when we believe we "remember" certain events that happen in the present, by thinking that we have gone through them already in the past. First of all, Bergson here sees a connection with dreams, saying that this illusion is followed "by a kind of unanalysable feeling the reality would be a dream."[28] Bergson then points to the fact that "people who are subject to the déjà-vu do often find a familiar word strange" (158). Bergson has in mind the experience we all are familiar with, when a familiar word becomes strange when we repeat it to ourselves an infinite number of times. The interesting question is to define in which way the word has become "strange" by means of this endless repetition. In fact, the word itself has not been changed; it keeps its orthography as well as its pronunciation. Still, after having been repeated so often, the word has adopted a strange character.

It is clear that, through a particular kind of "defamiliarization," the word has ceased to be a word, and, so I would claim, become a fact. It is finally, only what it is, only a fact without any symbolical (semantic) meaning. And only through this "factness" has it become so strange. Bergson also likens this phenomenon, as Tarkovsky would probably also have done, to those experiences that we usually have in dreams. Derrida has recognized the character of "inner necessity" that Artaud attributes to aesthetic dreams, i.e., dreams which play their game within an "espace clos" and which, in the end, play nothing but themselves. These dreams can even play their game of being to the point where they become real and, necessarily, cruel. Derrida writes: "For the theater of cruelty is indeed a theater of dreams, but of cruel dreams, that is to say, absolutely necessary and determined dreams, dreams calculated and given direction, as opposed to what Artaud believed to be empirical disorder of spontaneous dreams" (Derrida, 355; 242). It is the absolute strangeness of the dream, of the dream which, finally, claims to be real; all this is simply cruel.

Very obviously, we have here moved away from the concept of *ostranenie* as a simple device of making things strange. The strangeness of the dream follows its own rules, has its own necessity and is, as a consequence, not strange at all. It is, as a kind of new reality, only cruel. Consequently, Derrida is perfectly right when concluding that the theater of cruelty is against any form of theater of *ostranenie* ("foreign . . . to all theater of alienation," 359). Derrida's intention of reflecting Artaud's concepts of the dream against one of the most fundamental ideas of Russian Formalism testifies to his shrewdness. We need to agree that it is not more than true that dream is opposed to *ostranenie*. However, we should (in a more constructive way) consider quite attentively the fact that Tarkovsky's and Artaud's dreams do show us how to rethink and to extend the concept of *ostranenie* itself.

"Logic of the dream" and "theater of cruelty" settle down within a space of absolute *ostranenie* within which the "effet de distanciation" (French for "*Verfremdungeffekt*") produces a distance (of observation). However, this distance does not at all make "spirit . . . distinct of force" (Derrida, ibid.), as Derrida reproaches the conventional theater of *ostranenie* (of "distanciation"). In Tarkovsky the observing distance of the spectator projects the spectator (in a paradoxical way) right inside the time of the film; in the same way for Artaud the spectator resides "au milieu tandis que le spectacle l'entoure" (Artaud, 98). When Derrida writes that the *Verfremdungseffekt* has so far remained "prisoner of a classical paradox" (ibid.) of European art, we can state that Tarkovsky and Artaud have twisted the *Verfremdungseffekt* out of this prison.

Notes

1. *Einfühlung* has a strange and tortuous history covering the entire nineteenth century. It appeared with Herder and Novalis, and developed through the psychologist Theodor Lipps into a process of "identification" objectifying the subject. Because of the directness and "avoidance" of rationality within the process of understanding, *Einfühlung* could, at some point, "turn abstract" and lay the foundation for positivism. The fight between anti-subjectivists on the one hand, and subjectivists believing in the importance of *Einfühlung* on the other, foreshadows the rise of "logical positivism" which was later going to dominate part of the German scene.

2. Sergei Eisenstein, *Writings 1* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1988), 175.

3. "Portret Doriana Greiia, Iz istorii kino: Dokumenty i materialy," [1965] 22, quoted from Viacheslav Ivanov, "The Category of Time in Twentieth-Century Art and Culture" in *Semiotica* 8:2, 1973, 30.

4. Viktor Shklovsky, "Art as Device" in Lemon, L. and Reis, M. eds., *Russian Formalist Criticism: Four Essays* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 7.

5. Kazansky in Herbert Eagle ed., *Russian Formalist Film Theory* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1981), 108.

6. Viacheslav Ivanov, *Einführung in die allgemeine Semiotik* (Tübingen: Narr, 1985), 300.

7. Andrei Tarkovsky, *Sculpting in Time* (London: The Bodley Head, 1986), 192.

8. "Film and Painting" in Marina Tarkovakaja, *About Tarkovsky* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990), 145.

9. Jacques Derrida, *De la Grammatologie* (Paris: Minuit, 1967), 166.

10. Johann Georg Hamann, *Schriften* (Leipzig: Insel, 1921), 371.

11. *L'Energie spirituelle* (Paris: Alcan, 1922), 136.

12. Boris Uspensky, *A Poetics of Composition* (Berkley: University of California Press, 1973), 131.

13. Sigmund Freud, *Die Traumdeutung* (Wien: Deuticke, 1945), 154.

14. Mikhail Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990), 236 note 49.

15. See Ivanov, 1985, 291.

16. "The Rhetoric of the Image" in Roland Barthes, *The Responsibility of Forms.* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986), 38.

17. "Toward a Theory of Cine-Genres," in Eagle, 137.

18. Yuri Lotman, *Universe of the Mind* (London and New York: Tauris, 1970), 146ff.

19. Gérard Genette, *Figures* 11 (Paris: Seuil, 1969), 152.

20. *L'Energie spirituelle* (Paris: Alcan, 1922), 157.

21. Gaston Bachelard, *L'Eau et les rêves* (Paris: Corti, 1942), 32.

22. Maurice Pinguet, "L'Ecriture de rêve dans un comet à dés" in *Revue des lettres modernes* Nr. 336-339, 1973, 50.

23. Tvetan Todorov, *Introduction à la littérature fantastique* (Paris: Le Seuil, 1970), 22.

24. *L'Eau et les rêves*, 144.

25. Cf. Ivanov 1985, 304.

26. Antonin Artaud, *Le Théâtre et son double* (Œuvres compl. IV). (Paris: Gallimard, 1964), 99.

27. *De la Grammatologie*, 343; 234.

28. *L'Energie spirituelle*, 157.

Chapter Two

Space and Dream: Heidegger's, Tarkovsky's, and Caspar David Friedrich's Landscapes

Heidegger

In his essay on Hölderlin's poem "Poetically is Dwelling Man" (". . . dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . .")[1] Heidegger writes that any poetic dwelling on earth would be determined by dreaming and not by action. Instead of acting, poets would dream ("statt zu wirken, träumen sie"). Dwelling (wohnen) takes place between earth and sky but it does not consist of a realistic measuring of the space that extends itself between both. For Heidegger a dreamlike moment enters into the process of perception of the space between earth and sky, and this moment of dream transforms perception into a "dwelling."

Is it possible to say that Heidegger's space which is not "measured" is a "dreamt space"? In that case we would first need to specify the quality of this dream. The dream of the space between earth and sky is the dream of "something," meaning of a quantity that is known before it is dreamt. This is important and flows out of Heidegger's suggestion that the "dreamers of space" are poets. "Dreamlike desires" are not helpful to the poet since his aim is not simply to "dream" a world that is the world of his desires. He rather wants to see the "real" world in a dreamlike way: and only in this way can his seeing become a dwelling. The "non-poetic" or "non-creative" dreamer who only dreams what he intimately "wants" to dream, on the other hand, creates a picturesque "world of his dreams" or perhaps an idyll. He will never dream (create) a world that is limited by earth and by sky. Heidegger is aware of the negative side of "dream-worlds" when making—in a Nietzschean way—a derogatory remark about the

"idyllic use" of poetry by modern, so-called "cultured" people. The same things are true for their use of space.

Real cultural space must be composed ("gedichted") or also "dreamt." In the essay "The Thing,"[2] Heidegger explains that space should be seen as a "world" or as a "Geviert," that is as a self-sufficient entity which is neither explainable nor foundable on anything but itself (172ff). The parallel existing between the aforementioned idea of a "cultural space" and dreams is maintained here. The world is a dream world founded on nothing but itself, meaning that this world is not even founded on desires. The "world" that extends itself between earth and sky is an "aesthetic dream" by definition.

If we consider this thought further, we see that it actually corresponds with a certain idea of "dreamlike space." It is only through a "poetic dreaming" that man is able to "outwit himself" and to abandon, at least for a while, the measuring regard which he normally considers as his typically human, "inborn" capacity; this regard clings to his subjective as well as to his objective ways of "seeing the world." Only the poet and the dreamer (this means the real dreamer and not the Freudian *Wunschträumer*) live beyond both subjectivism and objectivism and for this reason they can accept as completely normal those things which appear strange to others. The poet and the dreamer do not try to "correct" the space within which they see things according to certain subjective or objective criteria. Their perception surpasses the "all too human" ways of seeing the world, be it the objective or the subjective one. The self-sufficient world that is to be perceived, this space between earth and sky, even at moments when it appears as extremely strange, is accepted as normal. It is not the poet but the scientist with his measuring eye who "alienates" or "estranges" the world by utterly believing that—of course—he would only "normalize" it. In this way the scientifically measured space is estranged. The self-sufficient world of the "Geviert," however, as long as it is really dreamt, is neither strange nor "normal" but only "what it is." And this is the way in which the dreaming poet perceives it. Heidegger also analyzes the role of "strangeness" ("das Fremde") within his philosophical reflections on the phenomenon of space deployed in his essay on Hölderlin. Here he becomes poetical himself: "Das dichtende Sagen der Bilder versammelt Helle und Hall der Himmelsrichtungen in Eines mit dem Dunkel und dem Schweigen des Fremden. Durch solche Anblicke befremdet der Gott. In der Befremdung bekundet er seine unablässige Nähe" (". . . dichterisch . . ." 195). We note that the *Be-fremdung* is caused here through a *Ver-fremdung*, this means through what we might call a modern alienation effect, because it is not even felt as *fremd* (strange). On the contrary, it is through the effect of strangeness that things are felt as being "close" (nah).

I will try to describe more concretely what the space between earth and sky most probably looks like. Of course, the event that "takes place" between earth and sky that Heidegger must have thought of is the landscape. The landscape is not only made of earth (though a scientist—a geologist—could, of course, say the contrary). For Heidegger it is the poetic, aesthetic landscape that is an event, taking place between earth and sky. How particular the status of landscape is in aesthetics, we understand if we remember that Hegel established in his *Ästhetik*

the idea of "beauty" as an intermediary state between a Rousseauist idyll and a state of generalized civilization ("Die Idee des Schönen"). An idea of self-sufficiency clings to the landscape. This emphasizes my point that the absolutely non-prejudiced state of being of the very space, which extends itself between earth and sky, can best be perceived through a certain dreamlike vision. Bachelard says that "with aesthetic passion we see only landscapes that we have first seen in dream."[3] The landscape is civilization but it does not need, as civilization does, a reason in order to be. It participates, as says Anne Cauquelin, "in nature's eternity, this means in that which has always been there before man, and which will still be there after him."[4] In this sense the landscape is a substance.

Chôra

What enters through Heidegger and through Cauquelin into the discussion on landscape is the problem of the *chôra*, of the place, this means of that non-reality born out of reflections on problems which are existent only in a spiritual world, this means in a world in which neither idyllism nor scientific measures can subsist. The landscape as an aesthetic phenomenon is a place, a *chôra*, for the simple reason that its character is more spiritual than positive. One can express the same thing by saying that the landscape is not an empty and closed space with eventual openings on each side,[5] that it is not a space within which we can perceive things, but that it is a thing itself. If all things are, as Heidegger says in his essay "Art and Space," places,[6] is then the landscape not one typical representative of the Heideggerian "thing"? Of course, we had already suspected this while thinking about the world and the "Geviert." The question now is how this thing can be perceived if the place (or the landscape) can neither be described by a subjective ("idyllic") observer, nor be told (through discourse), nor be conceptualized by means of philosophy.

Marc Ghitti says that places would be "played by thoughts."[7] This might point towards a solution. Not far from this, Bachelard has insisted on the difference between perceptions of abstract spaces and perceptions of "thingly matter." In particular, Bachelard points to the "advantage of a specialized *Einfühlung* (empathy), of an *Einfühlung* which fuses with matter rather than getting dispersed in a differentiated universe."[8] For Bachelard there is a way to avoid the perception of an abstract (realist or idealist) space in order to "feel" space as if it were a concrete matter. What is necessary is an aesthetic perception able to perceive space like a thing, like matter. This is a perception that can take place best in a dream. Space can become aesthetic through a dreamlike perception.

I have said that the landscape is perhaps not nature but like nature because it is self-sufficient. Nature is self-sufficient in the sense that it does not even need a dreamer (who creates a dream world) in order to exist; nature dreams itself. Likewise the difference between nature and civilization can be explained: civilization is dreamt by man, whereas nature is its own self-sufficient dream.

The landscape as an aesthetic problem needs to be considered on the grounds of this analysis of the phenomenon of dream.

Perhaps this can best be understood when comparing the landscape and the city. Often man likes to "idyllize" nature by making of it a "dreamy object" of his desires instead of dreaming it poetically. Civilization can undergo the same process. As matter of fact, it is not the "big city" which will become idyllic but the small village. The small city or the village can be man's dream in the simplest sense; the nostalgic, "subjective" human likes to go through "her" city like through a dream. The problem is that it is *her* dream and not the dream of the city itself. It is the dream that is caused by her personal desires and her childhood memories. Here any capacity to "dream" is accelerated through a division of the city into smaller sub-units. Then she dreams of her district, her quarter, her street. However, "dream" in the way it has been designed above should exclude all such elements of subjective reveries.

We understand this when we consider that the function of dreams is fundamentally different when concerning "big cities." One reason for this is that big cities are more like landscapes meaning that they seem to be dreaming themselves. Everybody agrees that no big city can be *our* dream, because everything that takes place in these "townscapes" is too unforeseeable, too surprising to have its root in our subjective desires. The city is a collective dream and this obliges us to be aware at any moment of an infinite number of unforeseeable coincidences. The city is no longer a personal "reverie" but it looks much more like a "real" dream, far removed from the *Wunschtraum* that is the idyll. Furthermore, the dream of the city can be watched and admired, making one thing especially clear: dreaming has the status of vision. Since the dream of the city does not flow out of our personal desires, the city is necessarily a dream that we perceive. And in this way the city becomes also a place for dwelling.

One has said that Heidegger's philosophy smells of earth and certain ideas concerning the earth-like character of his philosophy were sometimes pronounced along the lines of an ethical criticism. This criticism was "ethical" because one thought that any preference for the earth, especially for "one's earth" would imply a refusal of the city, meaning a refusal of the place of human social relations which, important as they are, should have a determining effect on the thinking of any philosopher. At times one has also liked to impute Heidegger, because of his distance towards the *social* component of human existence, an idyllic attitude towards human culture. However, whatever it was which led Heidegger into an obvious state of urbanophobia was not his love for the "earth" alone. Nothing can justify the argument that the smell of earth necessarily leads to idyllic reveries that overlap completely with those reveries dreamt particularly in small communities. The smell of earth can lead to the great dream of nature itself, an idea which I would like to explore with the help of another thinker.[3]

Tarkovsky

This "thinker" is Andrei Tarkovsky. A paradox clings to Tarkovsky that arouses my interest. In *Sculpting in Time* Tarkovsky says that one should refrain from deciphering his films by locating symbolisms or by seeing a film as an organization of signs. Instead one should "watch it as one watches the stars, or the sea, as one admires a landscape. There is no mathematical logic here, for it cannot explain what man is or what is the meaning of life."[9]

Tarkovsky points to the "landscape" as a conceptual means which serves—exactly like the *chôra*—to express that which is inconceptualizable since it does not contain the slightest trace of positivity. The paradox mentioned clinging to Tarkovsky consists of the fact that, on the one had, he puts forward the notion of landscape as a major aesthetic principle but that, on the other hand, there are extremely few landscapes to see in his films. If we say "landscapes" here, we mean "great views on landscapes" in the sense of self-conscious reproductions of nature's beauty. Tarkovsky does not film "great landscapes," nor does he film cities (apart from where they appear very briefly as symbols of disaster). If there are landscapes in his films these landscapes are not geometrical but "mental landscapes." They are the "zone" in *Stalker* which represents an "area" attached to no country and no precise time and even seems to "ignore straight lines" (Amengual). They are mental landscapes like "cosmic oceans" or a certain space station where people live, like in a *chôra*, through their own memories (or dreams).

These landscapes are anti-Euclidian "places" which are deducted from man's spiritual activity and not from existing reality. As says Emmanuel Carrère about *Nostalghia*, they are "known territories where even the difficulty to orient oneself, to distinguish up from down, outside from inside, to establish a scale which would say that the lake is bigger than a drop of water appears as familiar."[10] In this sense these landscapes are not products of civilization but *nature* which exists—like any nature—just for itself. And their existence appears as produced through the dream of their own being. The artist or the poet tries to recapture this nature. This does not mean that they try to dream this nature in the sense that they would try to invent it. Far from that, Tarkovsky's "landscapes" (or his films) have nothing of the "real," picturesque, idyllic, images of nature that would have been dreamt (wished) by a subject. They represent the play-like and "light" being that is proper to dreams, and which Tarkovsky classifies as "landscapes." They have their reason not in a human subject but only in themselves.

Ingmar Bergman says that all his films are dreams. Tarkovsky says that his films are landscapes. It is useless to reproach Bergman that in this film or that—which is a dream—one does not actually see dreams. If we cannot see dreams *in* the film, this is simply because the film itself is a dream. Similarly, if Tarkovsky's films are landscapes, how could we expect to find a "real" landscape in it? How could we expect to find a "Russian landscape" with dachas and picturesque peasants, as are common in so many Soviet films? As a matter of fact, we find Russian landscapes in "the earth scenes" of *Solaris*: a patriarchal

family, a horse and a dog, and we find similar things in those images of Russia that appear in *Nostalghia*. But they never have any idyllizing function because they are not constructed.

The idea of "construction" as opposed to a "dreamlike realism" can clarify many things in regard to Tarkovsky's position within aesthetic theory in this century. First of all it is important to underline that the "non-constructivist" component of Tarkovsky should be seen as one which testifies his modernism. "Flee all its picturesque constructions. The peasant does not dress in picturesque way but he is picturesque," a sentence not from Tarkovsky but from Adolf Loos, the Austrian architect and trailblazer of modernity. Simplicity, directness and clarity: it is by means of these principles that modern architecture tries to create new places. They are also the cinematographic principles of Tarkovsky, which sound like this: "Let the camera only seize that which is and do not construct anything."

I have inserted this remark by Loos because it too brings us closer to an understanding of the function of earth in Tarkovsky's films. One has said that for the equally earth-loving Dovzhenko (whom Tarkovsky wanted to resemble) the characters were growing out of the earth. This means that what is, is nature, and the simplicity of modern space is based on the idea that all objects are what they are, just as if they have been growing out of the earth. "Constructivism" represents an all too human subjectivist attitude that created not only scientifically measured spaces, but also idyllically constructed *chronotopes*.

I have said that Heidegger's philosophy smells of earth, as do Tarkovsky's films. A supplementary fact is that Tarkovsky is not interested in the sky which is for him totally empty: Clouds are preferably filmed as being reflected in puddles, and for Tarkovsky there is no link between earth and sky (cf. interview in *Positif* Oct. 69, 109). At least apparently, this would establish a distance between him and Heidegger's philosophy of the "Geviert." Above this it is the "Russian earth" with which Tarkovsky is in love, a preference that Heidegger—for matters of political correctness—would not have dared to express in regard to any "German earth." Concerning Tarkovsky, the question seems to arise of how an apparently "chauvinistic attitude" goes together with the modern spirit characterized above. It would be exaggeration to say that in Tarkovsky's films there would be a "cult of the earth." On the contrary, the earth is always seen by certain people whose attitude towards earth is more interesting than the earth itself. In other words, it is through people that the earth becomes spiritualized and for this reason it is difficult to decide whether Tarkovsky is anti-platonic (or anti-neoplatonic) or not. What is clear, however, is that any Platonic, scientific optimism in regard to a spirituality obtained through the intellect alone is abandoned. In Tarkovsky's films the matter or the mud is not seen (as in the neo-Platonic tradition) as an evil but it becomes spiritual itself at the moment human being, with all the subjective certitudes that are typical for her, ceases to be convinced by her own superiority. For this reason she decides to reunite herself with the mud.

By uniting herself with the earth, the human being cuts down her subjective being; she denies herself because any self, any body, exists only within empty

spaces. Within the dreamlike *chôra*, on the other hand, there are no bodies: "Man's relation to the place is established through the body up to the point that one no longer knows where the body ends and where the place begins," says Marc Ghitti (op. cit., 125). Tarkovsky, through his treatment of matter, appears not as Platonic but as Neo-Platonic in a way that would have pleased Plotinus. By reuniting the body of the hero with the mud, the "vision" of the hero ceases to be a vision in which a subject perceives an object. What has truly taken place is a union of subject and object in a really Plotinian sense.

Beyond this, with Tarkovsky the reunification with the mud has another dimension. Antoine de Baecque comments that many of the heroes in Tarkovsky's films (Rublev, the writer and the scientist in *Stalker*, Gorchakov in *Nostalghia*) renounce to the creation of their selves.[11] In *The Sacrifice* the hero destroys his house in an anti-idyllic gesture. The reunification with the creative mother earth undertaken by these creative persons is an act of humility. It signifies that they decide to stop any "subjective" (idealist) dreaming and that they are ready to dream nature as it really is (as it is dreaming itself). Here to "love the earth" is not at all an act of affirmation but of negation. In Nietzschean terms one could say that it is an affirmation of the will to power and at the same time an acceptance of the eternal return of the same. The earth is as divine as are Tarkovsky's female heroes. Their missions are clear and well defined but they are expressible neither through words nor through concepts. In general there is no "culte du vécu" in Tarkovsky's films, as has says Michel Chion.[12] The earth is not chosen as a space for an idyllic and stylized life that could, in the end, become the subject of "political cults"; rather man and earth are united within a single quantity that one could call dream or simply style.

Stylized spaces have not only three but many dimensions, because there is also a political, rhetorical dimension etc. Intimate space, on the other hand, has, as says Bachelard, "no dimensions," not even the usual three (*L'Air et les songes*, 17). "Space" functions here rather, as says Georges Perrec about the space of his room, like a "Proustian madeleine" which one can perceive best when "lying in bed," meaning when suffering from a reduced mobility. In Tarkovsky such a space is produced by letting it be perceived not by a proud, conceptual, subjective man convinced in his mathematical capacity or in his "stylizing" (Nietzsche would have said "decorative") power; but by a man whose Being is reduced to nature. Perrec writes about his body lying in bed: "Comme un mot ramené d'un rêve restitué, à peine écrit, tout un souvenir de ce rêve, ici, le seul fait de savoir (sans presque même avoir eu besoin de le chercher, simplement en s'étant étendu quelques instants en ayant fermé les yeux) que le mur était droite, la porte à côté de moi a gauche (en levant le bras, je pouvais toucher la poignée), la fenêtre en face, fait surgir, instantanément et pêle-mêle, un lot de détails dont la vivacité me laisse pantois. . . . C'est sans doute parce que l'espace de la chambre fonctionne chez moi comme un madeleine proustienne."[13] How much spirituality and dream are linked with regard to perception of place clarifies a similar passage from Baudelaire which describes "une chambre qui ressemble à une rêverie, une chambre véritablement spirituelle. . . . L'âme y prend un bain de paresse, aromatisé par le regret et le désir. . . . Les meubles ont des formes

allongées, prostrées, alanguies. Les meubles ont l'air de rêver; on les dirait doués d'une vie somnambulique, comme le végétal et le minéral."[14]

Caspar David Friedrich

Bachelard says that during the Romantic period the landscape has been a means of expressing subjective sentimentalities. In his book *Poétique de l'espace* he examines the possibility of expanding these Romantic dreams of landscapes into cosmic reveries. He concludes that "to imagine a cosmos is the most natural destiny of any reverie."[15] In Tarkovsky's films which function, as Tarkovsky has said himself, according to the model of the landscape, the destiny of his creative dreams has been fulfilled in *Solaris*. Still, it is unjust to say that at the root of all landscape dreams would be, even in Romanticism, "sentimentality." There is a Romantic landscape painter whom Tarkovsky very much admired and whose dreamlike visions permitted few sentimentalities: Caspar David Friedrich.

As in many romanticist landscape paintings, in Friedrich landscape becomes a bearer of meanings that transcend the landscape itself. This alone, however, is not what makes Friedrich so particular. In general, Romanticist landscape painting is inscribed in a movement at whose origin can be found Rousseau's idyllism, though this alone would have lead it to paintings of certain "jardins à l'anglaise" without ever leading to the upheaval of artistic language generally produced by Romanticist landscape paintings. Romanticism developed an intermediary line of expression bringing together objectivism and subjectivism. The painting of landscapes played an essential role here as far as certain classicist conventions could be overcome. In Friedrich's art, the theoretical battle between objectivism and subjectivism manifests itself through the development of a language linked to the language examined above: the language of dreams. Thus Tarkovsky's fascination with Friedrich's landscape paintings is no coincidence.

Romanticist subjectivism gave, especially through Schelling's writings on aesthetics, explicit theoretical indications about how landscapes should be painted. Friedrich was directly influenced by Schelling's philosophy. Schelling's idea of the "subjectively painted" landscape (a supposed reproduction of the observer's mental image) provided an intellectual foundation for Friedrich's paintings, but was, at the same time, submitted to modifications. Finally, Friedrich's variations of aesthetic subjectivism make his paintings more captivating than could an art following purely subjectivist laws. Here the element of dream plays an essential role.

There is a development parallel to Friedrich's relativization of subjectivism that concerns the Romanticist nostalgic unity of God, Nature and Man. Though such a concept of nature is necessarily present in Friedrich, a sophisticated use of a certain "simplicity" that has a dominating position in his landscape paintings (an obvious example is his representations of water) permits him at times to avoid picturesque styles of "great landscapes."

By examining the problem of nature in Romanticism, one easily comes across the *chôra* as a fundamental model for the presentation of landscapes and in this way for a certain conception of space. In his essay on "The Relationship Between Plastical Arts and Nature,"[16] Schelling criticizes any intellectual attitude, which sees nature as an accumulation of dead objects. The reason for his refusal is that such an attitude produces an idea of nature as a "container" within which are "put" diverse things. The problem of the *chôra* arises here not only indirectly (especially if we think of the existing similarities between *chôra* and landscape examined above with regard to Heidegger). Schelling wants to "solve" the problem of the *chôra* by insisting on the status of nature as a "creative original power." The artist who recognizes nature as such a self-sufficient entity will represent nature as a "life image." For Schelling nature is spiritual, or in other words, nature is *matter* whose spirituality has become visible. It has become visible through an aesthetic representation of nature.

The logical contradiction which represents perhaps the most dramatic paradox of all human art whatsoever, is crystallized in Schelling's reflection: how can a concrete thing like matter (which nature finally is) represent a quality like beauty which, in itself, has no concrete characteristics but is completely abstract. The problem is so general that one might not be too enthusiastic in regard to its discussion; no philosopher since Plato has solved it. However, the reason to insist on this problem in the present context is that Schelling represents it as an idea which is linked to the question of space, and that, secondly, it is Friedrich who seems to provide not its theoretical but its practical solution. Schelling says that the highest beauty is "without character" which means for him that it has no extension: it is like the universe that has "neither length nor breadth nor depth" (69). To a landscape painter inspired by Schelling's ideas, the problem must present itself as follows. The landscape is nature as such, it is a thing which is concrete but which is at the same time, because of its prolongation into an abstract eternity, not allowed to have dimensions in the same self-evident way as have those things that we see in "reality."

Friedrich's manipulation of classical schemes of dimension in representations of landscapes can be explained from there. Already in his early paintings he deconstructs the "classicist" hierarchy of pictorial components. As is well known, in his *Altar of Tetschen* any fore-, middle-, and background hierarchy which permitted classicist painters the installation of a "scene" into the space of nature, is destroyed. The space has no depth, everything on the picture is concentrated in one mountain. It is the play with dimensions, with the confusion of the different levels of the picture, which creates a dream effect. Nature speaks "directly" through the painting (without, of course, being able to cancel all conventional symbolisms), a condition brought forward by *subjectivism*. On the other hand, the directness of the expression is maintained also on an objective level, because the picture representing the landscape becomes, through the manipulation of the dimensions, a directly speaking *object*.

Catherine Lépront says that in some of Friedrich's paintings "the only perceptible plan is the one of the painting and . . . this one is irreducible to any particular world, not even to the undermined reality . . ."[17] In this way the land-

scape painting becomes a world in itself. There is no "place" here to measure because such a place must always be measured, as we already know since Plato's *Timeus*, from the point of view of a certain person or at least from a certain point whose position needs to be fixed within the space to measure. Dreamlike effects in paintings can be well produced through this dissolution of the dichotomy of movement and standstill. In dreams one often has the feeling, as says John Michaels, of "being in the dream through direct identification with the dream character object or landscape; at the same time there is often a sense of being an observer of our dreams [and] a spectator from that scene of presence."[18]

While for Schlegel a painter should not imitate nature but work on or even exaggerate nature's characteristics, Friedrich understands the exaggeration not as a painterly, picturesque "make up" of reality (as did contemporary Biedermeier art) whose aim was to achieve a higher authenticity. On the contrary, Friedrich works towards a mystification effect, which makes nature more "real" not because it is authentic but because it is *stranger*.

We touch here upon what seems most to link Friedrich and Tarkovsky: their preferences for the kind of strangeness that is crystallized in ruins. Being both opposed to a painterly style (for Tarkovsky it was Fellini whose "live pictures" he found unacceptable), the ruin as a lifeless and colorless object stimulates both Tarkovsky's and Friedrich's imagination. Friedrich's picture of the *Ruin Eldena* showing a ruin in which has been inserted a small wooden hut inspired Tarkovsky's peasant house in the church ruin in *Nostalghia*. For both Tarkovsky and Friedrich, Gothic ruins symbolize the death of past beliefs. Kovacs and Szilagyi have written in their book on Tarkovsky that "great culture" is today constituted of "cultural garbage" that would normally be conserved like ruins.[19] For Walter Benjamin ruins are those allegories, which flash from time to time in front of our mind at moments when we ponder upon the world's meaning without being diverted by all those various worldly speeches pretending to know the sense of the world. "Allegories are in the realm of thought what are ruins in the realm of things," is one was of the most miraculous sentences by Benjamin.[20]

The dreamlike strangeness of Tarkovsky's and Friedrich's spaces imposes itself like an allegory of a world in which modern enthusiasm for material progress does not exist but which nevertheless has the power to claim to be "real."[21] The ruin as a central piece of a landscape painting, becomes here the allegory of the world. Strangeness has become "reality" because the landscape of dreams has a mainly allegorical character whose materialization depends on a concept of space that is neither subjective-idyllic, nor objective-conceptual. Only through this concept of space that comes close to the *chôra* and that also Heidegger was looking for in his essay "Art and Space," not only the ruin but also the landscape itself, appear as a "thing" in the Heideggerian sense.

Notes

1. Martin Heidegger, ". . . dichterisch wohnet der Mensch . . ." in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954), 182ff.

2. Heidegger, "Das Ding" in *Vorträge und Aufsätze* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1954).

3. Gaston Bachelard, *L'Eau et les rêves* (Paris: Corti, 1942).

4. Anne Cauquelin, *L'Invention du paysage* (Paris: Plon, 1989), 31.

5. Cf. Heidegger, "Zeit und Sein" in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969).

6. Heidegger, "L'art et l'espace" in *Questions* IV (Paris: Gallimard, 1976). Essay added to the French version of "Zeit und Sein" ("Temps et être"). Does not appear in *Zur Sache des Denkens* (Tübingen: Niemeyer, 1969), volume in which "Zeit und Sein" is published in German.

7. Jean-Marc Ghitti, *La Parole et le lieu* (Paris: Minuit, 1998), 146.

8. Bachelard, *L'Air et les songes* (Paris: Corti, 1943), 17.

9. *Sculpting in Time*, 9. It is interesting to note that Tarkovsky's statement overlaps almost completely with one made by Wittgenstein who writes in *Vermischte Bemerkungen*. 'It could be that what is essential in Shakespeare is the lightness, the arrogance that one would have, if one really wants to admire him, to accept him in the way one accepts nature, for example a landscape" (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977), 98. The self-sufficient, "played" state of being of the landscape is consistently seen as an aesthetic quality and it appears to be suitable for the plays of Shakespeare In other words, the "perception of the landscape" becomes a generalized model for aesthetic understanding. As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein continues the aphorism by pointing to another aesthetic quality which is closely linked to that of "play" and which he sees as the principal structure underlying Shakespeare's "landscape": it is the notion of style. "If I am right in this it would mean that the style of his entire work is the essential which justifies itself." If the landscape is here opposed to the Cartesian *extensio*, "style" is opposed here to the formal structure of the play. (By following the same pattern one could oppose, by taking up a suggestion by Marc Ghitti, the speech of the play to its discourse.)

10. Emmanuel Carrère, "Etat stationnaire: où s'arrête-t-il?" in *Positif*, 1984.

11. Antoine de Baecque, *Tarkovski* (Paris: *Cahiers du cinéma*, 1999), 84.

12. Michel Chion, "La maison où il pleut" in *Cahiers du cinéma* 358, 1984.

13. Georges Perrec, *Espèces d'espaces* (Paris: Denoël Gonthier, 1974), 32-33.

14. Charles Baudelaire, *Le Spleen de Paris et Petits poésies en prose*, ed. M. Milner (Paris: Lettres Françaises, 1979), 62.

15. Bachelard, *La Poétique de la rêverie* (Paris: PUF, 1960), 21.

16. F.W.J. Schelling, *Sämtliche Werke* Bd. 7 (Stuttgart and Augsburg: Cotta, 1860), 289-329.

17. Catherine Lépront, *Caspar David Friedrich: Des Paysages les yeux fermés* (Paris: Gallimard, 1995), 140.

18. John Michaels, "Film and Dream" in *Journal of the University Film Association* 32, 1-2, Winter-Spring 1980, 85.

19. B.A. Kovacs and A. Szilagyi, *Les Mondes d'Andrei Tarkovski* (Lausanne: l'Age d'homme, 1987)

20. Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Werke* 1:1, ed. R. Tiedemann and H. Schweppenhäuser (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1982), 354.

21. Michel Estève, "Stalker" in *Esprit* 2, Feb. 1982.

Chapter Three

On the Blurring of Lines: Alexandr Sokurov

It has generally been agreed upon that Sokurov is to be considered the "new Tarkovsky." There are certainly numerous reasons for this *rapprochement*, and one of the most pertinent ones is that Sokurov achieves, like Tarkovsky, the creation of *dreams* within the art of cinema. However, though it is too early to speak about tendencies in Sokurov criticism, it is notable that, while Tarkovsky stimulated, also through his own writings, interpretations of his "dreams" through quasi-metaphysical concepts like "dream-time" or "dream-logic," Sokurov's work seems to inspire more aesthetic-perspectival interpretations evoking the existence of dreamlike "landscape paintings," perhaps happily summarized in the word "dreamscape." In Sokurov's films, the dreamlike ontological condition tends to be described as a "scape" linked to the metaphor of painting. Even natural sounds like wind or half-heard music (audible in *Mother and Son*), are likely to be described as an atmospheric and painterly "soundscape." This presents a contrast with Tarkovsky whose films have never been much described as "landscapes" and even less as "paintings." Tarkovsky's dreamlike spaces appear more as mental "zones," more or less linked to human civilization, and their theoretical elaboration seems to work better through the use of "structures" and "logic" than through "paintings" or "scapes."

One could draw a daring parallel. Does it not look a little as if Wölfflin's old distinction between the "linear" and "painterly" style would here be reanimated, this time in the domain of cinema, Tarkovsky being the linear Dürer and Sokurov the painterly Rembrandt? Should one not say that Tarkovsky is the one who sees temporal, abstract, "lines" where Sokurov sees morphological masses like painterly "scapes," and that both reproduce these visions through the art of cinema? Unfortunately this comparison, as tempting as it is, is wrong, and I want to show here why.

Two principal things should be said about the "painterly" character of Sokurov's films. Certainly, "objects" like mist-covered mountains are typically "objects for painters," and Sokurov's distortion of images through distorting anamorphic lenses and mirrors appears more *painterly* than typically "cinematic." However, one should recognize that through these painterly devices, Sokurov's dreamscapes formulate a new kind of cinematic *Verfremdung* which, though working very discreetly, turns on its head a complete aesthetics of cinema. As a matter of fact, Sokurov's painterly cinema is more than the simple "postmodern" combination of traditional and avant-gardist devices but it introduces an entirely new use of principle cinematic devices.

Traditionally, in cinema, the device of *Verfremdung*, of making things strange, has been understood as a manipulation of *rhythm*, *interval* or *time*. It is because of the *rhythm*—which can be "alienated" according to the director's aesthetic intentions—that the art of cinema remains special and clearly distinct from the static art of *photographs*. Normally, for a film director, to give in to painterly devices means to come dangerously close to the aesthetics of photographs, that is, it contradicts the nature of cinema itself. Almost like a proof for this hypothesis, painterly attempts in cinema rarely turn out to be fully convincing even in our times. Greenaway, Jarman and the Quay Brothers would be examples.

It is known that Tarkovsky fully agreed with the above-mentioned thoughts about the obligatory absence of "painterliness" in cinema. So why and how does his "heir" manage to do the contrary without ending up in disaster? Add to this the fact that the last time distorting lenses and techniques similar to Sokurov's were extensively used in cinema, was in French Impressionist cinema of the 1920s. It is known how much Tarkovsky was "against" Impressionism in cinema as well as elsewhere. First, Tarkovsky did not want to manipulate time, like Eisenstein, on a purely abstract level but on the more Proustian, "concrete" one; however, to make film into a painting would have been a sort of concreteness that would be qualified as naive, as lacking "time," or simply as lacking "style." "Style" used to be film's rhythm and so film was never going to be a "live picture." Then, film should not live only through the impressionistic "atmosphere" either, but through timely reality. It is obvious, though at the same time entirely enigmatic, that Sokurov attains a "dynamic" and "real" quality in his painterly images which is not simply due to the fact that "in it" objects are moving. The "pictures" really seem to have a timely *duration* though there is *nothing* like a rhythm, but also *more* than simply an "atmosphere" that has created this duration. So, what is the cinematic "style" in these "dreamscapes"?[1]

Let me first introduce a detail. The hypothetical opposition Sokurov vs. Tarkovsky gains complexity because both directors liked the German Romantic painter Caspar David Friedrich. In some ways, this preference suits both directors because in Friedrich's paintings we find the same odd mixture of simplicity and silence, the same simultaneous presence of strangeness and familiarity. Of course, Friedrich is the famous *landscape* painter, a fact which is less important for Tarkovsky but apparently more valued by Sokurov. Critics have noted Sokurov's apparent recreation of Friedrich's world in *Mother and*

Son especially when it comes to landscapes. In Friedrich, landscapes appear as entirely "subjective" that means, as stated by Schelling, they seem to exist only for the contemplator. At the same time it is more than surprising that Friedrich can really be compared to Sokurov. Friedrich is the painter of *clarity*, his forms are crystalline and solid, the details are often well painted, all the lines of rupture are very precise. It seems rather that what makes Friedrich's style is clarity. Spontaneously, it would thus be more logical to link Sokurov's blurred lines to impressionist paintings and to oppose it to Friedrich.

However, I believe that Sokurov's blurring of lines is not comparable to the blurring of lines in painting, and that, for this reason, his films are not painterly in the proper sense, but that Sokurov develops a mode of expression which is genuinely cinematic. In a word, Sokurov's "painterly" dreamscapes draw more on the power of *film stills* than on that of painted pictures. In film stills, the lines can be clear and present though at the same time self-negated and absent. Pascal Bonitzer has written about these photos which are not photos: "By what does one recognize at first sight a photo taken from a film? By the fact that the lines of the image, the fixed movements, the looks and the fault lines of the decor seem attracted, aspired by a center of gravity situated outside of the frame and diagonal to the axis of the objective."[2] When Sokurov "blurs his lines" he does so in order to produce a film still. One could say that this sounds still like an allusion to Wölfflin's lines which are, in the painterly style, "enlived by a mysterious movement."[3] Certainly, Wölfflin's "device" participates here in the animation of the frame, but one should not forget that in cinema a supplementary component is added. In cinema stills, the lines become stylistic lines; this means that, paradoxically, the picture is able to attain a temporal and spatial duration.

Let me end this short chapter with some general considerations of what I believe to be the place of Sokurov's art in our contemporary world, or more precisely, in our contemporary, mediatized, "image world." Modernity is determined by a science that is systematic as much as it is "mechanistic," and the symbolizing process of images in modern industrialized society has adapted itself to the mechanistic pace of technology, making the signification of "images" more and more "absolute." W.J.T. Mitchell writes about the role of images in modern society: "The commonplace of modern studies of images, in fact, is that they must be understood as a kind of language; instead of providing a transparent window on the world, images are now regarded as the sort of sign that presents a deceptive appearance of naturalness and transparence concealing an opaque, distorting, arbitrary mechanism of representation, a process of ideological mystification."[4] In my opinion Sokurov's films especially combat this modern conception of "industrialized" images.

Criticism of mechanistic and overly systematic approaches towards reality has been developed from early times on. Mention can be made of the philosophical tradition starting with Goethe and ending with Oswald Spengler and Wittgenstein, which attributed a particular importance to the status of "images" within culture. Spengler was convinced that "those problems of art whose meaning is not at all understood, [the] quarrel between form and content,

line and space, *the linear or the pictorial, the notion of style*," are closely linked to the "increasing doubt in the value of science . . ."[5] A more Goethian "morphological" or "physiological" way of perceiving reality would be necessary if humanity wants to overcome the decline of science from which it is suffering. Wittgenstein, Spengler's contemporary, was influenced by Spengler as much as he was by Wölfflin. In Wölfflin he liked a particularly well-developed vision of style as a supra-individual phenomenon which "depicts" rather than "expresses" the world. Not without reason, Wittgenstein would call the totality of formal elements of, for example, a sentence, a "picture" (*Bild*).

Repeatedly, Wittgenstein liked to contrast the model of the painter to that of the scientist because only the painter would follow an entirely *descriptive* approach. "To compose the landscape of these conceptual relations out of their uncountable fragments, as it is shown to us by language, is *too difficult* for me."[6] "I show my pupils details of an enormous landscape in which they will never recognize themselves" (511). "Finally, I am a painter, and often a very bad painter" (567).

I believe that this idea of an "unconstructed" way of *depicting*, as opposed to a constructing, linguistico-semiotic, and (phonetically) expressing way of representation, is intimately contained in Sokurov's aesthetics. When Christie sees in Sokurov's films a "counter-attack against computer animation effects" he does, indeed, not go far enough. I would hold that the baroque art of Sokurov combats an entire ideology of the image invading our modern world that has been characterized above by Mitchell. Sokurov might not have drawn his approach from a Goethian morphological-physiological vision of reality, but perhaps he has, instinctively, drawn it from the Russian iconoclastic tradition (remember that Mitchell's statement is taken from a book on icons). Many of Sokurov's "painterly" images appear like inexhaustible icons whose "time" can be intuitively felt. In the Russian tradition, icons, being closely linked to the Russian conception of art, perception, and knowledge, help to perceive knowledge "intuitively." In this sense, Sokurov's images are like dreams appearing like unconstructed pages filling themselves with content all alone. The images of old photos in *Whispering Pages*, for example, impose their notion of time upon us and enrich, like icons, our consciousness.

For these very reasons, I can hardly think of a modern image more opposed to those by Sokurov than that of the attacked New York Twin Towers, images that were, though apparently ritually repeating themselves, still not enriching but emptying our consciousness. I introduce this opposition of Sokurov's iconoclastic philosophy of the picture to that of the mediatized falling Twin Towers (which can appear as a caricature of a modern pictorial ideology), because, remarkably, Sokurov has said that he wants to "kick politics out of cinema and restore the 'rights of aesthetics'" (Christie, 17). The ludic status of Sokurov's non-constructed, dreamlike paintings finds indeed its unfortunate counterpart in the Twin Towers image which attained, by turning around and around, a "ludic" but empty quality.

This provides an interesting insight. The "political image" of the Twin Towers suffering from a terrorist attack, became, though never having been

"officially" aestheticized, paradoxically, purely aesthetic all "by itself" ("aesthetic" is meant here in its "empty," formal sense). This is entirely opposed to the images of Sokurov because here, though everything has been consciously aestheticized beforehand, the pictures always retain more than a purely "aesthetic" status. The "politics" of Sokurov's cinema is hidden in his subversive attack on the modern image ideology.

Notes

1. Cf. Ian Christie who touches upon this paradox: "Sokurov's 'Elegies' are filmic poems, in which visual rhythm—whether the staccato of rapid cutting or the sustained legato of slow-motion—replaces conventional narrative. This is pure film-making—though it is never abstract—of a kind new film-makers attempt. And in an era when the rate of cutting seems to be accelerating, Sokurov makes increasing use of sustained shots, though he is by no means averse to abrupt changes of scale" (*Sight and Sound*, 8:4, 1998).

2. Pascal Bonitzer, *Le Champ aveugle: Essais sur le cinéma*, Paris: *Cahiers du cinéma*/Gallimard, 1982), 97.

3. Heinrich Wölfflin, *Principles of Art History* (New York: Dover, 1950), 19.

4. W.T.J. Mitchell, *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), 8.

5. Oswald Spengler, *Der Untergang des Abendlandes* (München: Beck, 1922), 67, my italics.

6. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Bemerkungen über Farben, Über Gewissheit, Zettel* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1989), 561; Engl.: *Zettel* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1981).

Chapter Four

Ingmar Bergman and Dream after Freud

Dream Discourse

Bruce F. Kawin begins his book *Mindscreen: Bergman and First-Person Film* (1978) with the question: "Film is a dream—but whose?"[1] When Strindberg scholars began to examine Strindberg's *A Dreamplay* for the first time in a systematical way, their most prominent concern was formulated in the question: "who is the dreamer in the play?"[2] A typical reflex seems to make people ask, whenever they are confronted with a dream which does not take place within the safe ontological limits provided "by their own sleep," about the "who" of the dreamer. A dream needs a dreamer in order to be dreamt in the same way in which a novel needs a writer in order to be written.

As long as a dream takes place within the intimacy of our own mind we can be sure that it is we who are dreaming. Already in a novel, things are more complex. In internal monologues of modern literature the "I" can be overlaid with other narrating sources making the identification of a narrating "I" difficult. When this principle is even adopted as a formal principle for the novel as such (as it happened, for example, in *Ulysses*) the novel ceases to be "epic" because the narrating personality is nonexistent.

In performing arts and film things are still different. The adoption of the "stream-of-consciousness-style" that could flourish in the art of the novel led, at the time of Strindberg, to a crisis in the domain of theater.[3] Strindberg's dream-technique was difficult to accept because there was no "first-person" dreamer. Still in the 1960s, John Milton wrote about Strindberg that "something is wrong within the *Dream Play*," that a "technical fault" makes that the "dreamer is not properly established as an element within the play."[4] The fact to present a

dreamlike narration which is not dreamt (and consequently not narrated) by a particular person can, in dramatic art more than in literature, be perceived as an undue intellectualization of the work. Milton found that "the dream play, with its symbolism and its strange characters (each person is a facet of the dreamer) must be approached intellectually rather than emotionally" (111).

The authorship of the dream is evident only as long as it is really dreamt and this creates problems in film as well as in theater. We still know that it is Strindberg or Bergman who wrote the play or the script, but we do not know who is the author of the dream transmitting itself through the work of art.

The "devices" by means of which a "dream authorship" is undermined or abolished are as complex as are the devices by means of which a dream authorship can be restored. First of all a film director might be willing to "solve" the question of dream authorship by underlining the first-person status of the dream discourse. This will be done mostly by giving to the "first-person-person" an identifiable role within the universe created by the illusionist effects of the film. This device can be used artistically and it is part of the aesthetic repertoire of, for example, Fellini and Resnais. Bergman, on the other hand, refuses this procedure. Denis Marion explains the difference between Fellini-Resnais and Bergman in regard to the subject of dream speech:

> In *Eight-and-a-Half* it is Fellini himself who is dreaming, or his double on the screen (Mastroianni). In *L'Année dernière à Marienbad* it is one of the two main characters, leaving the choice to the spectator. . . . In *Silence* we hesitate even to guess who is dreaming (and this is certainly the reason why no critic has revealed the dreamlike character of this narrative), had not Ingmar Bergman himself said that it is he who is dreaming.[5]

True, with regard to *Silence* Bergman pointed out that the film is his dream. In many other films, however, his establishment of non-identified dream discourse caused confusion. Often the "I" of the dreamer was integrated into the artistic discourse of the work up to a point that it was no longer identifiable as an 'I'; and the confusing effect of this device was used for the production of a dreamlike expression.[6]

There is still another "solution." The events that take place on the screen can, because of the formal similarity that a film obviously has with dreams, be considered as the "dream of the spectator." Instead of believing that he is watching a film, the spectator might believe that he is dreaming. Kawin has characterized this situation: "One rests in the dark, and sees; one is silent, and hears. One submits to the dream field, yet actively scans it—for play, for release, for community, solitude, truth" (Kawin, 3). True, by establishing the dream as a phenomenon dreamt by the spectator, one releases an immense potential of research into similarities between film and dreams. However, the fact that the spectator can believe that he is dreaming the film, must be integrated into the general discussion on the authorship of the dream. The simple identification of the spectator with a dreamer prevents us from gathering information about the ontological status of the film itself.

This goes also for the contrary supposition, the one which holds that film is *not* a dream simply because the spectator is aware that he is not dreaming. Christian Metz has insisted on the basic distinction between film and dreams which leads him to an exclusion of all ontological questions in regard to the relationship of dreams and film: "The dreamer does not know that he is dreaming; the film spectator knows that he is at the movies: this is the first and principal difference between the filmic and oneiric situations. We sometimes speak of the illusion of reality in one or the other, but true illusion belongs to the dream and to it alone."[7] Metz is right, but his conclusion is too narrow when he says that "in the case of cinema it is better to limit oneself, as I have done until now, to remaking the existence of a certain impression of reality" (ibid.). From the mere fact that the spectator is still able to distinguish between reality and dreams one cannot conclude that a certain play with the confusion of both would be inessential for the experience of watching a film as such.

In general, it is wrong to confine aesthetics of film to artistic, stylistic, and formal elaborations of impressions of reality. The phenomenon of film is to a very large extent based on attempts to make the spectator lose his/her grip on the commonsensical distinction between dreams and reality. How would Metz classify, for example, Peter's statement in Bergman's *The Life of the Marionettes* that the story he is just telling (in the film) was experienced when he was "dreaming that he was dreaming." To say that the spectator has here to cope with nothing other than with an "impression of reality" simplifies the state of (aesthetic and psychological) affairs. No intellectual examination of film can neglect the attempts to blur the limit between film and dreams, even then when, as in almost all cases, these transgressions are not so successful that they lead to a literal confusion of reality and dreams.

The fact that the (authorial) point of view of the narrator (dreamer) can be dissolved is obvious in those films that try to establish a true aesthetics of the dream. Kawin claims that dreamlike films are self-conscious artworks in which narrative voices have been "generalized" up to a point that we perceive the artworks themselves as if they appear on a "dream screen." Kawin describes the experience of watching a self-conscious film in accordance with what has been mentioned in regard to Metz's point, but the confrontation of illusion with reality is described as more sophisticated: "The world of the self-conscious artwork is the world in which artist and audience confront each other across a proscenium both know to be 'true' but deliberately agree to consider 'false'" (Kawin, 50). A "dreaming mind" is present behind each screen and it invents an aesthetic structure through which thoughts are expressed subsequently. Whatever this structure might look like, there is no narration in a conventional sense of the word.

Kawin took the idea of the dream screen over from the American Psychologist Bertram D. Lewin who attempted to interpret dreams on the grounds of a phenomenon he actually named dream screen.[8] Lewin's ideas have, in their time, contributed in an outstanding way to an increasing interest in dreams in post-Freudian America.[9] In 1950 Lewin declared in an article entitled "Interferences from the Dream Screen":

> In a previous communication, a special structure, the dream screen was distinguished from the rest of the dream and defined as the blank background upon which the dream picture appears to be projected. The term was suggested by the action pictures because, like the analogue in the cinema, the dream screen is either not noted by the dreaming spectator, or it is ignored due to the interest in the pictures and actions that appear on it (104).[10]

Kawin's contribution to film theory is that he examined the validity of the dream screen (or mindscreen) in cinema providing interesting clues in regard to particularities of the narrative structure of film. A film which represents (for Kawin as for other critics) the most accurate example of a mindscreen effect is Bergman's *Persona*. In *Persona* there is "an impression of the mindscreen's being generalized, so that the film's self-consciousness appears to originate from within. Without being identified with a specific character, or with the filmmaker, the "potential linguistic focus" takes on the characteristics of a mindscreen. "The film becomes first-person, it speaks itself" (Kawin, 113-14).

A self-conscious, dreamlike film in which the film itself appears as a first-person narrator represents an interesting subject of research not only for narratology but also for psychoanalysis which has always been interested in how "dream-content" of dreams can be related to (or narrated by) the dreamer. We know about the classical Freudian devices of dreamwork which are condensation, displacement and distortion. In the case of *Persona*, all questions about the legitimization of any "device," even at the moment it has been identified *as* a device, reoccur because we have to ask ourselves: "*who* condenses, *who* displaces and *who* distorts?" From a Freudian mouth the answer would come spontaneously: the devices are effectuated by the ego, the id or the superego. However, in *Persona* it is none of the three in particular but it is just the film itself.

Dream Speech

If a film is able to represent, in an autonomous way, a first-person speech, one must clarify the relationships between film/dream and spoken speech. The film, which comes by its nature close to the mindscreen phenomenon as it has been described here, is the silent film. A film without speech develops a discourse embracing a wider spectrum of visual expressions than, for example, drama in which messages are formulated in the form of sentences. Images, gestures and movements become here dominant. The existential fear by which some directors of silent films were overcome when they learned about the possibilities of the sound film is grounded on the supposition that the intrinsic expressive possibilities of silent film would be reduced automatically by the introduction of the spoken word. It was the fear that "reducing cinema to drama" (Kracauer) would weaken the unique visual quality of cinema.

Accordingly, it has often been noted that moving images in film in which no sound is heard at all evoke the impression of a dream. "To be without speech"

and "to be like a dream" are highly compatible qualities. In *From the Life of the Marionettes*, Bergman introduces a dream sequence for a verbal soliloquy for which six pages of script had been written, but which has been transposed into a purely visual experience. Vlada Petric writes about this scene: "The imagery is oneiric on its own phenomenological level, which creates a real, a 'tangible' cinematic space, so powerfully visual that it is deprived of any sound; the two lovers move their lips but the words are not heard. Yet, just as in our dreams, we know what is said although we do not hear people talking."[11] Though "to be without sound" is not the same as "to be without speech," these two kinds of silence have essential things in common.

It has often been pointed out that in dreams the auditive quality is reduced to a minimal layer. Emil Kraepelin noted already in 1910 that in a dream visual qualities are dominant while the reception of spoken language clearly belongs to the state of waking life: "We remember here that our dreams unfold themselves through visions and representations of movements (Bewegungsvorstellungen), while audioperceptions recede very much to the background. At the same time the hearing of speech is usually our most important source for sense perceptions."[12] From there results also the difficulty of remembering elements of speech. Dream *images* can generally be fixed much more easily by memory than sounds. The conclusion which Kraepelin draws from this is understandable though premature. Kraepelin concludes that dreams are a matter of images because of their lack of logic and lack of grammar which only a linguistic structure can provide (cf. 27 and 101). In other words, dreams as images confront us with "the concrete" but lack even a minimal quantity of abstract (linguistic) thinking.

In the history of the interpretation of dreams this view has contributed to the false view about a "logic of dreams" being inferior to a logic of the waking life, which, in return, led to a "retrospective" installation of logic into the flow of concrete images by declaring that the images are *symbols*. The latter has mainly been Freud's task.

If in dreams it is, as Freud holds, the ego or the superego that "distort" common images or thoughts, what function can the spoken word have within these acts of distortion? And what function will its omission have? Otto Isakower suggested that words in a dream are a contribution of the superego.[13] A film which consciously omits all speech is thus like a dream from which the distorting effect of the superego has been excluded. This idea represents, however, a drastic simplification if it leads to the conclusion that in silent dream sequences, the "distortion" has been effectuated instead of by the superego, by the ego or the id. Isakower attributes direct speech to the superego probably because it makes its appearance on rather rare occasions. In dreams, direct speech occurs less frequently than visual ways of narrating; the *rare* appearance of the moralizing voice of the superego is one of the typical characteristics of dreamlike experiences as such. In general, dreams excel through the absence of moralizing questions (by which the superego should be affected). Calvin Hall has observed that political questions, even though individuals are affected by them in waking life, almost never enter their dreams:

> Dreams are relatively silent regarding political and economic questions; they have little or nothing to say about current events in the world of affairs. I was collecting dreams daily from students during the last days of the war with Japan when the first atomic bomb was exploded. Yet this catastrophe did not register in a single dream. Presidential elections, declarations of war, the diplomatic struggles of great powers, major athletic contests, local happenings that make headlines, all are pretty largely ignored in dreams.[14]

Freud's own ideas about spoken words in dreams seem to come closer to the truth than Isakower's. Certainly, Freud also sees dreams as a visual phenomenon subordinating speech to images. This tendency is so strong that even Derrida made a point of it, testifying in Freud a general preference for the non-phonetic, signifying dream screen which would not be, as it happens so often in our "conscious" waking life, "wiped out" (effacé) by those signifiers that appear more powerful because they are phonetically present."[15] Still, as Derrida also admits, speech *does* exist for Freud in dreams and Freud "had in mind less the absence than the subordination of the speech on the dream scene" (322).

Freud's main idea, however (which also remains undefined in Derrida's text), concerns the particular role that speech has within the network of a signifying dream-screen created by the dreamwork. Freud bases his "subordination" of speech to the visual on a particular constellation: the appearance of direct speech in dreams is clearly separated from the dreamwork as such. In *Die Traumdeutung* Freud announces that the "dreamwork cannot create speech from scratch"[16] and insists that the spoken words which obviously *do* enter our dreams must be considered as remnants from our waking life that have found their way into the dream more or less directly by eluding any claim of dreamwork. Freud mentions . . .

> . . . those speeches in the dream that have something of the sensual [sinnlich] character of the speech and are described as "speeches." Those others, which are not perceived as heard or said (which have no acoustical or motorical co-pronunciation [Mitbetonung] are simply thoughts that can also appear in our thinking processes in waking life and which become dreams without undergoing changes (GW II, 422-23, my translation).

It is thus inappropriate to say that direct speech in dreams should in the first place be considered as an intervention of the superego. Freud wants spoken words to be elements that are directly transmitted and that subsist in dreams in the form of non-estranged entities.

There are other theoreticians who insist that direct speech be due to productions of the ego or the id. Leon Altman, for example, writes:

> Spoken words in dream may come from what is heard, or from the verbalization of thoughts and affects. They may be derived from the id as an expression of libidinal or aggressive discharge. They may equally well be determined, for instance, by the integrative function of the ego and its requirement for coherence and logic, the product of secondary revision.[17]

Still, everybody will agree that the dream itself cannot be only speech and, consequently, it can never be a pure manifestation of the id or the ego either.[18] A pure "ego-dream" cannot exist because it would consists only of "revisions" of dreamwork without containing any material that could be revised.

If the dream is a first-person narrative, the "first-person" is not the ego of the dreamer: no ego is able to narrate because the task of the ego (as that of the superego) is to "revise" a dream content. In Freudian terms, drives, wishes and fantasies due to the id must meet with "counter demands" from the ego and the superego: only in that way can a dream be constructed.

Dream Styles

Robert Fliess has said that in dreams "raw material, in order to yield the product, may be subjected to every phase of the dreamwork" (Fliess, 131). This means that the dream itself exists only through a "*mise en forme*," through an arrangement or through an act of stylization. For Freud dreamwork itself is unable to create a dream: consequently, it can only "stylize." However, a film sequence like that of *From the Life of the Marionettes* introduces completely new connotations into the constellation of thoughts on dreamwork. The lack of speech in this sequence (which grants it its dreamlike identity) assists it to develop its own logic. This means that the scene can develop its logic of dreams without being obliged to base this logic on an elaboration of symbols.

This can be commented on in two ways. In a Freudian sense, the omission of direct speech heightens the dream effect because speech always comes from the "outside" and is not integrated into the logical structure produced by the dreamwork. A total omission of speech or even of all phonetic elements lets the logic of the dream sequence appear to be more self-contained. In a Kraepelinian sense, however, the omission of speech comes closer to an omission of logic as such because only speech is able to provide a logical structure. Without speech we are left with a disconnected bunch of images; this state of disconnection is for Kraepelin, of course, a characteristic of dreams.

Among the many points made about *Persona* is the prominent claim that in this film people seem to speak in a way that their discourses could be classified as neither direct nor indirect speeches. In other words, the film itself exists beyond criteria established by grammatical notions of direct or indirect speech. It narrates *itself* exactly like a first-person speaker and is in fact, as David Vierling has said, a "film of a film."[19] "Spoken speech" does occur in this film but it can be classified only with much difficulty as either direct or indirect. The speaker (of the direct speech) and the narrator (of the indirect speech) have lost, both of them, control over speech as such. In the end this produces the effect of a dream.

Strindberg introduced for the first time the "deconstruction" ("Zersetzung," for Marcuse) of form as an artistic means through which dreams could be produced. Like Bergman's ideas about the production of dreamlike impression,

this procedure is removed from typically modern conceptions current in psychology and film (and still more in theater) of the twentieth century. Strictly speaking, a dreamlike distanciation which functions, in a "deconstructive" way, by putting a film into another film or by putting a play into a play does not correspond with concepts of dreams or of art of the twentieth century but more with those of the nineteenth century. Tony James describes, in a book on the concept of dreams in the nineteenth century, how much in the eighteenth century (and a little onwards) "strangeness" (of the dream) was seen as due to a lack of consciousness, that it was considered as a state of mind coming indeed close to what is produced when letting a film be a film of a film, or a play be a play of a play:

> The eighteenth century Encyclopedia uses the word "bizarre" for dreaming. Not because the content of dreams is incoherent or strange, though that characteristic is of course recognized, nor even because there are perceptions without an object and the mind has no control over them. The reason is rather in the first instance that the mind can have ideas, while being unaware of itself.[20]

The main characteristic of the dream is thus not to be "strange" but to be a reality distant through its eminent lack of self-awareness. While the twentieth century infinitely manipulated the different devices of dreamwork until the last mystery of the dream's strangeness could be clarified in the name of science, the nineteenth century traced strangeness back to an altered different cognitive status. Bergman's treatment of dreams, influenced by Strindberg's non-modernism, represents an alternative to twentieth century treatments of the phenomenon of the dream.

Persona demonstrates, as David Boyd has put it, the "dispossession of the author of his text."[21] However, does this mean that the entire "author of the dream," this means the ego, the superego and the id are dispossessed, so to speak, simultaneously?[22] There might be an "I" in this film whose definition transcends those twentieth century psychological conceptions trying to define an "I" as the ego, the superego or the id. The "I" of this film appears as being prolonged infinitely, claiming to embrace simply everything which appears in the film. Marilyn Johns Blackwell has called this procedure "magical": "According to modern psychology, the 'I' is a perpetual continuity. The film, then, proposes a symbiosis: mask and dream, film and object, words and mutism, actor and pretended life, and a moment arrives—a charged magical moment—when they intertwine and become pure image."[23] A film which appears like a dream on the one hand and, at the same time as a first-person discourse, and which does so without leaving possibilities to split this "first-person" up into ego (whose ego?), superego or id—this film also makes a new statement about the modern ideas of style and of stylization.

The Russian linguist Boris Uspensky has formulated this very phenomenon in his own way and his ideas are typical for the modernist treatment of this problem: "Narrated monologue—which may be formally presented in the third or first-person—usually carries more traces of the author's reworking than the character's direct discourse. The character's individual manner, which appears

unmediated in its own direct speech, is often eliminated by the author's own style and speech."[24] Narrated speech is different from direct speech and this is mainly because it has one characteristic: it has gone through the author's work of stylization which means that the author's style has left its traces in it.

Stylization needs to be understood here in a very large sense: it does not even necessarily have to do with "style." Stylization can, as in the formalist avant-garde tradition, be seen as "estrangement" or as a "making things strange," as "putting an old contents into a new form," or as *ostranenie* which attempts to "alter" existing material from a point of view settled outside the sphere of the material itself. In regard to the alienating effect of the narrative discourse Uspensky writes: "The external point of view, as a compositional device, draws its significance from its affiliation with the phenomenon of *ostranenie*, or estrangement. The essence of the phenomenon resides primarily in the use of a new or estranged viewpoint on a familiar thing . . ." (131).

The first-person narration which is called *Persona* is different from usual first-person discourses established by an "authority" through the act of an estrangement or a stylization. *Persona* is narrated by nobody else but the film itself. Of course, nobody will deny that there is, in the most general sense, a person (Bergman) who remains—as an author—"behind" the spectacle in the way in which Bazin believed that behind every film there must be "a person." However, there is also much reason to think that here the person is *Persona* itself.

First, dreamlike discourse belongs here no longer to the class of reported speech. This represents, in aesthetics as well as in linguistics, a new constellation. Reported speech has to do with style, not just in one sense but in two: first, reported speech imposes a style on (it stylizes) the speech that it reports, and, second, it preserves stylistic elements of the "original speech" in the form of "traces." Pavel Voloshinov characterizes, similar to Uspensky, reported speech in the following way: "The author's utterance in incorporating the other utterance brings into play syntactic, stylistic, and compositional norms for its partial assimilation—that is, its adaptation to the syntactic, compositional design of the author's utterance, while preserving (if only in rudimentary form) the initial autonomy."[25]

Within the Freudian context established above, neither formalist nor realist considerations (like that of, for example, Bazin) are able to grasp the problem represented through *Persona*. *Persona* is perceived as a dream without being a recording of Bergman's (or anybody else's) dream. The idea of "dreamlike realism" suggests itself as a convenient "way out" of a certain dilemma without representing a valid theoretical solution. The problem is so old that Strindberg's contemporaries had already been resigned to it.[26] Dreams in art cannot be due to a "realism of a special kind" holding that the non-reality of dreams should be considered, for artistic reasons, as a reality. Nor are dreams due to an act of "stylization" stylizing reality (a non-dream) into a dream. On the contrary, what really "makes" the dream is the fact that reality and non-reality appear as indistinguishable.

In *Persona*, the dream looks as if it has produced itself. It "presents itself" without using the strategies of either *ostranenie* or of realism (acts which, both of them, have to be effectuated from the point of an—even disguised—first-person author). *Persona* has not been "made strange" by an author in order to speak the strange language of dreams: *Persona* attempts to be a dream.

This means that, if *Persona* has not been "stylized" through the reworking process of an author, *Persona* itself is already style! Béla Balász claims that "stylization is always a deviation from authentic, objective reality."[27] Balász allows "subjective shots, including entire dream sequences, as long as such visual distortion [is] set against an orderly plot."[28] Dreams are here constructed through a conscious machine of dreamwork and "fades, dissolves, and other narrative punctuation graphically indicate that the images are of human construction, meant not to stand for reality but to criticize it or to respond to it" (Andrew, 91).

What happens, however, if an objective, authentic reality that Balász accepts as self-evident, never did exist? What happens if the origin of the dream is nothing other than the dream itself (a film about a film)? In that case the dream (and together with it also the style of the dream) changes status. The dream is then no longer the result of a dreamwork, and its style (the "dreamstyle") is no longer the result of stylization.

Formalist considerations of the subject are one-sided. In formalist approaches the idea of a constructed dream speech which needs to be arranged and stylized by a first-person author is predominant. This is how formalism was able to build up a stand against realism. For formalist theory (be it film theory or poetics) a "direct discourse" in the sense in which realism understands it—be it a dream discourse, direct speech in a novel, or even a confession written in a diary—does not exist. Formalist poetics teaches us that whatever we believe to be "realist" will turn out to be a stylistic arrangement later. Victor Shklovsky wrote about what he called Rozanov's "confessional style": "My remarks about the intimate tone of Rozanov should in no way be understood in the sense that he confessed and emptied his heart. No, he adopted the tone of the confession as a device."[29] Even in the confession which is a narration as direct, intimate and "truthful" that normally we would not expect the slightest stylizing input, we find stylization! The Formalists believe that discourse always implies the use of an "author's irony, his accentuation, his hand in ordering and abbreviating the material" (Voloshinov). Any first-person narration (even when classified as an intimate stream of consciousness) contains stylization, artistic devices, or *ostranenie*.[30]

Caméra-Stylo

Marsha Kinder analyzes in an essay from 1982[31] how in dreams visual images are transformed into narratives. Kinder concentrates on the component of "randomness" and asks if the human mind does not form a more or less rational kind of narrative almost "automatically." Purely random combinations of images

are unlikely to be accepted by the human (waking as well as dreaming) mind. Kinder suggests that "we seem to be programmed for narrativity" (Kinder, 1982, 223). She develops an interesting reflection on Freud's view on the dream work on the one hand, and on the status which the conscious and the unconscious should have in regard to these new evaluations of automatism in narrativity. Theorizing on the phenomenon of dreams in art, Kinder introduces the notion of style in order to solve the tension which exists between an "unconscious control" over the dream and the conscious, creative "establishment of links" ("Kittgedanken" in Freud):

> The traditional opposition between conscious control and unconscious randomness, which has been one of the primary objections to the consideration of dream as art—this opposition must be reconceived in one of two ways: either as an opposition between selection and randomness, which function together as essential components of any creative system . . . ; or as an opposition among various kinds of control, including conscious vs. unconscious control, which was implicit in Freud's dreamwork theory and in his conception of overdetermination. Moreover, the unconscious systems are not limited to Freud's notion of the id. For example, in the context of literary scholarship, unconscious stylistic traits have traditionally been used as the most reliable basis for identifying anonymous manuscripts. The same principle is used in handwriting analysis and voice prints. In her influential essay "On Style," Susan Sontag—a phenomenologically oriented critic who has been highly censorious of psychoanalytic criticism and the Freudian search for latent meaning—argues that the role of the random component of style has never been sufficiently acknowledged. In insisting that what is inevitable in a work of art is the style, she explains why the unconscious stylistics have been used to identify anonymous texts (223).[32]

Kinder's argument challenges several conventional views on dreams in general as well as on film dream. So far, the strict separation of "materialized" images and the "logic" into which they are inscribed permitted the definition of a special position not only of the psychoanalyst but also of the film director.[33] The materialist reduction of images presupposes that images first exist independently from logic and are then later inscribed into an abstract structure (Formalist film aesthetics is supported by this idea). What is lost within this model, however, is the style of the film as well as the style of the dream.

Bergman has elaborated his film aesthetics of dreams in a way which made many people (including himself) think that all of his films can be considered as dreams. Let us look at what some critics had to say about stylization and dreams. Brigitta Steene wrote that though "Bergman's actions take place in realistic settings . . . we realize that these settings are stylized rather than socially and geographically concrete."[34] This means that "stylization" is here necessary in order to create a setting that appears to exist beyond concrete time and concrete space.[35] Similarly, James Scott classified an early film, *The Naked Night* (1953), as "stylized realism" which he clearly distances from the "explicitly symbolic mode of *The Seventh Seal*."[36] Even more, Simon Grabovski believed that "the central visual impression of Bergman's *Smiles of a Summer Night* would be one

of stylization"[37] and that there can be detected a general "stylized still quality" (204) in Bergman's films in general, though he also attests that for Bergman stylization represents "the only way, after all, of attaining 'true' period reality" (ibid.).[38]

Stylization is here understood not as a simple abstraction from a concrete (period) reality but as being backed by a sophisticated relationship between the stylized product and reality. While stylization has been recognized by many critics as being crucial for the character of Bergman's films, it is amazing that this high degree of stylization apparently failed to create something like style. Jacques Siclier, for example, states that the establishment of style would represent a major problem in Bergman's œuvre when writing: "At the end of a study of Ingmar Bergman's films . . . I remain unable to define what one could call, for lack of a better word, his style."[39] And Ayfre writes: "The problem that one can wonder is if it is really possible to speak here of a style, so dazzling is the variety of Bergman's manners."[40] Instead of attempting to trace a "stylistics" in a conventional, abstract sense of the word, Siclier suggests that we widen our concept of style and understand it as a reflection of a kind of *écriture* (a clue also provided by Kinder) as it was elaborated by the *cinéma d'auteur*. The *cinéma d'auteur* represents an alternative to a cinema supposed to work in accordance with certain stylistic rules because here style appears as a kind of *écriture*: "This term of style tends to disappear in order to be replaced with that of *écriture* concordant with the modern notion of the author which is now current in cinema as much as in so-called individual arts" (Siclier, ibid.). The impossibility to crystallize an unconscious stylistic structure arranging "real images" in a definite logical order leads (in the context of film studies as well as in that of psychology) to a research into a concept of style able to subsist beyond the usual devices of stylization. *Ecriture* in the *cinéma d'auteur* is supposed to transgress the division of film into form and contents, it designates "neither a content nor a style" (Ayfre, 1969, 162). What sounds contradictory turns out to be also the only apt formulation for any statement about style in Bergman. Even where critics have recognized a degree of stylization (and even where it was said to be undermined by an ideology called "stylistic realism" (Scott and Grabovski), this "stylization" nevertheless produced a *concrete reality*.[41]

Kinder points to Susan Sontag's essay "On Style" in which Sontag brings forward radical arguments concerning the identification of a work of art with its style. In the same volume in which this essay appeared, Sontag produces extensive quotations from Alexandre Astruc's essay "La Caméra-stylo." This essay, which appeared in the late 1940s, established an aesthetics of cinema that bases its expressions on the idea of writing rather than on conventional conceptions of the image as a phenomenon restricted to visuality. For the *cinéma d'auteur* group the language of film can be *shaped* until it becomes as subtle as the language of literature. Cinema is no longer seen as a consecution of images but adopts more abstract characteristics. In a way, it is able to integrate abstraction in itself. Abstraction is no longer present as an underlying structure of the film (as it is the case, in the most extreme form, in the production of montage) but expresses itself directly. Astruc writes: "By language I mean a form in which

and by which an artist can express his thoughts, however abstract they may be, or translate his obsessions exactly as he does in the contemporary essay or novel. That is what I would like to call this new age of cinema, the age of *caméra-stylo*."[42] Astruc's strategy is directed against surrealist cinema on the one hand, and against conventional documentaries on the other. It intends to grasp "any kind of reality."

The production of an aesthetic *écriture* is based on subjectivism as much as on objectivism; and only on the ground of this dialectical exchange of objective and subjective positions does the *caméra-stylo* attain its degree of sophistication. In a film "recorded" by a *caméra-stylo* there is no evocation of subjective, intimate symbols; nothing has been produced by the artist through the direct transposition of an inner reality; on the other hand, there is no objective recording of reality either. There is no documentation undertaken from the detached point of view located outside the things filmed.

The procedure of the camera which works like a pen, which records concrete reality by, at the same time, transforming it into an abstraction, is related to the production of a certain kind of narrative. A *caméra-stylo* can produce an "*écriture*," but it would be too simple to say that a film is transformed into literature only because the camera is transformed, in a metaphorical way, into a pen. The use of the camera as a pen has more to do with an interplay of realization and abstraction or, to use another term, of stylization. In other words, the writing camera produces style. Marcel Martin goes as far as saying that the "new language" which cinema has discovered makes sense only as long as style turns out to be the main protagonist of this medium. "The real main character of this cinema is thus the style . . . . The 'poetic cinema' (cinéma de poésie) is thus essentially founded on the exercise of style as inspiration."[43]

A new, non-formalist, definition of style is relevant in regard to the "*cinéma d'auteur*" and to other expressions of a cinema that have decided to become "modern" in a way different from the cinema of the avant-garde. Post-formalist cinema sees style as a self-reflexive quality escaping the abstract registers of formalization.[44] The *caméra-stylo* can be seen as an initiator of a new cinematic expression linked to the production of style in film, though it is not simply that of an aestheticism that "stylizes" images captured from reality. In a paradoxical way the idea of *caméra-stylo* is fed by an anti-stylistic realism since the camera as a tool producing *écriture* functions on the grounds of contradictory affirmations about the importance of style in regard to reality. The *cinéma d'auteur* aspires to "express any kind of reality" (Astruc) and this is supposed to create a realism unrestricted by the devices of stylization. At the same time, the generalism implied by the *caméra-stylo*'s approach to reality does not ask for a generalized perception of reality that perceives simply "everything."[45] The realistic attitude of the *caméra-stylo* is not all-embracing but it reduces the signification of reality at the moment of the first encounter. It functions like a "negative symbolism" in which reality becomes an anti-style significant only though its non-signification.

Amédé Ayfre, who molded these thoughts into a complex, phenomenologically minded philosophy, saw the "refusal of style" as an essential characteristic of a cinema striving to appear as a "phenomenological realism" (Ayfre, 1964, 214). Certainly, this phenomenological realism is meant to depict a "spiritual" reality and not just a "real" one.[46] Realism is here still supposed to create a perfect illusion but this illusion is due to a "prodigious asceticism of means" supposed to reproduce reality in a more artistic way, as could both expressionism and Constructivism (215).

Still, the aesthetic asceticism inherent in the realist procedure should not be understood, as Ayfre notes in the same essay, as an attempt to "stylize the event." What is in question is not "architecture but existence" (316). Phenomenological existence must exist beyond constructive, architectonic devices and also beyond stylization. This "phenomenological realism" is far removed from conventional ideas about realistic narrative modes abundant in cinema theory. David Bordwell believes that realistic expressions could be grasped best through norms and codes which can vary according to different criteria but remain formalizable in the last instance. "Realistic" motivations will be applied according to what the given narrative mode defines as realistic. In other words, "verisimilitude in a classical narrative film is quite different from verisimilitude in the art cinema."[47]

Such an abstract idea of "realism" is strongly linked to an equally abstract concept of style in art. For formalists like Bordwell, realism is one style among many possible styles meaning that it bears those characteristics which the spectator feels to be more realistic than others. Less realistic ones will appear to the spectator as, for example, artistic, stylized or artificial.[48]

However, Buñuel claimed that film is a dream not because of its unrealistic but because of its realistic nature. Bergman's work appears here as a pioneering search for a concept of dreams which is "real" just because the "boundaries between waking reality and dream, sanity and hallucination are completely dissolved" (Kinder, 1981, 29).[49] The dream is produced here "directly." The result is that a "style of a dream" cannot be fixed by means of formal methods. For this reason, also Bergman's approach is linked to the *caméra-stylo* conception that should better be called, as this chapter has been trying to show, the conception of a *caméra-style*.

Notes

1. Bruce F. Kawin, *Mindscreen: Bergman, Godard and First-Person Film* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 3.

2. Cf. Richard Bark, *Strindbergs drömspeltecnik—i drama och teater* (Lund: Studentlitteratur, 1981).

3. Peter Szondi, *Theorie des modernen Dramas* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1956), 66.

4. John R. Milton, "The Aesthetic Fault of Strindberg's 'Dream Plays'" in *The Tulane Drama Review* 4:3 1960, 115.

5. Denis Marion, "Tystnaden—dimensions oniriques" in *Etudes cinématographiques* 46-47, 1966, 82-83.

6. Also in Strindberg's *Dreamplay* the "'I' has become . . . almost completely a part of the art world" as has noted Ludvig Marcuse and the position of the dreamer can be looked for only inside the dream." Ludvig Marcuse, *Strindberg* (Berlin: Schneider, 1922), 104.

7. Christian Metz, "Fiction Film and its Spectator: A Metaphysical Study" in *New Literary History* 8:1, 1976, 75.

8. Bertram D. Lewin, "Interferences From the Dream Screen" *The Yearbook of Psychoanalysis* 6, 1950. Lewin declared later himself that some of these presuppositions can be considered as naive. "Reconsiderations of the Dream Screen" in *Psychoanalytical Quarterly* 22, 1950, 174-99, see 174.

9. Cf. Robert Fliess, *The Revival of the Interest in Dream* (New York: International Universities Press, 1953), 110.

10. Lewin saw the dream screen as the mother's breast and that his conclusions were mainly inspired by the discovery of so-called blank dreams, i.e., dreams in which nothing is present but a blank screen. This is of secondary importance for the present reflections.

11. Vlada Petric, "Bergman and Dreams" in *Film Comment* 17:2, 1981, 57-59, quotation from 59.

12. Emil Kraepelin, "Über Sprachstörungen im Traum" in *Psychologische Arbeiten* 5 (Leipzig: Engelmann), 1910, 95.

13. Otto Isakower, "Spoken Words in Dreams" in *Psychoanalytical Quarterly* 23, 1954, 1-6. Cf. also Fliess 1956, 128.

14. Calvin Hall, "A Cognitive Theory of Dreams" in *The Journal of General Psychology* 49, 1953, 273-82, quotation from 275.

15. Jacques Derrida, *L'Ecriture et la différence* (Paris: Seuil, 1967), 312.

16. Freud *Die Traumdeutung* in *Gesammelte Werke II*, 421.

17. Leon Altman, *The Dream in Psychoanalysis* (New York: International University Press, 1969), 38.

18. Also Altman affirms that no dream is simply an id-dream but no dream is simply an "ego dream" either (37) and that direct speech can only appear as an *interference* in dream without being able to produce dream.

19. David L. Vierling, "Persona: The Metaphysics of Meta-Cinema" in *Diacritics* 4, 1974, 49. Cf. also Metz: "The dream story is a 'pure' story, a story without any act of narration, emerging in turmoil or in shadow, a story that no narrative process has formed (deformed), a story from nowhere, which nobody tells to nobody" (Metz, 1976, 91).

20. Tony James, *Dream Creativity, and Madness in Nineteenth Century France* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1995), 5.

21. David Boyd, "Persona and the Cinema of Interpretation" in *Film Quarterly* 37:2 1983-84, 17.

22. Boyd believes that *Persona* is located "at the intersection of the various histories of an art, an artist, narrative mode, a cultural tradition, a technological apparatus, a physical event, and no one of these histories can claim any obvious priority over the others" (ibid.).

23. Marilyn Johns Blackwell, *Persona: The Transcendent Image* (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1986), 5.

24. Boris Uspensky, *A Poetics of Composition* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 43.

25. Valentin N. Voloshinov, *Marxism and the Philosophy of Language* (New York, Ann Arbor: Seminar Press, 1973), 116.

26. Ludvig Marcuse noted about Strindberg's *A Dreamplay*: "Denn heisst es, dass ein Kunstwerk die Form eines Traums haben soll? Wäre das nicht eine neue üblere Aufnahme eines irrenden Realismus? Gibt es denn im Gegensatz eine Form des wachen Lebens?" (Marcuse, 1922, 112)

27. Béla Balász, *Theory of the Film* (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 272.

28. Dudley J. Andrew, *Major Film Theories: An Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976), 90.

29. Victor Shklovsky, *О теории прозы* (Moscow: Krug, 1925), 168.

30. It is interesting to compare this problem with the device of *skaz* that is well known in Russian literature. *Skaz* represents a sophisticated play with the hidden authorship of a text or a textual passage and has occupied the minds of formalist linguists. *Skaz* characterizes the introduction of a text into a text, a procedure which is also the main device through which Strindberg and Bergman create artistic dreams. In *skaz* a text is presented as stemming from an imaginary author though, obviously, it *is* the author who wrote it. *Persona*'s aesthetics of dream transcends even the structures produced by deconstructive plays with the identity. Kawin notes that "there is a concealed 'I' in this film, whose dream is the visual field that appears on the theater screen. His response comes outside the film, in the 'waking world' of the title" (139). If *skaz* characterizes the "false" reproduction of direct speech through a discourse of an author whose "authorship" has been "disguised" by using a subtle play of different stylizations, would it then not be possible that a discourse is able to avoid any authorship? It would be a discourse narrated only by itself. *Skaz*, as has been insisted by Viktor Vinogradov ("Das Problem des Skaz in der Stilistik"), Yuri Tynianov, ("Dostoevsky and Gogol" both in J. Striedter, *Texte der russischen Formalisten*, München: Fink, 1969), Boris Eikhenbaum ("Как сделана шинел Гоголя" in *Poetica*, Budapest: Tankönykiadó, 1982) and others, is best characterized as a "play with stylization." Through Bergman's dreamstyle this play element has been intensified up to a point that even the last trace of a stylizing authorship ceases to be recognizable in terms of a stylistic structure.

31. Marsha Kinder, "Dream as Art; Model for the Creative Interplay between Visual Image and Narrative" in *Dreamworks* 2:3, 1982.

32. Cf. Lacan, who considers in *Le Problème du style et la conception psychiatrique des formes paranoïaques de l'expérience* the function that style could have in mental disorientations, delirious phantasms and, above all, in certain forms of paranoia. For Lacan it is the "abstraction" by means of which psychology attempts to rationalize psychic life. Between the reality of objective realism and the rules of an abstract, classificatory system as established by science, Lacan locates the a "stylistic reality" (Lacan, 1975, 384).

33. Cf. Dudley Andrew, who describes, in the context of film studies, the psychologist as a kind of "logician" occupied with revealing an unconscious logic in an illogical discourse. This statement is linked to a conventional view on the film structures: "The psychoanalyst is an emblem for the discursive reason as he tries to trace a latent logic in the dream of his patient. The patient supplies the imagination, the analyst brings a measure of logic" (1976, 252).

34. Brigitta Steene, "The Isolated Hero of Ingmar Bergman" in *Film Comment* 3:2, 1965, 69.

35. It is interesting to note that the same has been said about the setting of Strindberg's *A Dream Play* where "stylized decorations" are required and are supposed to produce certain dream mood (cf. Martin Lamm, *Strindbergs Dramer II* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1942), 156.

36. James F. Scott, "The Achievement of Ingmar Bergman" in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 24:2, 1965, 266.

37. Simon Grabovski, "Picture and Meaning in Bergman's 'Smiles of a Summer Night'" in *Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism* 29:2, 1970, 203.

38. In France, Bergman's films have been introduced as films in which "one does not feel the camera" (Martin, 1966, 65), and which produce, just because the camera is no longer used simply as a camera, "writings in a poetic language" (ibid.). Godard wrote that

in "Bergmanorama," cinema is "art" because the director has to produce as if he is in front of a white page" (Godard, 1958, 2). Ayfre mentions a "tension interne au style de Bergman, une dualité sinon un dualisme qui oppose terme à terme au réalisme et à l'expressionisme, baroque et classique; spontanéite et réflexivité" (Ayfre, 1964, 280). See also Skoller who affirms with regard to Dreyer that "style is not imposed upon the situation but rather grows from it organically." In Dreyer style is "not grafted on or cleverly imposed" (Skoller, 1970, 15).

39. Jacques Siclier, "Le Style baroque de la nuit des forains de Ingmar Bergman" in *Etudes cinématographiques* 1-2, 1960, 109.

40. Amédé Ayfre, *Conversion aux images?* (Paris: Cerf, 1964), 277.

41. Ironically, Maaret Koskinen sees in the phenomenon just described an element which constitutes "Bergman's style." Koskinen's explanations of this phenomenon are revealing and show how much this phenomenon is linked to Bergman's own aesthetic economy. In Bergman, Koskinen thinks, we can observe "a peculiar mixture of the abstract and the concrete, the metaphysical and the realistic. This oscillation is perhaps part of Bergman's stylistic uniqueness, which he has gradually refined. One example is *Fanny and Alexander*, in which the most fantastic events are told in a seemingly straightforward, simple, and 'realistic' way" (Maaret Koskinen, "The Typically Swedish in Ingmar Bergman" in R.W. Oliver, *Ingmar Bergman: An Arist's Journey* (New York: Arcade Publishing, 1995, 132). The mixture of the abstract and the concrete which is not perceived as an "abstraction from the concrete" produces reality in the same way in which it produces style. Koskinen's conclusion is stunning, especially because she points to a parallel movement taking place on another level of cinematic aesthetics. The overlapping of the concrete and the abstract, of reality and style, goes in parallel with a superposition of also reality and dream. Dream is style just because it is not due to an abstracting act of stylization. Koskinen writes: "There are found all kinds of Ovidian metamorphoses and mysteriously Swedenborgian correspondences across time and space; people and places meet and merge as in a dream and change shape. This is done, however, without the camera commenting and without making use of overexposure or other cliched transitions to indicate the difference between dream and reality: Style and content have become one."

42. Quoted from the English translation of Astruc essay: "The Birth of a new Avant-Garde: La Caméra-Stylo" in Peter Graham, *The New Wave* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1968). Quotation from 18.

43. Marcel Martin, 1966, 68. Cf. also Martin: "Astruc revendiquait une liberté d'*écriture* et de style qui est celle d'un Antonioni, par exemple, chez qui le cinéma, enfin délivre du carcan de la tradition théâtrale, débouche dans les grands espaces de la liberté-romanesque" (54).

44. Cf. Roy Armes, "Insofar as modern cinema has an identity, it this lies in the meaningfulness of its forms, in a style which moves away from mimesis and towards a greater stylization and self-awareness" (Armes, 1976, 20).

45. Dudley Andrew writes about André Bazin, the main theoretician for the cinema d'auteur: "Bazin saw in realism a kind of style which reduced signification to a minimum. In other words, he saw the rejection of style as a potential stylistic option" (Andrew, 1976, 143).

46. This is similar to the distinction which Kracauer makes between "photographic reality" and "camera reality" (cf. Kracauer, 1973, 150).

47. David Bordwell, *Narration in the Fiction Film* (London: Methuen, 1985), 153-54.

48. Formally, in this scheme the Bazanian opposition of realism against stylization has been maintained. However, it has been formalized avoiding the question of how a phenomenological *content* of reality might be perceived. A film might shift from a

realistic, "flat" code to a stylizing code. Within this conception, a conflict between realism and stylization cannot and does not appear. "Technique creates style" (as Bordwell and Thompson affirm), and style is a "formal system of the film that organizes film techniques" (*Film Art: An Introduction*, New York: Knopf, 1971, 262). Stylistic features like superpositions can be defined as "punctuation marks" helping to organize the formal play of single film segments which can appear as "fades, cuts, dissolves, color shifts, musical bridges" (264). A paradoxical project like that of Bazin, Ayfre or Kracauer which attempts to retrieve style by rejecting style (Bazin) or to apply an aesthetic asceticism on reality without applying stylization (Ayfre) or, as has said Kracauer, to establish a "balance between realistic and formalizing tendencies" cannot be grasped through such a formalizing concept. For Kracauer it was important that the "the formgiving tendency does not rise above the realistic one" (Siegfried Kracauer: *Theorie des Films*, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973, 67).

49. Truffaut once designated Bergman as one of the purest representatives of the aesthetics of the caméra-stylo when saying about Bergman that "instead of a pen he has used the camera. He is an author of cinema" (quoted from Gene D. Phillips, "Ingmar Bergman and God" in S. Kaminsky, *Ingmar Bergman: Essays in Criticism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975, 45).

Chapter Five

A Short Note on Nordic Culture and Dreams

The general cultural situation of the Nordic countries has had an influence on the creation of an art, which transcends some patterns of typically modernist aesthetic production. There is a sphere of "Nordic art" which is constituted by elements whose existence is not coincidental. This brief chapter explores the cultural environment of the European North from the beginning of this century on, by focusing some characteristic elements. It is striking that in the North one has developed a kind of "dream art" or a special cinema of dream. As a matter of fact, this kind of aesthetic expression has been elaborated more in the North than elsewhere in Europe where it has always had a far more marginal position.

Mauritz Stiller, the famous Swedish film director of Finnish origin, remains unforgettable not only because of his discovery of Greta Garbo, but also for his *The Saga of Gunnar Hede* (1922). This film, as well as Sjöstrom's *The Phantom Chariot* (1920), but also Dreyer's *Vampyr* developed in a very serious way different possibilities of transferring dream and the fantastic onto the screen.

The Dane Carl Dreyer managed to escape the "Romantic anguish" to which German expressionism was confined and produced an art of dream which is seen by many as one of the first expressions of dream in film. The Swedes, on the other hand, used superimpressions for the creation of fantastical images, which has been important for the development of European cinema in general.

It seems that Nordic cinema was able to be "original" because it was not embedded in a large-scale movement; Northern film directors have profited rather well from a certain amount of liberty which made them able to juggle with contemporary ideas without being responsible, in the last instance, towards a powerful international tendency. Stiller, for example, used the "montage of attractions" which is, of course, reminiscent of Eisenstein's procedures. However, for obvious reasons, it cannot be seen as having been developed under direct influence of Russian Constructivism. The situation can be characterized as

follows: Swedish cinema of the 1920s did not develop within a cultural vacuum; still, it is the *distance* which Swedish cinema maintained towards mainstream European culture which has made possible the elaboration of an original language that has never been *completely* dependent on certain modern European movements.

An account of classical Swedish cinema given by Dreyer emphasizes the original combination of abstract form with conventional narrative effects. However, abstraction and montage here did not, and this is contrary to Eisenstein, negate the possibility of *empathy* as an essential dimension of aesthetic experience but, paradoxically, they were able to reinforce it. Dreyer writes: "All of Europe learned about the Swedish film, among other things, that a film's rhythm was born from the action and the environment in the film. In this way, a very important interaction is created because the drama creates a rhythm which in its turn supports the mood of the action at the same time that it influences the viewer's state of mind so that he much more easily identifies with the drama itself."[1]

The greatest phenomenon of Nordic cinema is, however, Ingmar Bergman. There are probably as many hints which suggest that Bergman overtook central ideas from his Swedish environment as there are hints which suggest the contrary. Even though the influence of Swedish film classics on Bergman should not be underestimated, there is nevertheless much reason to argue, as has been done, for example by Philip Mosley, that "as a film-maker Bergman is largely self-taught."[2] One needs to note that "to be self-taught" seems to adopt in the Nordic context rather existential, and not only institutional character. It seems to signify (and this especially in the case of Bergman and the popular image that is usually attributed to his person) to be mainly preoccupied with one's own pains and not to care too much about "influences." In this sense Bergman does not at all escape Nordic culture: On the contrary, the fact of being in the "privileged" position of being a self-taught major European director can be seen as being linked to significant characteristics of the very Nordic environment.

To be Swedish meant to live in the periphery and in isolationism which is most likely to become a drawback, but could also become an advantage. It is clear that Swedish cinema especially of the thirties and the forties was trying to transform this very situation into an advantage. Sjöstrom and Stiller were trying to create an independent style that was supposed to be uniquely Swedish. However, there is a particular aspect of this "art" which one does not dare to call provincial. It is clear if we are interested here in "provinciality," we are not really attracted by the idyllic aspect that this term embraces; on the contrary, it is rather the tension which arises from a pressure-loaded contact between the province and the center which appears as fascinating.

Mikhail Bakhtin once coined a concept of provinciality: "The basic significance of provinciality in literature—the uninterrupted, age-old link between the life of generations and a strictly limited locale—replicates the purely idyllic relationship of time and space and the idyllic unity of the place as locus for the entire life process."[3] Provinciality understood in this sense can, in the domain of art as elsewhere, all too easily function as a minus. However, if we look closely

at the foreign reception of, for example, Ingmar Bergman we recognize a constellation, which seems to suggest that a minus can also be transformed into a plus. Jacques Siclier said that "[la] situation isolée de metteur en scène suédois ne lui ait donné qu'une connaissance fragmentaire de l'évolution du langage cinématographique" concluding that Bergman is nevertheless an "auteur" and "moderne."[4] The plus which has been obtained here is, firstly, the creation of a special relationship between cinema and literature and, perhaps even by being linked to this, a style which never suggests an idyllic chronotope.

It is common to say that at the beginning of the century artists like Sibelius and Munch, but also the Belgian Art nouveau movement could provide, at a moment of cultural crisis, new ideas which the center of Europe (especially Paris) was then unable to produce. It was also during that period that Nordic art could book its largest number of successes in the domain of culture. One has tried afterwards to prolong this glorious phase at a time when Nordic art had already reached the sober forms of a special version of modernity. The most urgent question that the Nordic countries had to answer to themselves, once the wave of National Romanticism had faded out, was whether they would be able to derive a stylistic power of forms not only, as it had happened until then, from the form itself but also from a historically determined environment.

The activities of the Nordic art and craft movement of the 1950s represent one of the most famous modern productions of Nordic culture. To this movement is linked the name of an architect who counts, together with Bergman, among the few Nordic artists who have gained an international reputation in this century: Alvar Aalto. Sigfried Giedion has tried to sum up the most important achievements of Aalto and his statement is characteristic. Giedion refers to the problematical character of evaluations of Nordic culture when saying about Aalto that "by about 1930 . . . once the functional conception had been attained . . . it was possible [for Aalto] to strive for a further development and to dare the leap from the rational-functional to the irrational-organic."[5]

The question remains open, of course, how well the "rational-functional" could have been established in Finland at the time Aalto made the "leap" to the organic. Was modernity really so well established that it could have represented a basis firm enough for making such a leap? If it had not been really established, in that case it is perhaps not apt to speak here of a "leap." Certainly, Aalto, from a certain point of his career on, decided to choose elements that were derived from a pre-industrial era in order to develop his particular architectural symbolism that would become so famous. It is natural that, by doing so, he selected only those elements which were closest to him; is this sense his choice did not really require a leap. Aalto's idea to link the modern industrial production to the pre-modern "values" of nature and wilderness should be reconsidered in light of this background.

There is a certain functional model of cultural history which consists in the fact that an interesting aspect of a certain culture is sometimes provided by nothing other than what is lacking in this culture. This means that, as has been mentioned before, a minus can sometimes be transformed into a plus. Demitri Porphyrios went so far as saying that "Aalto's arrival at a kind of symbolist

primitivism, that was to be experienced by Europe and America as international regionalism, was a symptom of his intellectual provincialism."[6] In some cases it is possible for the regionalism of the province to become significant for those who look at it from the center: In this way the province is able to expand its status of regionalism to a status of more general importance. This status can even appear as a phenomenon which might appear as slightly more grotesque as that of "international regionalism."

However, in defense of Bergman and of Aalto it needs to be said that in their case "international regionalism" has never had anything of the provincial, idyllic vibrations which cling to Scandinavian crafts of the fifties, one could conclude that the art of "producing culture" in the North still has something to do with the overcoming of regionalism. In the case of Bergman is clear that, though the reproach of international regionalism has perhaps sometimes been made, it has never represented (not even in regard to his early films) a major argument within the entire body of Bergman-criticism. For Aalto something very similar is true. Certainly, this has to do with the lack of provincial idyllic vibrations in Bergman's films as well as in Aalto's buildings, a quality which clings rather much to Scandinavian crafts. In regard to Bergman one has generally found that a sometimes pronounced romanticism of nature would denote rather his courage to refer to classical themes without being afraid that they could appear as clichés. Here also we recognize a parallel with Aalto.

Certain points in Bergman's aesthetics, points that seem to have an immediate link with the Nordic environment, suggest parallels with Aalto: they illustrate the general difficulty in which a producer of culture in the North can be involved. Several of the problems which Aalto met in his own country, but also those difficulties which the reception of Aalto has often created abroad, can be explained by referring to those characteristic qualities that are intrinsic in the North as a region which has a paradoxical relationship with the phenomenon of provinciality.

Notes

1. Carl Dreyer, "A little on Film Style" in *Cinéma* 6:2, 1970, 12.

2. Philip Mosley, *Ingmar Bergman: The Cinema as Mistress* (London: Marion Boyars, 1981), 15.

3. Mikhail Bakhtin, "Forms of Time and Chronotope in the Novel" in *The Dialogic Imagination* (Austin: Texas University Press, 1981), 229.

4. Jacques Siclier, "Le Style Baroque de *La Nuit des Forains* d'Ingmar Bergman" in *Etudes cinématographiques* 1-2, 1960, 109.

5. Sigfried Giedion, "Alvar Aalto" in *The Architectural Review*, Feb. 1950, 77.

6. Demetri Porphyrios, *Sources of Modern Eclecticism: Studies on Alvar Aalto* (London: Academy Editions, 1982), 81.

Chapter Six

From "Ethno-Dream" to Hollywood: Schnitzler's *Traumnovelle*, Kubrick's *Eyes Wide Shut*, and the Problem of "Deterritorialization"

"I dreamt that I am awake, I dreamt that my eyes are wide open."
– *From an inner monologue of Schnitzler's* Der Sekundant

Stanley Kubrick's *Eyes Wide Shut* (2001) is an adoption of Arthur Schnitzler's *Traumnovelle* ("Dreamnovella," 1926).[1] Differences appear not so much with regard to the plot but with regard to aesthetic elaborations. As the title of the novella shows, Schnitzler intended to let the entire narrative appear as a dream. Kubrick and his co-writer Frederic Raphael do not continue this project: the title of their film includes no allusion to "dream" but evokes, in a more indirect way, a psychic state of "auto inspection," that is of taking, "eyes wide shut," a thorough look at one's interior psychic life. On the DVD flap one acknowledges the script's inspiration to Schnitzler's *Traumnovelle*, a title which is, curiously, written in German and thus unable to give non-German speakers a clue that here we have to do with a dream in its entirety.

Schnitzler employs complex strategies to show that dream and reality can never be clearly distinguished. The structural model valid for many of his works is that of *estrangement*, of the shifting of the familiar to the uncanny, and of the replacement of certitude by possibility. In the *Traumnovelle*, various structural and stylistic devices attempt to blur the dividing line between reality and dream: the frequency of expressions like "lost in dream," "like in a dream," "he heard himself in a way one hears oneself in a dream," "as if everything had been a dream" leaves no doubt that Fridolin's *entire* experience, even if it is not a dream in itself, has to be understood as a genuine dream experience. Fridolin

and his wife are "traumlos" (dreamless) only during those two morning hours that Schnitzler compresses into a few lines at the very end of the book: when all confessions are made and they are waiting for the next day to come. Their psychic state of dreamless awareness of the world is cancelled at the moment the maid knocks at the door in order to introduce them to a new series of lived dream/reality.

Kubrick/Raphael's film does not appear as a dream in its totality but rather like a "real" story in which dream sequences have been inserted. For this reason it comes across like a cinematic illustration of a message handed over by the enlightened Dr. Freud: If we only manage to carefully inspect our dreams from time to time, the affairs of our waking life will become much more manageable. Mathew Sharpe (a disciple of Dr. Lacan) finds that *Eyes Wide Shut* "casts into relief the malaises haunting our own specifically later capitalist 'permissive' mode of organizing sexuality and sexual difference."[2] Such a criticism is not contained in Schnitzler's *Traumnovelle*. Like in all his works, instead of accusing he simply *narrates* the fleeting impressions yielded by a dissolving world and points out the misunderstandings that such a decline produces.

True, most generally speaking, both Schnitzler and Kubrick criticize a kind of modern enlightened false consciousness, but the way each of them does it is different and this is essential. Schnitzler sees typical *fin de siècle* bourgeois values like rationality, individuality, progress, self-determination, and integrity in decline in Viennese society. He formulates his criticism by depicting the existential crisis Fridolin undergoes when he is invaded by a sort of reality that overlaps with a dream. However, it would be wrong to conclude that Schnitzler speaks here as the medical doctor that he actually was, and that he is trying to heal Fridolin from his strange syndrome. Unlike Freud, Schnitzler "refused to get to the bottom of dreammatters" and is not eager to produce new scientific insights with the help of literature. In that sense, Schnitzler's social criticism comes closer to that of the *philosophical* and pessimistic Freud who remained convinced that a certain feeling of discontent cannot be eliminated within human civilization.[3]

Kubrick, on the other hand, seems to be convinced that truth overlaps with scientific reality. Once Bill Harford (played by Tom Cruise) has solved the riddle and revealed the undoing of a late capitalist upper class, the "dreams" he went through are of no further interest: what matters is only their interpretation. Also Fridolin recognizes that the bourgeois order and the certitude of his existence are not more than appearances and lies; but he also recognizes that there is no position *outside* the dream that would permit him to experience his life in an entirely "real" way. In other words, Fridolin does not discover a reality behind the falseness of dreams. For a moment he might believe he has looked through the deceitful tender atmosphere of their bedroom because, by telling him her dream, Albertine has revealed her "real" nature. He recognizes that she is "faithless, cruel, and treacherous." But is this "reality?" Certainly not, since the space within which Fridolin believes to discover "the truth about Albertine" is itself no more than the space of another dream.[4]

Contrary to Kubrick, who composes a drama with the help of symbolizing characters that act out in a metaphorical way the combat between (false) dreams and (true) reality, Schnitzler wants to see *everything* as reality, even the dreams. "Modern psychology pays too much attention to metaphors rather than to psychic realities. The establishment of the *I*, the *super-ego* and the *id* is intelligent but artificial" says Schnitzler.[5] Reality is no certitude but it could be a dream. While we are free to suppose that there is a reality behind every dream we still have to admit that there is no certitude about this either.[6] On the contrary, knowledge is most likely to come to us when we manage to see reality *as* a dream, that is, when we know, during a flash of a moment, *that* it is a dream (and perhaps even stay aware of that fact), but still *continue* dreaming because no doctor can cure us from this disease.

Apart from that, for Schnitzler this is no disease but a benediction. As says Max in *Promenade* (Spaziergang): "If we want moods to arise it is necessary that senses and thoughts be somehow tired. Should we really be awake all the time, or should we even attain the ideal state of waking in which all senses are able to perceive everything, the waving veil that is put over the distinctness of things and thus produces the tones of our moods, would disappear."[7]

From Dream-Time to Drama-Time

While the chronological order of the storyline remains intact in the film, it is obvious that Kubrick/Raphael have changed the *rhythm* of the temporal narrative structure. Kubrick transforms Schnitzler's even and indifferently advancing time flow of dream in which many sequences appear as self-contained, into a pulsating (though slow) time flow of a drama.

Schnitzler does not use such a dramatic dialectic. (He might have considered using one but abandoned it at a very early stage. In a 1907 version of the story, Fridolin, after having been thrown out of the manor house, is not sent on a walk through the Viennese suburbs, but dies in a duel.)[8] Since his novella *Lieutenant Gustl*, Schnitzler is the master of "inner monologue" which is almost always linked to an expression of dream. Very often in monologues a dreamlike atmosphere is produced not through the introduction of strange events but through the style of language (*Der grüne Kakadu*, *Zum großen Wurstel*, *Paracelsus*). In the *Traumnovelle*, the synthetically summarizing style of the narrator's voice is "heavy," overly meaningful, solemn and abstract, and evokes powerful omniscience. During the whole first part of the novella, the narrator's voice remains linked to the style of the sort of 1001 Nights fairytale that Fridolin and Albertine read to her daughter right at the beginning of the story.

The *Traumnovelle*'s "inner monologues" are not really monologues, but third person accounts of complex interior considerations delivered by a paternalist narrator: "Harmless though permanently lurking questions were exchanged against sly and ambiguous answers. None of them could ignore the fact that each was lacking sincerity, which made each of them feel moderately vengeful" (8). The intimate account of the conversation is continued in this style though it gets,

towards the end, more and more interspersed with direct speech. A dramatic conflict *almost* arises when Albertine says: "if you only knew." For once she speaks with "strange harshness" though the discussion is soon guided by the formal voice of the narrator who quickly prevents the situation from turning into a real conflict.

Kubrick decides to have this drama of existential conflict acted out. In the book, Fridolin's and Albertine's dialogues remain half-*narrated.* In the film, Alice's (played by Nicole Kidman) performance gets immensely "real": "Millions of years of evolution? Right? Men have to stick it in everyplace they can. But for women, women! It's just about security, and commitment, and huh, whatever the fuck else! If you men only knew!"

Steven Spielberg affirms in the "Special Features" interview recorded on the DVD that Kubrick liked to "tell stories differently." What happens when the master-storyteller meets the master of inner monologue? One could expect that the dramatic tension contained in the inner monologue will simply be heightened. The problem with *Eyes Wide Shut* is that here we have to do not with a simple story but with a dream.

When Georg Wilhelm Pabst approached Schnitzler with a concrete project to adopt the *Traumnovelle* as a film, Schnitzler suggested using *sound* but no *language*.[9] Kubrick's decision to render Fridolin's monologues not in "voice over" but to reproduce them through the visual presence of Bill Harford can appear as a solution that is in keeping with Schnitzler's idea. The problem is that Bill Harford, as he is played by Tom Cruise, is widely unable to render Fridolin's complex inner monologues. True, like Bill Harford, Schnitzler's Fridolin is only superficially in harmony with the values of his society. However, Fridolin's self-doubts and inferiority complexes (he feels inferior to Dr. Roediger [Carl in the film]) let him appear much more like a humiliated and ruminating rebel who sublimates his sense of revolution into cynical, mystifying language that suggests (though never reveals) hidden animosities. Bill Harford, on the other hand, is the impeccable good guy who does not seem to hide his real self behind an empty and superficial rhetoric but simply *is* empty and superficial. Only when he gets angry he is ready to fight in a straightforward manner.

At first sight, both the book and the film open with a description of happy bourgeois family life. However, there is an important difference. In Schnitzler's work, the parents read a fairytale to their six-year-old daughter whose text is quoted at the very beginning of the novella without any introduction. Kubrick decides to omit this; instead he lets a Vienna-style waltz by Shostakovich play which, as we surprisingly notice some seconds later, comes from the Harford's stereo.

Then the story starts. Fridolin and Albertine (Bill and Alice in the film) are invited to a ball (a masked ball in the book though not in the film). At the ball, both are brought to the brink of unfaithfulness though in the end nobody transgresses the limits. In the film, these events are shown at length while in the book they are only mentioned in a cryptic and fleeting fashion, not occupying

more than fifteen lines. Schnitzler's distanced and condensed style reinforces here the authority of the meta-narrator.

Kubrick lets his characters not only act out Schnitzler's allusive remarks but introduces a new series of events together with a new character. Ziegler's addition is essential: Only through Ziegler does it become possible to transform Schnitzler's vague storyline composed of self-contained and elliptic events into a more cause-effect oriented dialectic able to produce a dramatic constellation.

In the book, Fridolin never sees the girl that is called Mandy in the film. In the film Bill sees her right at the beginning when he is called to assist her medically. When Bill sees her again in the morgue, there is no doubt either about her identity or about his love for her. These things remain formally ambiguous in the book. A further check with Ziegler confirms that the woman is also the one who "sacrificed" herself at the party (though it remains unclear if she really *died* in that context or if she committed suicide later). In Schnitzler's novella the girl remains the great unknown factor until the end because Fridolin never saw her without a mask. His inquiries do not provide any insight into *reality* but rather into another mystery that is the product of his dream work: he recognizes that he had always imagined the girl's face as that of Albertine.

Such vague constellations were unacceptable for the dramatists Kubrick and Raphael: through the addition of the mafia-like Ziegler and his involvement with a girl that the right-minded Bill has to search for and finally finds, the *Traumnovelle* becomes a detective story with an incorporated romance.

A day after the ball, Fridolin/Bill and Albertine/Alice discuss the events of the preceding night. Suddenly their conversation turns serious: both mention temptations of adultery to which they were submitted during their vacation. These temptations are presented in the form of fleeting attractions and sexual fantasies that do not allow one to decide *what* had really happened but are scheduled as a dream: Albertine starts her "confession" by saying that the whole day she had been lying on the beach "lost in dreams." Expressions like "experiences delivered to the deceiving semblance of lost opportunities" and the allusion to "dream" that could transfer their lives one day to an unknown destiny, blur the limit between what is real and unreal. The dream effect dedramatizes the narrative. When Albertine mentions, just after having made the "confessions," *his* former girlfriend in a way "as if it would come out of a dream," Fridolin feels "threatened" ("doch wie ein Vorwurf, ja wie eine leise Drohung klang er ihm entgegen," 13). It remains unclear *why* he actually feels threatened.

These are only some examples of how carefully Schnitzler attempts to transform the narrative into a dream narrative by avoiding dramatic conflicts. Instead of hiding Freudian symbols in the discourse he employs sophisticated dreamlike devices. In the book Fridolin also tells *his* almost-adventure with a fifteen-year-old girl on the beach in Denmark which gives the dialogue an almost ritual-like symmetry. Kubrick leaves this confession out which lets Alice emerge as the quasi-guilty wife and Bill as rightfully angry husband. In the book, Albertine immediately aims at reconciliation; as a result Fridolin is not really

angry but merely "disdainful" at her clumsy attempt at reconciliation ("er verzog spöttisch den Mund," 14).

By suppressing Bill's confession, Kubrick/Raphael willfully renounce a further dream effect: later, in the costume rental store, a similar girl appears which produces in Schnitzler's book a Bergman-like hallucinatory dream effect. (Kubrick does not seem to be fond of such oneiric rhyme effects. In the book, the password that Fridolin obtains from Nightingale is "Denmark," a typically Freudian uncanny allusion to the confessions that he had just heard some hours ago from his wife. Kubrick changes it to "Fidelio," a lame allusion to the theme of fidelity.)

In the middle of the conversation Fridolin/Bill is called to see a patient. In the film, a confused and troubled Bill rides on a taxi and imagines, in a sort of pictorial inner monologue, *pictures* of his wife making love to the Danish officer. The images *deprive* here the story of its dreamlike nature. Alice's confession gains an ontological expressiveness that annuls Schnitzler's intended ambiguity (Kubrick seems to have attempted to reduce this very expressiveness by turning these pictures into black and white). In the book there is a long and complex inner monologue that combines elements from all domains of life and reduces the thoughts about the Dane to something subordinate.

From there on Bill/Fridolin undergoes a series of extremely uncanny experiences: the daughter of a patient who has just died surprisingly confesses her love for him while she is standing at her father's deathbed. Soon afterwards Fridolin/Bill is approached by a prostitute whom he pays without having had sex with her. In Schnitzler's novella, these events are dreamlike to the extent that they just "happen" and fade out: insufficiently prepared by preceding "real" actions they do not leave palpable traces in the real world either. Like the "confessions" about imaginary sexual adventures in Denmark, they remain in the ambiguous conjunctive sphere of the potential. In the film, there is a real *reason* why Bill leaves the prostitute: his wife calls him on his mobile phone which makes him kind of wake up from the dream he is in and forces him to face reality. In the book, Fridolin's decision to leave seems to flow out of the dream itself as it remains largely unexplained from a logical point of view. These, like many other actions in Schnitzler's book, appear like *automatic* actions. As a consequence, in the film it is "unclear" why Bill goes back to the prostitute on the next day while in the book no real motive is needed: it is just like in a dream.

Continuing his walk through the city, Fridolin/Bill meets his former fellow student Nightingale. Nightingale is about to leave for an obscure party which usually resembles, as he says, a wild orgy. Intrigued, Fridolin/Bill asks for the password which he obtains. In a nearby shop he rents an appropriate costume. He gets entrance to the obscure party and observes ritual-like obscene dances. It is important to point out that in the book these events lack many elements of erotic experience: at Schnitzler's party, the male dreams of desire cannot be lived out:[10] The gentlemen "seem to practice a purely masochistic ritual in a way that, standing fully dressed in front of the naked women, they push their voyeurism to the limits" (Sebald).[11] Schnitzler's orgy is an aesthetic dream

whereas Kubrick's is the depiction of a Freudian *Wunschtraum* (dream of desire).

Fridolin/Bill's appearance at the party has raised suspicion and he is asked for the second password which he does not know. His life is threatened and he manages to escape only because a woman offers to sacrifice herself in his place. On his return home he wakens Albertine/Alice who tells him a dream that strangely echoes the events that Fridolin/Bill has just been through.

On the next day Fridolin/Bill decides to inquire about what had happened the night before but is not successful. The mystery that troubles him most is the identity of the woman who sacrificed herself for him. When he reads in a newspaper about a certain woman who committed suicide that night, he considers—without having any particular reason to do so—that she could be the woman he is looking for. Fridolin goes to the morgue and is allowed to examine the body but cannot identify her. For Bill things are different: through Ziegler he is finally able to identify the girl.

From Ethno-Space to Hollywood

Schnitzler's story is transferred from *fin de siècle* Vienna to contemporary Manhattan. Before examining the problems that arise here for literary or cinematic space as such, I would like to reflect upon the consequences that this shift brings about for the *Traumnovelle*'s cinematic adoption as a genre. No doubt, Schnitzler is linked to Austrian culture like few other authors of his generation. However, in spite of the ethno-components it contains, Schnitzler's novella is in no way a piece of folk art. In theory, a literary work like the *Traumnovelle* can be transplanted anywhere; still it seems that a transfer from Vienna to Manhattan has a general consequence for this piece of European culture.

Had the film been made in Vienna as an Austrian film by an Austrian director using the German language, this would have affected not only the cinematic space *within* the film but also the space in which the film itself is inscribed. As an Austrian or German film launched on the international market, *Eyes Wide Shut* would have occupied exactly that space that Deleuze and Guattari attribute to *Minor Literature*, that is, to a literature that has to find, far away from the mainstream, "its own point of underdevelopment, its own dialect, its own third-world, its own desert."[12]

Deleuze and Guattari use the concept of "minor literature" in the context of Kafka studies and the literature produced by the German-speaking community in Prague. In minor literature, they find, individual affairs are immediately linked to larger, collective and political affairs, constantly producing active solidarity between members of the community (30ff).

There are serious reasons to ask if today's non-English-speaking cinema, as it faces the immense machinery of American cinema, cannot be granted the status of "minor cinema" that the Jews of Prague liked to defend.

Kubrick/Raphael saw no problem in transferring Schnitzler's socio-pathological picture of Vienna to New York. Finally, had not Schnitzler himself insisted that all he depicts is "love and death" which exist in *any* time and in *any* space?[13] Schnitzler, as the Austrian antipode of the Czech Kafka, might not have been aware of everything that such thoughts imply. True, love and death exist everywhere, but they exist *in another way* in minor literature than in major literature. As a proponent of major literature, Schnitzler could not suspect that his novella would one day be transformed into a major film.

Kafka thinks that a minor literature is more apt to elaborate "matter" (Diary December 25, 1911). He could as well have written that it is more apt to elaborate space. I am not talking about idyllic, folk-like and "rustic" space that Kubrick should have produced of Viennese culture. I am rather talking about a particular spatial quality that lets Viennese culture appear as a dream culture; and my point is that this quality can be obtained much better through minor than through major approaches. The reason is that *minor literature is dream literature* by nature. In minor literature, as Deleuze/Guattari confirm, "the individual affair becomes . . . more necessary, indispensable, blown up like with the microscope to the point that a completely other story acts within it" (30). Is this not also an exact description of the construction of dreams? The space of minor literature is so small that *everything* becomes important: every matter, as banal as it might look, is able to produce a large story; and when this happens, the story develops in a dreamlike manner: constantly evolving within a space in which everything is not only what it appears to be but connected to the infinite sphere of the unconscious.

Major literature, with its large but more neutral space on the other hand, uses an entirely different spatial aesthetics because here space serves merely as a background for dramatically constructed stories. Of course, these stories also can be dreamlike but they will never employ space itself as a means to produce dreamlike expressions.

Had the *Traumnovelle* been adapted in the form of *minor cinema*, Vienna would represent, as it does in the novel, the *Abgrund*-like space of dream-reality with its own strange logic, laws and associations that are determined by its culture.

Several instances of how space is "told" in the *Traumnovelle* and in *Eyes Wide Shut* confirm my hypothesis. As mentioned, the *Traumnovelle* is not a piece of folk art. True, there is a strong local coloring in the novella, almost like in *Lieutenant Gustl*, but in the *Traumnovelle* the ethno-components are constantly mixed with those spheres to which normally only dream has access: to an unconscious reality that remains closed to clichés and prejudices.

Since the *Traumnovelle* is set in a no-man's-land just before the breakup of the monarchy and in the postwar years of the republic, any exposition of the local culture of the *belle époque* is necessarily dreamlike because it almost belongs to the past.[14] Above that, Fridolin's odyssey takes place within the space of a dream that gets subsequently deterritorialized through its inscription in other dreams. The story starts *with* or *as* a fairytale, incorporates several accounts of dreams in itself without clearly showing the limits between the first

"dream reality" and the subsequent ones (Eric Santner speaks of various Buñuel-like levels surreality).[15] The reader gets sucked into a dream and before he is able to find a way out of it, he gets sucked into another dream. In this sense, the space of the novella becomes a real *chôra* to the extent that we are confronted with a "dream within a dream." Reality is seen through dream and dream is seen through reality. However, this constellation, which would normally result in a purely fantastic and abstract experience of space, remains consistently glued to the concrete: to the labyrinthic ethno-space of a decadent Vienna.

Schnitzler's story begins in an utmost "spaceless" fashion. The fairytale offers no space and the self-sufficient style in which the narrator tells of the events that Kubrick/Raphael act out in "real space" (the ball), take place "nowhere." What follows are memories from the past. Here we are brought to an exotic place that is culturally very different from Vienna: Denmark. A sunny Nordic beach serves as a theater of both Albertine's and Fridolin's adventures and forms a contrast with the dreamlike labyrinthic nightly Vienna. Everything that happens in Denmark counts among those few things in the book that are likely to *really* have happened. Kubrick does not bother to reproduce this mnemonic space of the real (though it could have created an interesting contrast, in the way in which Tarkovsky inserts the "earth sequences" in the flow of fantastic space scenes of *Solaris*). Instead Kubrick prefers to instrumentalize the Danish experience to make it a starting point for the film's dramatic action.

The concrete space of Vienna becomes a point of reference able to pin the *chôraic* space of this interlocked series of dreams to something concrete and "real" (though the real becomes subsequently dreamlike itself). Two examples: After having said that for Fridolin, "as he was mechanically walking the nightly streets, everything became unreal, even his home, his wife, his child, his profession," Schnitzler adds: "The town hall clock stroke half past seven" (73). Or: "The people . . . appeared to him as ghostly-unreal. He felt like a runaway; run away not so much from an event as from a melancholic enchantment that he would not allow to get power over him," immediately followed by: "The snow on the street had melted away, to the left and to the right were piled up little white mounds, the gas flames in the lanterns flickered and from the nearby church it stroke eleven. He decided to pass half an hour in a quiet café close to his home and crossed the Town Hall Park" (21).

Concrete geographical indications of Vienna are abundant in the novella (Town Hall Square, University, Josefstadt, several street names) and descriptions of the city are often combined with empathically written meteorological indications. After having left the obscure party in the manor house, Fridolin walks home through the countryside surrounding Vienna. Schnitzler provides a two-and-a-half-page-long atmospheric description of the Viennese suburbs through which Fridolin approaches the city in the early morning hours. (In these suburban landscapes Schnitzler had also set some of his most obscure characters: here the Jewish hypnotizer Marco Polo in *Die Weissagung* created his illusions and Paracelsus made people dream strange things.)

In the film, the switch from one dream sphere to another is organized in a totally spaceless manner. Bill does not take a walk after having left the party. What matters for Kubrick is not the artistic elaboration of space but the dynamic of a rhythmic scheme able to work in the service of a dramatic dialectics.

Finally it seems that Schnitzler himself has been aware of the spatial tension between major and minor experiences and incorporated them even in the *Traumnovelle.* When Fridolin scans the headlines of a journal while sitting in a café he suddenly reads: "In some bohemian city German-speaking plates had been torn down. In Constantinople there was a conference on railway constructions in Minor Asia in which participated also Lord Cranford" (27). Through a strange juxtaposition of minor and major affairs Schnitzler creates a spatial dream effect.

The Vernacular-Universal: Towards a Minor Cinema

Deleuze and Guattari refer, in order to establish a linguistic canon for minor literature, to a linguistic model developed by Henri Gobard who distinguishes between four kinds of language: the *vernacular* (here); the *vehicular* (everywhere); the *referential* (over there); the *mythical* (beyond) (Deleuze and Guattari, 43). It is clear that, as a dream discourse reaching beyond itself, the *Traumnovelle* is not simply vernacular. At the same time it is not a mythical fairytale either (like, say, Hoffmansthal's contemporary *Zauberflöte* in which all concrete social questions are presented in a stylized and symbolic form that Schnitzler refused). Rejecting all aesthetic idealization and employing even Jewish-Viennese dialect, the *Traumnovelle* becomes the paradoxical model of a vernacular-mythical ethno-dream. The ethnic world is present almost everywhere but is constantly devalorized because the story takes place in a "fluctuating intermediary land between the conscious and the unconscious."[16]

It would be wrong to say that Kubrick simply shifts the story from the vernacular Austrian sphere to the vehicular US-American one. The dramatic cinematic language (just like the English language in general) is more than the vehicular English that is so common in the international world today. Cinema-English is a language that draws from a long Hollywood history and must therefore be considered as vehicular-mythical.

Through the subordination of space to drama, *Eyes Wide Shut* becomes a typical example of *major cinema.* Had Kubrick followed Schnitzler's paradoxical juxtaposition of abstract, dreamlike "no-space" and concrete ethno-space, his film would have been an ideal example of *minor cinema.* Instead Kubrick deterritorializes the *Traumnovelle* not in order to make of it a piece of dreamlike *minor cinema* that remains indebted to the "vernacular and beyond." He transforms it into a piece of *major cinema* that is the vehicular myth of everybody. Schnitzler's ethno-dream goes Hollywood.

Notes

1. Arthur Schnitzler, *Traumnovelle* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 2003).

2. Mathew Sharpe, "Contemporary Sexuality and its Discontents: On Kubrik's [sic] *Eyes Wide Shut*" in *Symptoms: Online Journal for Lacan* 4: Spring 2003. No page numbers.

3. In spite of their "friendship" which they developed only at a very late stage of their lives Schnitzler remained skeptical of Freud's intentions (see Ulrich Weinzierl, 82). At the time Schnitzler writes the *Traumnovelle*, Freud composes *The Ego and the Id.*

4. This is in keeping with the most important motivations of Schnitzler's writings in general. In his memories (*Jugend in Wien*) Schnitzler notes that already as a child he did not consider "the world of the stage as a world of deception and deceit, whose corruption by an unexpected intrusion from the sphere of reality I would have to feel like an insult or as if having been waken from a dream. I rather found that what had opened up here to me was a world of inspirations, disguises, with funny and sad jokes. In a word—I, and certainly no reasonable being even when deeply moved by art, would fail to see the unreal nature of even the highest artistic achievement. This small experience might have contributed, as petty as it was, to the development of my fundamental motive that is the confluence of seriousness and play, life and comedy, truth and lie . . ." Arthur Schnitzler, *Jugend in Wien. Eine Autobiographie* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1981), 27. Equally important for Schnitzler are the thoughts of the literary aesthetician Hermann Bahr (see Gotthart Wunberg: "Fin de siècle Wien. Zum bewusstseinsgeschichtlichen Horizont von Schnitzlers Zeitgenossenschaft" in *Text und Kritik* 4, 138/139, 1998, 14ff.). In 1894 Bahr attacked Naturalism and its conception of art as "reality." At the same time he remained opposed to a decadent art that created nothing but dreams: "Und wieder wurde die Kunst, die eine Weile die Markthalle der Wirklichkeit gewesen, der 'Tempel des Traumes.' Die Ästhetik drehte sich um" (86).

5. Heinrich Schnitzler, Christian Brandstätter, Reinhard Urbach (eds.), *Arthur Schnitzler: Sein Leben, sein Werk, seine Zeit* (Frankfurt: Fischer 1981), 343.

6. "Aphorismen" in *Arthur Schnitzler: Sein Leben, sein Werk, seine Zeit*, Aphorismus 25 (279): "Ist es dir noch nie begegnet, dass plötzlich in einer grossen Gesellschaft, nachdem du dich eben noch ganz wohl gefühlt und vergnügt befunden, alle Anwesenden dir wie Gespenster und du selbst dir als der einzig Wirkliche unter ihnen allen erschienest? Oder wurdest du noch nie mitten in einem höchst anregenden Gespräch mit einem Freund der völligen Unsinnigkeit all Eurer Worte und der Hoffnungslosigkeit bewusst, einander jemals zu verstehen? Oder ruhtest du noch nie selig in den Armen deiner Geliebten und spürtest mit einem Male untrüglich, dass hinter ihrer Stirne Gedankten spielen, von denen du nichts ahnst? All dies ist schlimmere Einsamkeit als das, was wir gewöhnlich so zu nennen pflegen. Das Alleinsein mit uns selbst."

7. Schnitzler, "Spaziergang" in *Komödiantinnen* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1996), 69: "Zum Entstehen der Stimmungen ist eine gewisse Müdigkeit der Sinne und der Gedanken notwendig. Wenn wir stets völlig wach wären, oder wenn wir ns gar zu jener idealen Wachheit vorringen könnten, in welcher alle Sinne vollkommen aufnahmefähig wären, so gäbe es jenen wallenden Schleier nicht, welcher sich vor die Deutlichkeit der Dinge legen und uns die Töne unserer Stimmungen bringen."

8. Dorrit Cohn, "A Triad of Dream-Narratives: *Der Tod Georgs, Das Märchen der 672. Nacht, Traumnovelle*" in Erke Nielsen (ed.): *Vienna 1900: Change and Continuity in Literature, Music, Art and Intellectual History* (München: Fink, 1982), note 39.

9. Letter of December 20, 1930 to Heinrich Schnitzler.

10. Eric L. Santner, "Of Masters and Slaves, and Other Seducers: Arthur Schnitzler's *Traumnovelle*" in *Modern Austrian Literature* 19, 1986, 3/4, 40.

11. W.G. Sebald, "Das Schrecknis der Liebe. Zu Schnitzlers 'Traumnovelle'" in *Merkur: Deutsche Zeitschrift für europäisches Denken* 2:39, 1985, 128.

12. Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, *Kafka. Pour une littérature mineure* (Paris: Minuit, 1975), 33.

13. H.-J. Schrimpf, "Arthur Schnitzlers Traumnovelle" in *Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philologie* 82, 1963, 173.

14. Michaela Perlmann, *Arthur Schnitzler* (Wien: Metzler, 1987), 157.

15. Cf. Santner, "As in a Buñuel movie there is no frontier between dream and reality—just different levels of surreality" (op. cit. 33).

16. Arthur Schnitzler, *Aphorismen und Betrachtungen* (Frankfurt: Fischer, 1967), 455.

Chapter Seven

Wong Kar-wai and the Culture of the *Kawaii*

Since 1988, the year of the release of *As Tears Go By*, many academic texts have been written about Wong Kar-wai and his films. Among the themes dealt with are 1) Wong's emergence from the Hong Kong cinema scene and the exceptional status he enjoys within this scene; 2) the similarities between Wong and an extremely wide range of Western directors. The twofold concentration on Wong's Hong Kong origins on the one hand, and his compatibility with Western cinema on the other, can be explained through Wong's almost unique ability to make films that appear to be equally Chinese and Western, or equally local and global.[1] However, in my opinion, any limitation of analysis to a dialectic of Eastern and Western elements runs the risk of bypassing the real sources of Wong's oeuvre. I am not aware of a single study that attempts to integrate Wong in the wide, though limited, cultural sphere of modern or post-modern East Asia. Stephen Teo points to Wong's Asian literary influences like the novels of Osamu Daizai and Haruki Murakami. He even sees "a film like *2046* [as] living proof of Wong's global and pan-Asian strategy (it features stars from all the Asian territories mentioned, while the device of having these stars speak in their own mother tongues is also part of the strategy)."[2] I want to extend Teo's anticipations and explain Wong's work by not reducing it to a selective amalgamation of "East" and "West" but by understanding it as a phenomenon flowing out of a sphere that must be considered as having a culture of its own: the sphere of modern East Asian culture. By using this approach, I want to avoid relativism like that expressed by Jenny Kwok who claims that "the Third World is so infiltrated with First World images and narratives that it is not possible to identify Third World 'national' symbolic products anymore," a relativism which affirms that national characteristics do not exist at all.[3] On the other hand, I want to avoid the essentialism which sees films and all cultural productions as expressions of national culture. Wong's world is neither the traditional Chinese

one nor the "globalized" or international one, but that of lower middle class inhabitants of "modern" Asia who profit from the effects of globalization only in an indirect way. For lack of a better word, I designate the culture of those East Asian countries that have long since been submitted to a Western influence as "Pan-Asian." These countries have not simply been "Westernized" but have created a cultural style driven by a dynamics of its own that is able to exist, as an autonomous unit, next to "Western" or "Asian" culture. They are mainly: Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan and Korea but—so far—*not* the Republic of China. Of course, a link between the Pan-Asian sphere and China exists, but only—exactly like in Wong's films—though a memorable "Shanghai-past" that brought forward its own original culture in the 1930s and 1940s.

The polemical title of this chapter which mentions the culture of the *kawaii* in the context of a study on Wong Kar-wai, attempts to draw attention to an underlying cultural pattern that is, in my opinion, present in the cultures of the aforementioned countries. *Kawaii* means "cute" in Japanese and denotes a common popular culture closely linked to aesthetic expressions of kitsch which developed remarkably distinct features in all modernized East Asian countries.[4] Modern East Asian popular culture bears traits of a social crisis that is most obvious in Japan, and which some people characterize as being "all style and no substance." An eminent disillusionment with society as well as a psychological helplessness has created a (youth) culture that engages in unspirited consumption and the creation of a commodified dreamworld. Though these features are not necessarily explicit and prominent in Wong's films, I still think that they are *implicit* and hidden as expressions of the Pan-Asian cultural sphere that I am trying to describe. Unquestionably, Wong depicts, in his particularly nihilistic and detached "dandyist" manner, emotive lifestyles without substance determined by a non-productive existential emptiness.

The cute is defined as childlike, sweet, innocent, pure, gentle and weak. The aesthetics of cuteness (kawairashisa) has been developing in Japan since the 1980s and in the late 1990s it turned into an explicit kitsch-culture.[5] However, cute culture is not restricted to Japan but has also been observed, for example, in Taiwan.[6] Fluffy stuffed animals dangling from the bottom of the cell phones of women in their thirties, men wearing Pikachu on key chains[7] and the ubiquitous presence of Hello Kitty and Doraemon figurines in households[8] is a substantial ingredient of a unique culture that has been driven to such an extreme only in East Asia. Wherever it appears, cute-kitsch culture is more than an aesthetic style but a full-fledged way of articulating a subjective attitude that becomes manifest in design, language, bodily behavior, gender relations, and, most generally, in subjective perceptions of the self.[9]

I am not saying that Wong Kar-wai's films are kitsch, nor am I saying that his films would straightforwardly produce an aesthetics of the *kawaii*. Still I believe that, in a most general sense, the *kawaii*, as a cultural pattern of East Asian humanized globalization, is indirectly present in Wong's work. This becomes particularly obvious if we consider the cultural phenomenon of *kawaii* culture from the angle of another Japanese notion, that of *amae*. Many authors have linked the *kawaii* to the *amae*. The psychologist Takeo Doi detected in the

early 1970s a kind of "willful immaturity or childishness" among Japanese youths that revealed, in his opinion, a desire to be indulged like children.[10] In his famous study on the phenomenon of the *amae* in Japanese society, Doi shows that being voluntarily dependent on others has been idealized by Japanese society up to the point that it can be considered as a cultural specifity. The *amae* is the "coaxing" done by children who refuse to recognize, in an adult way, their responsibility towards the world. These children aspire to be wrapped in the dreamy tenderness of their mothers who will not refuse their *amae* and provide an environment adapted to the needs of the children's *amae*.

It is rather easy to crystallize such a structure of *amae* or "childish dependence on others" in Wong Kar-wai's films. But let me first establish more clearly my understanding of Pan-Asian culture.

Pan-Asian Culture

Are Wong Kar-wai's films "Asian"? It is clear that other Asian director's films are more Asian than his. Chen Kaige and Zhang Yimou, when representing pre-revolutionary China, have been criticized for catering to "the West's endless appetite for Chinese exoticism."[11] Implicit in this reproach is that, with regard to Orientalism, Chen's and Zhang's films seem to inhabit the same level as Spielberg's *Memoirs of a Geisha*. As a matter of fact, *most* films can be inscribed in a logic of either the global or the local. Exoticizing films like *Memoirs of a Geisha* work in the service of globalized capitalism, as much as John Woo's gangster films affirm, with their tales of endless greed and simplistic logic of good vs. bad, the image of local capitalism. Wang Xiaoshuai's *Beijing Bicycle*, on the other hand, as it shows the disappearance of Shanghai's *hutongs*, might work in the service of globalized *anti-capitalism*.

In what logic (or in what cultural space) can we inscribe the films of Wong Kar-wai? My answer is: in the logic of dandyist Pan-Asianism. In this culture, capitalism is parodied, good and bad guys appear as dreamy clones of themselves, and Asia is only evoked after having gone through *mneme*, that is, through the director's personal memory of "Asia."

In Wong Kar-wai's films there are, apart from in *Ashes of Time*, few objects that deserve the predicate "Asian" in a historical or traditional sense. Still, anyone who has traveled in modern Asian countries will recognize a clearly spelled out "Asian reality" in Wong's settings that consist of convenience stores, noodle bars and fast food joints, of narrow alleys and long shopping arcades. Wong depicts post-colonial Asian modernity highlighting everything that Westerners find so astounding: unbelievably crammed apartments combined with an abundance of merchandise and ubiquitous consumerism. He even overemphasizes urban density by interweaving, for example in *Fallen Angels*, the existence of three types of transport in one single place (trains, cars and airplanes); in *Happy Together* he shows strangely undefined living spaces and in *Chunking Express* and *Fallen Angels* some spaces are simply impossible to live in. The Western traveler finds that housing conditions are evidence—even in

Japan—of the countries' only relatively recent ascent to "Western modernity." In real Hong Kong and in real Japan we constantly feel a non-modern past; a past which is also constantly present in Wong Kar-wai's films: decaying storefronts, kilos of paint peeling off the walls, and entirely messed up plans of urbanization.

Let us say that Wong Kar-wai is neither Asian nor Western but resides on the strange middle ground of cultural difference that the Japanese philosopher Naoki Sakai has characterized as determined by an "unobjectifiable 'feeling' of anxiety or of the uncanny that cannot be contained within the economy of spatialized time governed by the pleasure principle."[12] This is what I consider a characteristic of contemporary "Pan-Asian" culture.

Though there are numerous allusions to other Asian countries in Wong's films (the Japanese man in *2046*, an explicit documentation of modern city life in Taipei with its underground, neon lights and skyscrapers in *Happy Together*, etc.) one way in which Wong Kar-wai sketches a Pan-Asian time-space is by evoking—directly and indirectly—an ominous Hong Kong-Shanghai link. As both Tsung-yi Michelle Huang and Abbas Ackbar have shown,[13] Shanghai remains the alter ego of Hong Kong and especially in the domain of cinema this needs to be put forward. Shanghai cinema of the 1930 and 1940s constructed an image of Asian modern urbanity for itself. Some of the Shanghai film studios set up branches in Hong Kong and Guangdong in the 1930s, and many moved to Hong Kong in 1937 because of the Japanese occupation. Shanghai silent films like Wu Gongyang's *The Goddess* (*New Woman*), offer stylized urbanity, neon lights, shopping malls and low life as a setting for an all-too-human melodramatic story. The subtlety, diversity, complexity and intellectual enlightenment brought about by May 4th culture, has been translated into cinema through the creation of a vernacular-modernist tradition typical of Shanghai silent films;[14] and this vernacular-modernist tradition has been revived by the First New Wave of Hong Kong cinema of the 1970s and 1980s.

It is moot to speculate in which particular ways this most original modern Chinese culture might have influenced Hong Kong cinema and Wong Kar-wai in particular. Influences can be indirect and difficult to trace. But it is necessary to insist on the status of Shanghai "highbrow" culture as an essential element of modern Pan-Asian culture. The reason is that the heritage of "modern" Chinese literature of the 1920s and 1930s (from which, for example, all of modern Chinese literature has sprung) can be assumed only by the afore mentioned "Pan-Asian" countries.[15]

Wong cultivates in his films an explicit Hong Kong-Shanghai link. In *Days of Being Wild* and in *In the Mood for Love*, Rebecca, played by Shanghai-born singer Rebecca Pan (and herself a personification of the Hong Kong-Shanghai link), is from Shanghai and her personality evokes the lifestyle of Shanghai of the 1930s. *In the Mood for Love* is played out among the people of the Shanghai diaspora of Hong Kong in the 1960s. In *2046*, one actually has the impression of being in 1940s Shanghai rather than in the Hong Kong of 1966. The *qipao*, also used in *In the Mood for Love* and *Eros*, contributes to this Shanghai atmosphere while the tango, an equally important element of Shanghai culture, has a similar

effect. Tango dancing in *Happy Together* (situated in the Chinese community of Buenos Aires) creates the strange impression of a Chinese/Argentinean cultural superposition. Compare this with Liu Kang's description of a Shanghai dance party: "When held in the dimly lit European style pubs in Shanghai and accompanied by live dance bands, the well-dressed, but by now grey-haired, couples, long retired employees of Western firms established in the 1940s, could indulge in nostalgia for the bygone days of Shanghai's colonial glory and decadence. Shanghai is the 'authentic origin' of Western style cultural life."[16] We find here a great deal of the atmosphere of Wong's films.

The "Dandyist Sphere:" *L'Amour Impossible*

I said that Wong is the representative of "dandyist pan-Asianism." Having introduced my understanding of pan-Asian culture I will now have to clarify what I understand by dandyism. Furthermore I will show that a certain kind of dandyism can be seen as an integral part of pan-Asian culture.

L'Amour impossible is the title of a novel written by one of the foremost 19th century dandies, the French writer Jules Barbey d'Aurevilly. *L'Amour impossible* could also be the title of almost all of Wong Kar-wai's films. Tsung-yi-Huang has shown how Wong establishes himself in *Chungking Express* as "an archetypical director-*flâneur*, [a] cinematic detective of urban life, if you will, on the streets of Hong Kong in the age of globalization."[17] Not only in *Chungking Express* but in all of his films except *Ashes of Time*, Wong's characters stroll aimlessly through urban settings like dandies. And like dandies, they are neither opposed to their capitalist environment nor fully integrated into it but "play the game" of urban life in a strangely indifferent way, developing, equally like dandies, an unreal, dreamlike mode of existence.

In urban life we observe, as said Elizabeth Wilson in an article on the culture of the *flâneur*, "bits of the 'stories men and women carry with them, but never learn their conclusions; life ceases to form itself into epic or narrative, becoming instead a short story, dreamlike, insubstantial or ambiguous."[18] In a very similar way the lifestyles of Wong's characters are insubstantial. In spite of the internalized melodramatic struggle that they obviously do undergo, in the very end they receive no more than what the dandyist characters in Barbey d'Aurevilly's novel receive: "Some empty kisses, some gloomy and vain caresses in compensation of missed happiness and impossible enthusiasm."[19]

The precision with which Leslie Cheung combs his hair at the end of *Days of Being Wild*, the ritualistic consumption of canned pineapples in *Chunking Express* – all this can be understood as dandyist and parodist attempts to resist alienation in the consumer world of late modern capitalism. A typically dandyist lack of initiative and resoluteness lets Wong's characters appear simultaneously as victims and as non-victims of their modern environment. In *Chungking Express*, although Cop 223 (Takeshi Kaneshiro) spends the night with Brigitte Lin in a hotel room, he has the right only to look at her but not to touch her. This ridiculously aestheticized relationship leaves experience in the domain of the

image or imagination. Wong's films represent a panorama of parodied capitalism in which even drug-mafias and crime for money (normally parameters of ultimate harsh capitalism) get absorbed in a dreamsphere eternally cushioned in moderately narcissist emotions and only partially controlled immature subjectivism. *Dandyism* as an ironical attitude of the authentic survivor in capitalist society supplemented by a strong feeling of sublimated interdependency among individuals, creates, in almost all of Wong's films, a social and emotional labyrinth from which none of his characters is able to escape.

This is what can be considered, in a more general way, as "pan-Asian dandyism." Those who consume today in a detached way, who make fun of consumption and at the same time of themselves are those young Asians who participate in a certain postmodern form of dandyism. Like dandies, they appear to be in a paradoxical way integrated and at the same time resisting capitalist consumer society. Do young Japanese girls who walk around with expensive Louis Vuitton bags as if they were gadgets not have something of modern dandies?[20] Yes, in a purely schematic way, because their consumerism has adopted traits that clearly transcend the classical models of bourgeois consumption. The symbolism of the Louis Vuitton bag as a classical attribute of bourgeois lifestyle has obviously been led *ad absurdum*. Also dandies like to hijack cultural symbols and to apply them within a new, self-made referential framework. At the same time these girls are *not* dandies because their "dandyism" does not create, as did, for example, the historical Japanese dandyism of *iki* culture,[21] a certain degree of individualism. For these Japanese girls, the classical dandy culture of resistance or renunciation has become an item for consumption in itself, just like all other items that are sold through our capitalist economic system. This means that, instead of resisting the impulse of consumption and of creating the more stringent style of the "real dandy," contemporary East Asian dandyism creates the coaxing and indulgent style of the "false dandy" that is so closely linked to the concept of *kawaii*. In a way, "dandyism" exceed itself here by undergoing an intercultural interpretation which repeats the paradoxical scheme of resistance-integration typical of East Asian modern culture. In any case, it parallels a model that the Japanese sinologist Yoshimi Takeuchi detected as early as 1948 when he wrote: "Through its continued resistance, the Orient appears to have produced non-European things that are mediated by, while at the same time exceeding, the European."[22]

The *Kawaii* Sphere

Already in *As Tears Go By*, a gangster movie in the style of John Woo, Wong explored the theme of the immature person. Fly would "rather be a three-minute hero" than "be a fly all my life." In most of Wong's films the characters are linked through a structure of dependence that Takeo Doi has called the structure of *amae*.

In classical Japanese aesthetics, this structure has been *opposed* to that of the dandyist style of *iki*. In Wong's films, however, the coaxing *amae*-dandy is the rule. A recurring theme is that of one person attempting to get closer to another person without having the courage to commit him/herself to a real relationship. In *Days of Being Wild*, *Chungking Express*, *Fallen Angels*, *Happy Together*, and *In the Mood for Love*, people remain obsessively undecided. In *Days of Being Wild*, Yuddie (Leslie Cheung) treats his girlfriends irresponsibly but goes coaxingly to his stepmother whom he accuses of being responsible for all the misfortunes that have happened in his life. His stepmother is no less irresponsible because she refuses to disclose the identity of Yuddie's real mother, afraid that her son's attention for her will diminish.

In *Chungking Express*, Faye (Faye Wong) breaks into Cop 663's (Tony Leung) apartment, which is an extremely childish act. She refuses to take responsibility for what she has done by making herself believe that everything has taken place in an act of sleepwalking. Throughout the film Faye appears like a sort of handicapped Gelsomina, childishly sulking and hardly able to speak. When Cop 663 finally wants to date her, she rebukes him. Cop 223 (Takeshi Kaneshiro) demonstrates an equally immature behavior. He decides to fall in love with "the first woman that I walk into" and is convinced that she will like him. In a way, he is going through reality like adolescents go through computer games: detached, full of illusions and unprepared to have "real" feelings.

In *Fallen Angels*, the killer's agent (Michelle Reis) has a vamp-like outfit that seems to be inspired by manga-like kitsch style. But in spite of her outfit she insists that she is a "docile girl," which seems to mean in the first place that she is unable to take initiatives. Also the killer (Leon Lai) clearly states that he likes "the others to make decisions for me." He shies away from responsibility of any sort and does not even come to a meeting to tell his assistant about his decision. The agent desperately seeks to get closer to the killer but tells herself at the same time that "it can be boring to know too much of a person."

Very much shaped by kitschified lifestyles is Blondie who is outright childish, overly happy when it rains, and obsessed (like many other characters in Wong's films) by the desire to be noticed and not to be forgotten.

In *Happy Together*, the main characters' perpetually recurring suggestion to start their relationship "from scratch" is naive, abstract and innocent. Ho Po-wing (Leslie Cheung) is a sort of coaxing child. He gives Lai Yiu-fai (Tony Leung) his watch but later wants it back. "You don't even notice that they have smashed my face. You could at least have said something," he complains. In this film a kitsch lamp becomes the symbol of the couple's desires.

I suggest that a prominent structure of *amae*—which is so important for the formation of the aesthetics of the *kawaii*—makes Wong's films fundamentally East Asian, and this the more so as it produces a certain aesthetic effect: All the characters' actions, captured as they are within the people's *amae*, appear as strangely self-contained or perhaps even "virtual." This brings us to another aspect that Wong's films share with contemporary East Asian culture: that of "life" as a dreamlike experience.

The Dream Sphere

Unable to live a "real" life, the characters in Wong's films decide to reside in a commodified dreamworld without *real* relationships, limiting their real activities to coaxing. Wong's films have been described as tragedies of missed encounters. However, where is the tragedy? As a matter of fact, tragedies are impossible here because Wong does not write dramas where the plots develop a tension. One of the reasons is that the deconstruction of storylines, the doubling of characters, etc. destroy any particular perspective from which the story can be seen which creates the impression of something virtual or of a dream. It has been noticed that *Fallen Angels* is the 3rd act of *Chunking Express* and the continuation of *As Tears Go By*. In *Days of Being Wild* a new character (Tony Leung) appears at the end of the film without having any connection with the story. In a similar way, the episode with Su Lizhen in *2046* does not fit in the rest of the story. Furthermore, there are strange déjà vu effects, which show, for example, the agent's cleaning of the killer's apartment like a dream-reminiscence from *Chungking Express*.

When Faye cleans Cop 633's apartment in *Chungking Express*, Wong presents this event through a dreamlike perspective by letting Faye say:

> I had a dream that afternoon
> I seemed to have been in his house
> I thought I was going to wake up when I left the house
> What I don't know is that from some dreams
> You simply never wake up

Faye also wonders "if sleepwalking can be passed on to others." At times, Faye's speech is overlaid with "California Dreaming" and thus inaudible, a simple device showing that she is living in a dream.

But Cop 663 does not act like a mature person either. He does not fully notice that Faye has changed his flat, contemplates objects like a nerd who is absorbed in his own dream of a life. The film ends like a dream in which persons have changed identity: Cop 633 becomes the restaurant owner and Faye becomes the stewardess.

Wong's concentration on details, apparently free montage of sketches, experimentation with images and a somehow disconnected presence of characters which are simply there without being inscribed in a clear dramatic structure, lets this film become dreamlike. "Dreams are made only of beginnings," said Paul Valéry.[23] Wong does not tell stories but merely shows fragmented aspects of ways of life.

At times Wong allows elements from "real" life to penetrate the net of human relationships that have never had a chance to become "real": brutal gangster life. However, even this does not appear to be real. The fighting scenes are like dream sequences not because they are in slow-motion but because they are out of place.[24] The self-reflexivity that the film establishes makes us think

is just a scene. Wong's melodrama is abstract: It aims to be a melodrama as such or a melodrama with a metaphysical status.

Manga

The deconstruction of real stories or simply of "real life" and its replacement by a dreamworld constructed around the desire of *amae* and the drive towards consumption is often supported in Wong's films by the kind of manga aesthetics that is becoming ubiquitous in modern East Asia. As mentioned, the killer's agent's and Blondie's aesthetic outfits in *Fallen Angels* have manga features. This aesthetics is fully explored in the "science fiction" dream-sequences of *2046*. These stylized androids who wear space-suit-bikinis and who are somehow reminiscent of the ironic kitsch creations of the video artist Mariko Mori, seem to have stepped directly out of a manga.

Wong's films have been likened to MTV aesthetics because of his use of "striking camera angles, abrupt cuts, visual ellipses, sudden dislocations . . ."[25] I would claim that Wong's films have something of a manga. Wimal Dissanayake notes that "rather than focus on full-body action shots or close-ups on faces and acrobatics in brilliant light, he focuses on shadowy figures partially seen through a haze as fragmented bodies in an encompassing thickness" (p. 60). This is manga aesthetics.

While classical American comics stylized their characters in unrealistic ways and let them act in slow-moving plots, Japanese mangas developed an extremely fast-moving and complex visual language. First of all, the visual vocabulary became richer through the use of cinematic techniques like close-ups, fade-outs, montage, slow-motion, perspectives from different angles, etc.[26] In addition, the visual component became much more important than the text. The emphasis was now on the psychological state of the characters that manifested itself through facial expressions as well as through the atmosphere and the dynamics of the situation.[27]

In 2001, the manga artist Takashi Murakami presented, in a lecture, the opening scene of Spielberg's *Saving Private Ryan* and pointed to the "hyperrealistic fetishization of bullets piercing flesh as particularly American" which he contrasted with the melodramatic almost balletic slow-motion versions of such scenes in Japanese films.[28] In *Ashes of Time* many fighting scenes are filmed in slow-motion, which pushes them towards an utmost abstraction. This abstraction is pushed even further because, as Abbas finds, "invisibility is more important in Wong's fighting sequences than visibility. Very often action has been speeded up to a blur."[29] Nothing could be more opposed to the "American" realism described by Murakami.

The parallelism between Wong and mangas is not as amazing as it might appear. Wong's cinema has a direct link with Hong Kong action cinema that evolved in close contact with martial arts; and mangas integrated a lot of martial arts. But there is more to say about the abstract, hieroglyphic nature of Wong's images. Tesuka Osamu, the "father" of Japanese mangas, has said that manga

pictures are in the first place hieroglyphs. They are abstract and "read" like a graphic character.[30]

Dissanayake insists on the hieroglyphic nature of Wong's pictures and refers to Marie-Claire Ropars-Wuilleumier's studies on cinematic signs. According to her, the hieroglyphic nature of cinematic signification "challenges realistic assumptions and mimetic impulses in order to highlight the polysemous nature of cinematic signs" (p. 71).

It is not only the fighting scenes in *Ashes of Time* that are reminiscent of mangas but also the rhythmic images with which Wong sketches the crowds in *Happy Together*; or the stroboscopic chase sequences in *As Tears Go By*. In general, the highly stylized, abstract quality of Wong's images creates a realism that is well known from mangas: The *objects* that are seen are not stylized but realistically produced; but the *images* are stylized and alienated from the concrete content they express. Interestingly, this strategy helps—in Wong's films as much as in mangas—to avoid overly melodramatic impressions even at times when the story *is* utterly melodramatic.

It goes without saying that within this aesthetic system the formation of a really *dramatic* storyline is difficult. The images of this "story" are rather perceived from moment to moment, from aspect to aspect, and at times the storyline can become an almost secondary feature. This might not be obvious in the overall production of mangas but is true for the more and more popular Japanese "amateur mangas." The sociologist Sharon Kinsella analyzes amateur mangas as—in some respects—extreme manifestations of manga aesthetics; she detects an almost total absence of narrative structure: "The symbolic appearance of characters and the emotion attached to the characters' situations [can] become more important than the traditional plot."[31] It remains to note that this also corresponds with Paul Valéry's definition of dreams: "In dreams there is [only] the rule of the linear and the superficial. There is no perspective [and] everything appears word for word."[32]

Last but not least, mangas, as the prime examples of escapism from post-industrial society that they are, are products of East Asian *kawaii* culture. Being made for and featuring "passionless cultural connoisseurs," "crystal people" and introverted consumers born into relative affluence and lost in the realm of aesthetics, mangas are foremost examples of a Pan-Asian dandyist consumer culture.

There is a marvelous Japanese example of fusion of "serious" literature with manga aesthetics which bears, in my opinion, parallels with Wong Kar-wai's films: the novels of Banana Yoshimoto who acknowledges mangas as a primary influence of her works.[33] In her novels, just like in most mangas, the main protagonist is most often the *shôjo* (young girl). The *shôjo* is an immature figure who lacks "libidinal agency of her own," is unproductive and, finally and in the context of capitalist society, "not real." In other words, the *shôjo* is *kawaii*: she cannot express herself and is stuck between reality and fantasy. The vacuous sense of her life is compensated by a kind of cold, idealized romanticism that often ends up as a simulated life.

Also in Banana's fiction we read mainly about *amours impossibles*: near incestuous pairs of half-siblings, playful flirtations with stepfathers, narcissist self-love, and lesbian attractions whose nostalgic objects become dreamlike and unreal. And all this happens in overpopulated cities emptied of human feelings but richly filled with consumable commodities.

Conclusion

Wong's films, Banana's novels, and mangas, typically homegrown cultural productions of East Asia that they are, depict neo-humanist attempts to survive in a capitalist environment. They are based on a common East Asian escapist cultural experience in which culture appears less than ever as a real world containing objectified elements but in which culture has become a dream language able to produce itself spontaneously and in a strangely self-sufficient manner. This is why I said at the beginning of this chapter that Wong's work should not be seen as a selective amalgamation of "East" and "West" but as a phenomenon flowing out of the sphere of modern East Asian culture. The dream language of East Asia is "pure" to the extent that elements (from Eastern and Western cultures) have not merely been "used," combined, and fused; on the contrary, the pictorial language appears at any moment to have been spontaneously created with the same naiveté with which Leslie Cheung suggests starting the same relationship always anew and "from scratch."

In other words, here "culture" is not so much evoked as a geographical and historical reality but appears as something that bears imagined and fictionalized characteristics *from scratch* and by definition. Wong Kar-wai's films are examples of such contemporary East Asian aesthetics as his images are like riddles or, as Walter Benjamin has pointed out with regard to modernity in general, as "picture puzzles" that persistently elude semiotic fixation.[34]

This is also the reason why I am extremely cautious when it comes to evaluations of Wong's oeuvre in terms of cultural decadence or pessimism. Dissanayake—though he is not the only one—believes that "the world that WKW repeatedly recreates is one of decadence, exhaustion, decay and ruin. A focus on fragmentation, rather than on totality, is a way of highlighting the contours of this world" (p. 124). That this is not necessarily true becomes clear when we think of the cultural framework of *kawaii* into which the present chapter attempted to integrate Wong's films. The *kawaii*, as Larissa Hjorth has said, is "not about post-humanism but rather a clear demonstration of neo-humanist types."[35] In this sense, East Asian *kawaii* culture, just like Wong's films, should be understood as desperate attempts to create a dreamlike humanist space within the harsh reality of globalized capitalism.

Notes

1. Stephen Teo insists very much on Wong's films as manifestations of "contemporary localism" that is global and local at the same time. *Wong Kar-wai* (London: British Film Institute, 2005), 161.

2. Teo, 152-53.

3. Jenny Kwok Wah Lau, "'Farewell My Concubine': History, Melodrama, and Ideology in Contemporary Pan-Chinese Cinema" in *Film Quarterly* 49:1, 1995, 16-27, see 22.

4. See my chapter "Wabi-sabi/Kitsch/Virtual: The Aesthetics of Frozen Dreams (with a Note on Mariko Mori)" in Thorsten Botz-Bornstein, *Virtual Reality: The Last Human Narrative* (Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi, 2007). The word *kawaii* comes originally from the Chinese as *ke'ai* ( ). Today the Japanese word *kawaii* is getting more and more popular among Chinese youths. The Chinese magazine *Rayli* ( ), for example, distributes every month lots of information about the Japanese and Korean entertainment and fashion industry and is more accessible to Chinese youths than European fashion magazines. A special issue from 2006 was: "Childlike 31 Days." See also a dialogue from Chun Sue's novel *Beijing Doll* (New York: Penguin, 2004) [Chinese: 2002]: "Then why do you want to be with me?—Because . . . because you're cute.—Just because somebody's cute doesn't mean she is stupid.—Cute and stupid, same thing" (90).

5. Sharon Kinsella, "Cuties in Japan" in Lise Skov and Brian Moeran (eds.), *Women, Media and Consumption in Japan* (Honoloulu: Hawai'i University Press, 1995). The article is available on Kinsella's website.

6. See Tzu-I Chuang, "The Power of Cuteness: Female Infantilization in Urban Taiwan" in *Greater China* Summer 2005, 21-28.

7. Anne Allison, "The Cultural Politics of Pokemon Capitalism" in *Media in Transition 2: Globalization and Convergence* (Massachusetts Institute of Technology), 3.

8. Natalie Augier, "The Cute Factor" in *New York Times* Jan. 3, 2006.

9. Cf. Brian McVeigh, "cuteness is not just a fad in the fashion cycle of Japanese pop culture; it is more of a 'standard' aesthetic of everyday life." *Wearing Ideology: State, Schooling and Self-Presentation in Japan* (New York: Berg, 2000), 135.

10. Takeo Doi, *The Anatomy of Dependence* (New York, London, Tokyo: Kodansha, 1973).

11. Cf. Chris Berry, "If China Can Say No, Can China Make Movies? Or Do Movies Make China? Rethinking National Cinema and National Agency" in *Boundary 2* 25:3, Fall 1998, 129-50, 140; and Sheldon Hsiao-Peng Lu: "Postmodernity, Popular Culture, and the Intellectual: A Report on Post-Tiananmen China" in *Boundary 2* 23:2, 1996, 139-69, see 154.

12. Naoki Sakai, *Translation and Subjectivity. On Japan and Cultural Nationalism.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

13. Tsung-yi Michelle Huang, "Mutual Gazing and Self-Writing: Revisiting the Tale of Hong Kong and Shanghai as Global City-Regions" in *Concentric: Literary and Cultural Studies* 31:1 (January 2005), 71-93. Abbas Ackbar, "Cosmopolitan Descriptions: Shanghai and Hong Kong" in *Public Culture* 12:3, 2000, 769-86.

14. Miriam Bratu Hansen, "Fallen Women, Rising Stars, New Horizons: Shanghai Film as Vernacular Modernism" in *Film Quarterly* 54:1, 2000, 10-22, see 13-14: "[These] most sophisticated and vibrant works of silent cinema worldwide" continue "the heritage of May 4th movement."

15. For the time being it cannot be assumed by the Chinese because the population of the Republic of China does not seem to be prepared to appreciate the intrinsic paradoxical mixture of anti-traditionalism and anti-modernism that this literature offers.

Novels by Shanghai authors like Ding Ling or Ba Jin from the 1930s are reminiscent of Wong's stories. Ba Jin's *Autumn in Springtime*, for example, tells of an impossible relationship though, of course, in the end, this relationship is impossible because of traditional society's insistence on arranged marriages. But the overall tone of the book highlights more the existential absurdities of the situation than the politically motivated need of social reform. A pessimism or nihilism proper to Lu Xun, links Wong rather to the cultural sphere of Shanghai's 1930s than to that of present China.

16. Liu Kang, "Popular Culture and the Culture of the Masses" in *Boundary 2* Fall 1997, 110.

17. Tsung-yi-Huang, "Hong Kong Blue: *Flâneurerie* with the Camera's Eye in a Phantasmagoric City" in *Journal of Narrative Theory* 30:3 2000, 385-402, see 385.

18. Elisabeth Wilson, "The Invisible Flaneur" in S. Watson and K. Gibson (eds.), *Postmodern Cities and Spaces* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), 73.

19. Jules Barbey d'Aurevilly, *L'Amour impossible*, in *Œuvres complètes*, 17 vols (Paris: Bernouard, 1926-27), Vol. 9, 147.

20. The specialist on Japan, sociologist Brian McVeigh, has listed the main traits of this peculiar "resistance" culture which seem for me to overlap with the main characteristics of dandyism: "Resistance consumption does not forcibly question, it raises doubts; it does not directly challenge, it playfully provokes; it does not deride, it humorously mocks; it does not threaten, it ignores; it does not attempt an overthrow, it briefly displaces; it is not insurgent, it is carnavalesque; it does not subvert, it diverts attentions (if only temporarily) from the dominant structures; it does not stage a political revolution, it encourages participation in hedonistic agitation. Practices associated with the consumption of cuteness are not antistate or anticorporation in any organized, explicit or obvious sense; they are not self-conscious 'political statements'." *Wearing Ideology: State, Schooling and Self-Presentation in Japan* (New York: Berg, 2000), 158.

21. See my article "Iki, Style, Trace: Shuzo Kuki and the Spirit of Hermeneutics" in *Philosophy East and West* 47:4, October 1997, 554-80 as well as my article from 1995 on the idea of "real" and "false" dandyism: "Rulefollowing in Dandyism: Style as an Overcoming of Rule and Structure" in *The Modern Language Review* 90, April 1995, 285-95.

22. Yoshimi Takeuchi, *What is Modernity? Writings of Takeuchi Yoshimi* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 56.

23. Paul Valéry, *Questions du rêve* in *Cahiers Paul Valéry III* (Paris: Gallimard, 1929), 194.

24. If we compare Wong's films with those of Stanley Kwan, this becomes obvious. Also Kwan's *Lan Yu* is melodramatic and treats a theme similar to that of *Happy Together*, but his slow-motion scenes do not have the same effect as in Wong's films.

25. Wimal Dissanayake, *Wong Kar-Wai's Ashes of Time* (Hong Kong University Press, 2003), 71.

26. See Frederic L. Schodt, *Manga! Manga! The World of Japanese Comics* (New York: Kodansha, 1984), 160 ff.

27. Kinko Ito: "A History of Manga in the Context of Japanese Culture and Society" in *Journal of Popular Culture* 38, 2005, 457.

28. Quoted from Michael Darling, "Plumbing the Depth of Superflatness" in *Art Journal* 60:3, 2001, 79.

29. From Dissanayake, 89.

30. There seems to be a tradition of "hieroglyphization" in Chinese cinema since Miriam Bratu Hansen has said that in Shanghai silent films "the lights of Shanghai are abstracted into hieroglyphs." Hansen, 2000, 15.

31. "Japanese Subculture in the 1990s: Otaku and the Amateur Manga Movement" in *Journal of Japanese Studies* 24:2, 1998, 289-316, see 301.

32. *Cahiers Paul Valéry III*, 55.

33. Cf. John Whittier Treat: "Yoshimoto Banana Writes Home: Shojo Culture and the Nostalgic Subject" in *Journal of Japanese Studies* 19:2, 1993, 353-87.

34. "Passagenwerk" in *Werke I*, "Introduction."

35. Larissa Hjorth: "Odours of Mobility: Mobile Phones and Japanese Cute Culture" in *Asia-Pacific Journal of Intercultural Studies* 26: 1-2, 2005, 39-55, see 44.

Chapter Eight

Aesthetics and Mysticism: Plotinus, Tarkovsky, and the Question of "Grace"

Is there a reason to associate the Neo-Platonic philosopher Plotinus (204-270 CE) to the Russian film director Andrei Tarkovsky? At first sight, these two people do not seem to have much in common except that one has produced, among other things, an aesthetics of images approaching a kind of aesthetic mysticism, and that the other has practiced the art of cinema with a philosophical ambition that some would like to qualify as "mystical."

Did I say "mystical"? Bergson has often insisted that Plotinus always maintained a clear distinction between "mysticism" and "dialectic," saying that these two movements seem to overlap only when approached from afar.[1] On the other hand, even without such a definite link between Plotinus and mysticism, the concession that mysticism would have "knocked several times at [Plotinus's] door" must be taken seriously with regard to any analysis of his philosophy. In reality, Plotinus is to be located in a field stretching between mystical temptations and a certain "Greek intellectualism" that remains well established throughout all of his philosophy. Only in this sense does Plotinus confront us, as Emile Bréhier says, with a "unification of rationalism and mysticism." Such unification might appear to us today as either unacceptable or interesting precisely because of its paradoxical aspect.

Also, for many people Tarkovsky's "spiritualist" penchant flows out of a religious, "non-modern" attitude, and has given rise to mystical interpretations leading to mystifying stylizations of Tarkovsky especially during the post-Soviet era. On the other hand, Tarkovsky is, like Plotinus, the heir of a rationalist tradition strongly marked by scientific formalism which was actively developed in Eisensteinian cinema.

For Tarkovsky as for Plotinus, there is thus a rupture and at the same time, a non-rupture with certain rationalist movements. Plotinus abandoned research into rational structures of the moral unity preached by Plato, Aristotle and the

Stoics, and attempted to approach his "mystical union" directly. However, the unified and integral character of the "mystical union" remained inspired—and this is what constitutes the paradox—by the Platonic tradition. In a similar way, Tarkovsky advances a poetical way of reasoning whose structure, he proposes, is not removed from but is extremely close to intellectual reasoning. This reasoning attempts to overcome superficial models of contemplation in order to embrace all truth and all complexity of human life. If mysticism subsists here, it is not an end in itself, but functions in the service of a "higher rationality."

For Plotinus, mystical knowledge is only, according to Bréhier, "the clear and living experience satisfying the aspiration to unity, i.e. the fundamental aspiration of reason."[2] For Tarkovsky, reason, or even ethics, requires a transformation of formal logic into a "logic of dreams," because the poetry of dreams represents for him "one way of being conscious of the world" and supports our efforts to "face reality" (*Sculpting in Time*, 21). This means that intellect, in Plotinus and in Tarkovsky, is not overcome in order to reach an intellectual level of mysticism, a mysticism creating blurred images and hazy ideas and asking intellect to settle definitely in a sphere of vagueness and exaltation. Rather, intellect itself becomes the origin of wisdom.

The intention to simply overcome intelligence, on the other hand, would entail that everything floats away "into a dream" as says Plotinus: "Then the real man of dignity must ascend in due measure, with an absence of boorish arrogance, going only so far as our nature is able to go, and consider that there is room for the others at God's side, and not set himself alone next after God. This is like flying in our dreams and will deprive him of becoming a God, even as far as the human soul can. It can as far as intellect leads it; but oneself above intellect is immediately to fall outside it" (II, 9, 9, 1. 49).[3]

For Plotinus, Greek intellectualism subsists through a strategy that is never abandoned: keeping us from evil by keeping us first from ignorance, since ignorance is considered the primordial evil.[4] On the other hand, Plotinus certainly *can* be considered as the parent of medieval mystics like Meister Eckhart and A. Silesius. Tarkovsky, since for some he evokes the mystical atmosphere linked to a non-modern or pre-modern age, comes perhaps close to just these mystics. However, what is fundamentally important is that, as mentioned above, Plotinus and Tarkovsky have merely touched upon mysticism without ever leaving the ground of rationality that their predecessors firmly established. Possibly, this makes their works intriguing for later generations overcome by crises of reason.

If there is mysticism in Tarkovsky and Plotinus, this mysticism remains always "disquieting" in that it never defines itself as a final position. In the end, neither mysticism nor rationalism are accepted as intellectual forms. For Plotinus, the only supreme force that remains is pure intellect representing a quantity "without form." Brunschvicg, despite reservations about Plotinus's philosophy, has highlighted this by writing: "How can we elude the question eternally asked by mysticism without ever obtaining the quietude of undivided evidence?"[5] Today, when criticism of scientific rationality based on Galileo and Descartes occupies a more and more important place in philosophical activity,

the refusal of such quietude can certainly appear even more attractive than in Brunschvicg's day.

Tarkovsky's and Plotinus's situations are thus not, despite the temporal gap by which they are separated, incomparable. W. Theiler describes how Plotinus desired to "escape the cage constituted by his contemporary world in which all activity was predetermined, and where man's interior progress was constantly limited (already by the fact that man had lost all faith in new discoveries). [Plotinus therefore wanted] to pursue the idea that the 'highest' is irrational, non-determined, and unlimited."[6] Plotinus's supreme value became that of beauty superimposed with truth, spelled out as a "spiritual" quality.

Plotinus loathed the complex materialism of the Stoics and the less complex materialism of Democritos and Epicurus,[7] while Tarkovsky confronted the duplicitous materialism—no less complex than that of the Stoics—that was rendered through simultaneous Marxist and Capitalist interpretations. His response was an art whose images "express themselves all alone" and which can, thanks to their inherent non-semiotic and non-scientific tendency, appear "mystical."

The Simplicity of Images

Brunschvicg has described the function of images in Plotinus saying that these apparently "simple" images nevertheless escape, through their very simplicity, any "quietude" offered by "official" philosophical strategies like idealism or materialism: "The historians of Plotinus, obeying their doubts or biases, forced themselves to introduce his thought into the divisional framework to which they were accustomed: immanence or transcendence, procession or emanation, pantheism or theism. But the causality of the One is established precisely in order to foil any attempt of classification by concepts: it can be grasped only with the help of images borrowed from the sight of organic or inorganic nature" (84).

Plotinus and Tarkovsky share not only a "disquieting mysticism," but also arguments concerning the "simplicity" of images. What is striking in Tarkovsky's films is a certain aesthetic "necessity" present in the form of a profound and underlying language. Whether this language can be qualified as "rational" or as "artistic-mystical" is secondary. Important is that the root of Tarkovsky's expressions cannot be localized in a pure *imaginatio*, that is in an imaginative act in the proper sense of the term, and this is amazing for an artist working first of all with images. For Tarkovsky artistic expressions have to "come from inner necessity, from an organic process going on in the material as a whole" (*Sculpting,* 120). An organic whole is formed by an "inner necessity" (121), which arises out of the "inner dynamic of the mood of the situation" (74). The "image" is thus inscribed in a rhythm of necessity and not in the "imagination." This might be surprising for us though in the Middle Ages, and in the Renaissance one would have affirmed that the image must always *be in* the mind of the artist. An image always preexists in a preliminary form, or else it comes

out of the spirit, that is it is immediately produced by a spiritual-artistic act. Panofsky explains that during the Renaissance nobody would have accepted beauty as being "the daughter of imagination."[8] This intimate appreciation of artistic values developed beyond the idea of pure appearance, also remains the exclusive attribute of Plotinus's philosophy.

Marsilio Ficino was impressed, during the Renaissance, by the Plotinian experience through which "one grasps 'beautiful images' instead of propositions, just like the life of Gods within the intelligible."[9] Imagination, on the other hand, remained an "inferior function," purely reproductive and so to speak "non-spiritual." Consequently, it was seen as never being able to free itself from the "mud of matter" (Krakovski).

The Problem of Materialism and Subjectivism

Tarkovsky was well aware of the philosophical problems linked to the subjectivity of perception. It could not be otherwise, since the preceding generation of Russian film directors had chosen as a preferred subject the destruction of all subjectivism in cinematographic art. The opposition of Tarkovsky and Eisenstein can be explained by the fact that, among other things, the younger intended to modify the final result obtained by the materialist deconstruction of subjectivist empathy, a deconstruction carried out before by the Eisensteinian materialism-formalism. This does not mean that Tarkovsky would have liked to re-establish, through a simple act of conservation, the idea of subjectivist empathy as it existed in pre-formalist aesthetics. On the contrary, he wanted to go further and bestow a new, more philosophical, value to empathy as well as to any artistic "feeling." Any idea of empathy remains inscribed in a *Platonic* philosophical project. To overcome this project was the aim of Tarkovsky as well as of Plotinus.

Alternatively, the "alienation effect" invented by the Russian formalists, presents itself as a rationalist strategy whose objective is to avoid the banality of any relationship between subject and object—a relationship that will inevitably become "banal" at the moment the subject "imposes" itself to the contemplated object. Subjectivism becomes "banal" because, just like hedonism, it sees only those things that it wants to see, without letting the subjectivist perspective undergo the slightest act of refraction. This refraction can be imposed upon the subjectivist way of seeing by the material itself. This was at least the approach applied by the formalists, and it is furthermore for this reason that Formalism must be seen as a form of materialism.

It has been recognized only much later that all materialism eventually becomes as banal as subjectivism. Materialism recognizes only those things as real—and there it also resembles hedonism—that are material, without ever asking, since it rejects the existence of things spiritual in the first place, what "spiritual" input could provide a thinking subject. Regrettably, this point was rarely taken into consideration by the formalists themselves since they might not even have seen it as a problem. Tarkovsky as an artist inclined towards "the

spiritual" had to unravel a knot of ideas that had firmly established itself in formalist aesthetic theory.

Plotinus was confronted with problems on the same order. Plotinus remains an anti-materialist, but is he as much and for these reasons a subjectivist? Despite the objections of many specialists, Bréhier considers Plotinus as a subjective idealist. A priori, because he aspires to a "mystical union," Plotinus should be classified as a subjectivist because the refusal of "materialism" can only lead to its contrary—subjectivism. Still, the "mystical union" of Plotinus's design is not as simplistic as the union which is usually advanced by subjectivism. If, according to Plotinus, the "mystical union" attains the highest degree of mysticism, it does so through highly complex philosophical reflections.

To know the world "in a simple manner" by avoiding, within the act of contemplation, all abstract deformations, rationalist or scientific, does not imply the assimilation of this world to one's personal and subjective vision. Such simplification mirrors the kind of simplification typical of the scientific approach (of positivism which can be considered as the "first son" of subjectivism, for example).

Plotinus is certainly not looking for *such* a kind of simplicity. His aim is to see things and the entire world without adapting them to any definite perspective, neither to that of subjectivism nor to that of objectivism. This is what constitutes the "mystical" vision in Plotinus. Plotinus's bodily attitude (practice of asceticism) as well as his spiritual attitude strives towards utmost simplicity. Constant exercise brings about a metamorphosis of the regard which attempts to see only the divine presence: "When it looks upon the authentic existences it is looking upon itself; its vision as its effective existence, and this efficacy is itself since the Intellectual-Principle and the Intellectual Act are one: This is an integral seeing itself by its entire being, not a part seeing but a part" (V, 3, 6).

By explaining that all things proceed from the "One," Plotinus hopes to avoid all mechanisms that would complicate our perception. To say that all things come from an absolute One means that things are just what they are, that they present themselves to our eyes in an absolutely simple manner, and that they need no auxiliary language, neither the language of objective science nor that of an "empathizing" and subjective approach. In this way, they truly appear as what they are.

In Plotinus, the absolute immediacy through which things are communicated to the observer is also reminiscent of certain pre-formalist ideas that existed in Europe at the beginning of modernity, known under the name of philosophy of *Einfühlung* or of empathy.[10] Paradoxically, Plotinus's immediacy is also reminiscent of formalism itself, which had decided, through the famous "alienation effect," to brutally extradite things to the sphere outside their subjective context in order to make things speak "directly." It is clear that Plotinus chooses neither the way of empathy nor that of alienation. As a matter of fact, not only empathy, but also the "alienation effect" remain profoundly Platonic since for Plato, *vision* always remains, as has said Pierre Hadot, a "presence at distance" (Introduction to VI, 9, 43).

Plotinus is not a subjectivist but rather an intuitive metaphysician similar to Schelling, Ravaisson and Bergson for whom art "prints the things in us" ("imprime les choses en nous") but who do not reduce art to a simple movement of expression retrievable by subjective empathy. In Plotinus's philosophy, the individual consciousness of the subject entirely negates itself within a mystical union. Certainly, Plotinus here can be no further removed from a philosophy of empathy. On the other hand, the "imprints" that our soul perceives are not "marks of a seal engraved in the soul" either (as for example, Epicurian sensualism would hold): "Memory is not to be explained as the retainer of information in virtue of the lingering of an impression which in fact was never made; either an impression is made upon the mind and lingers when there is remembrance, or, denying the impression, we cannot hold that memory is its lingering" (IV, 6, 1). An impression is rather produced at the moment man makes an aesthetic experience in the form of an authentic and spiritual act, and the subject is not looking for an object but for a "presence."

Truth and Alienation

More precisely, Plotinus is looking for what he calls the "intelligible," and this is grasped neither by brute sensation nor by abstraction or analysis. As mentioned above, it is something one finds without searching, through "simple" contemplation. "Simple contemplation" was certainly a project also pursued by the Russian formalists who, within a wave of generalized anti-idealism, turned against everything that resembled a philosophy of empathy. This is how they began, for example, to place their objects in particularly unusual contexts in order to confront the spectator in a shocking and provocative manner with the object itself. The "brutal" effect brought about by this experience was supposed to communicate things in a thoroughly immediate way. Of course, a stone placed grotesquely in an unusual environment (in a soup dish for example) will appear as even more "stony" than normal. The problem that was gradually discovered with regard to this theory of perception was, however, that it would develop into nothing other than pure materialism. This means that, through its very nature, formalism developed away from aesthetic contemplation. Tarkovsky's task was to "reapply" the fundamental idea of the "alienation effect" to questions linked to truly aesthetic theory and practice.

Also in Plotinus we find the conviction that beauty is realized only through a "shock" experience: "So Intellect was raised to that height and stayed there, happy in being around that God; but the soul also which was able turned to it and, when it knew and saw, rejoiced in the vision and, insofar as it was able to see, was utterly amazed. It saw as if in utter amazement, and, since it held something of it in itself, it had an intimate awareness of it . . ." (VI, 7, 31).[11] First, it must be understood that Plotinus is still speaking of "simple" contemplation here. Simple because carried out by a spectator "able to contemplate," that is whose soul has adopted a "certain attitude": "Such vision is for those only who see with the soul's sight—and at the vision, they will rejoice, and awe will fall

upon them and a trouble deeper than all the rest could ever stir, for now they are moving in the realm of Truth" (I, 6, 4). Here, it is not the materialist arrangement of things that brings about immediate aesthetic experience. On the contrary, it is through a certain spiritual attitude that we rediscover all those things that we already knew before (in the form of traces and shades), but which appear now, all of a sudden, as an "authentic" reality.[12] In this way, one is bound to leave behind opinions and "dream images" in order to unite with the authentic "Good." It is obvious that here "to contemplate" no longer signifies "to see an object," but that it refers to the union of object and subject: "By principle they see principle and are linked with it, by like they have contact with the like . . ." (VI, 9.11). The question of subjectivism does not even arise here since it is the subject itself that has modified its status and its being. This is a theory of perception founded on immediate experience excluding, by its very nature, any risk of falling back into the trap of a philosophy of empathy which is only possible because, as Bréhier says, "the intelligible world remains precisely that interior side of things whose knowledge seems to be a sort of deepening of sensation (approfondissement de la sensation) rather than an abstraction" (xvi). (This sensation should not be understood in the materialist sense of the term.)

The famous German aesthetician Oskar Walzel addressed the technical "devices" (priëmy) that were developed by the Russian formalists by investigating the devices by means of a special notion of *form* that he derived directly from Plotinus's conception. Walzel's opposition of Plotinus and the Russian formalists is supposed to indicate as clearly as possible the direction into which modern "formalist" humanities (*Geisteswissenschaften*) should develop: It should be a science that has overcome the *initial* stage of formalism and that has developed a new, more complex one. In *Vom Geistesleben alter und neuer Zeit* Walzel writes: "This form—in Plotinus's sense—is not based on technical devices but indicates rather an interior relationship between exterior appearance and its spiritual presupposition" (57).[13]

The development of Russian formalism towards a Plotinian "formalism" has been realized by no one better than by Tarkovsky. The conception of the image that should, according to Tarkovsky, manifest "an organic link between idea and form" culminates in an aesthetics of non-symbolic images communicated without passing through the intermediary of the (interpreting) intellect. Tarkovsky's images present the transcendent or the divine directly, without appeal to the intellect, perhaps in a way contrary to traditional Platonism.

Tarkovsky considered cinema and music as "immediate" art forms. He quoted Gogol's conviction that the function of the image is not to express ideas about life but life itself. The pictorial "expression" is not symbolic or even "signifying." Rather it requires a "spiritual" receiver able to unite himself with this expression by means of "simple" contemplation. The "expression" is not constructed here, but results from an observation that can be grasped perfectly through Plotinus's philosophy: "If nature creates these organisms, this will be an immediate art. Nature is like a painter who contents himself with looking at his model, while the image draws itself on the canvas all alone.[14]

Plotinus's main idea of art parallels Tarkovsky's cinematographic conception, since Tarkovsky insisted that "the fundamental element of cinema comes from observation." Life's pure observation asks only for contemplation, and no intellectualism—be it materialist or subjective—has the right to interfere. Certainly, for this reason, Tarkovsky's conception can still appear as "mystic." Pètr Kral has written concerning "Tarkovsky's philosophy" that "the All would be, altogether, the fact to accept the world's strangeness without resigning oneself to it, and this as a final opening. If the whole world seems to inhabit these images, men will reunite in its center."[15] The simplicity of the image is represented here by strangeness, perhaps that of a dream which—paradoxically—does not appear as strange but as authentic.

Finally, Plotinus's ideas correspond not only to Tarkovsky's aesthetics but also to that brand of cinema theory called "dreamlike realism" developed by André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer. Kracauer denied the possibility that cinema could be painting because painting would be unable to offer "raw material." Instead, it would console us with extracts of material reality. Still, what Kracauer develops is not "materialism," even if the same words written by a formalist theorist could or should have been interpreted as such.

What Kracauer produces is rather a "mysticism" holding that "reality" can immediately enter, in the form of "camera reality" ("Kamerarealität"), into cinema. The German term "Kamerarealität" well expresses the quasi-Plotinian fusion aspired by Krakauer: eye and object of vision become one, and reality and camera fuse into a camera-reality (cf. Kracauer, 62). At the same time, the impact of the "shock theory" subsists here, since the raw material is still able to shock us—and this not only because of a certain intellectualist arrangement—but also due to the *presence* it retains. In the moment we are confronted with the camera-reality, the world appears as an absolute. In this state, even the distinction between dream and reality becomes relative. This does not mean that reality appears as "weakened as in a dream." On the contrary, as a dream it can appear more real than reality. Kracauer claims that films will appear as dreams just because in films we are emotionally "moved by the raw and unpainted presence of the objects" (224). Contact with reality is, in these images, still fresh and immediate, and it is this shocking authenticity that lets them appear as dreams.

Dream and Grace

At the center of this theory can be found an aesthetic concept that goes along well with what Plotinus called "grace." Dreamlike realism searches for a quality of image graspable neither through empathy nor through abstract analysis. It is an image that must be "caught" through an act of dreaming. As a matter of fact, this dream is far removed from anything like "imagination," because its aim is to overcome all categories of consciousness and unconsciousness. Kracauer uses the German expression "to dream after something" (einer Sache nachträumen, 256) in the sense that one joins a thing by imagining it as it would appear in a

dream. This dream, which is simultaneously not a dream, catches reality not by representing it but by uniting itself with it.

Plotinus's grace as a quality that deeply influenced Renaissance thinkers, and which Schiller still referred to as the "beauty of the soul," is most radically opposed to materialism as well as to any theory of empathy. It is a non-present presence, a kind of suspended form not unrelated to the notion of "style" that we maintain today. It is the glow of the light of God (VI, 7, 22) and flows, as a "flash," directly out of the One. Grace is an essence to be realized in form; it has no direct relationship with the "exterior" aesthetic form since the exterior exhibits only signs. It is that which *irradiates* symmetry rather than symmetry itself (VI, 7, 22). In this way, it is immediately linked to this concrete simplicity or simple presence that bestows beauty on all material things (I, 6, 2) and that is perceived at first sight by those "who see with the Soul's sight" (I, 6, 4).[16]

Karacauer's preference for a "truth without make-up" is echoed by Plotinus's refusal of "made up dead bodies," by which he means all matter "intellectually arranged" without being touched by the illuminated essence of the *Intelligible*. "Grace exists through the feeling it expresses," said Ravaisson,[17] yet despite this it is not a "sentimental" matter developed for the pleasure of "empathic people." "To put one's own feelings into one's art is always vulgar," says Tarkovsky[18] (which likely explains his appreciation of Asian art). Grace, on the other hand, is not an object at all, and as a consequence, it does not require objective contemplation. All grace requires is a "simple" regard: looking at matter without searching for it because it is simply present.

In this way, matter can also appear as "spiritual," which is particularly manifest in Tarkovsky. The most extreme example is perhaps that of the astronaut Henri Berton. At the beginning of the film *Solaris*, we see him talking in a video nervously before a commission revealing his experiences on the remote planet of Solaris. He describes a strange fog which revealed visions of a garden or of a giant child. Clearly for Berton, who perceived the ocean Solaris as comprised of a "thousand changing and moving colors reminiscent of torrents, seaweed, grasses, and the wind of the planet it comes from," *matter* symbolizes nothing other than itself. Finally, only by making visible the substantial force that matter retains, "the ocean" has the chance to become "spiritual."

This principle can easily lead to a dreamlike realism which also concerned Plotinus. Jean Brun has said (in the context of a discussion on Plotinus), that "for the magic idealism of Novalis, there is no difference between the human body, which is a reduction of the cosmos, and the cosmos, which is a gigantic projection of the human body. This is why, still according to Novalis, there is no reason to distinguish the world that one is dreaming and the world *in which* one is dreaming" (Brun, 112). The matter that must be "caught by the dreams" thus invites us to a dreamlike contemplation of the world.

The distinction between matter and form which, according to Heidegger, has served since Plato and Aristotle "as the conceptual schema par excellence for any theory of art and every aesthetics,"[19] has, in Plotinus and Tarkovsky, been undermined by a mystical aesthetics. "Beauty," traditionally understood as the aesthetics of an exterior form, becomes synonymous with splendor or grace.

Notes

1. Bergson: *Les Deux Sources de la morale et de la religion* (Paris: Presses universitaires de France, 1962), 234.

2. Emile Bréhier, *La Philosophie de Plotin* (Paris: Vrin, 1968), 167.

3. Quotations from Plotinus are from *The Six Enneads*, transl. Stephen MacKenna and B.S. Page (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952).

4. Cf. Brun, 1988, 74ff: "Le mysticisme de Plotin est fortement teinté de l'intellectualisme grec puisque, pour lui, la connaissance suffit de nous détourner du mal qui est l'ignorance."

5. Léon Brunschvicg, *L'Esprit européen* (Neufchatel: Baconnière, 1947), 73.

6. Willy Theiler, "Das Unbestimmte, Unbegrenzte bei Plotinus" in *Revue internationale de philosophie* 1997:2, Nr. 92, 290.

7. Cf. IV, 7, 2-3: "Body—not merely because it is a composite, but even were it simplex—could not exist unless there were soul in the universe, for body owes its being to the entrance of a Reason-Principle into Matter, and only from soul can a Reason-Principle come. Anyone who rejects this view, and holds that either atoms or some entities void of part coming together produce soul, is refuted by the very unity of soul and by the prevailing sympathy as much as by the very coherence of the constituents." And about the Stoic *pneuma* he says: "Matter itself could not exist: the totality of things in this sphere is dissolved if it be made to depend upon the coherence of a body which, though elevated to the nominal rank of 'soul,' remains air, fleeting breath, whose very unity is not drawn from itself" (ibid.). Cf. also Ravaisson, 56: "L'une que Cicéron appelle plébéienne, que Berkeley appelle au XVIIe siècle petite philosophie et Leibniz *paupertina philosophia* c'est celle des Démocrite et des Epicure, dont les principaux facteurs furent les sens et l'entendement, l'entendement étant l'auxiliaire naturel des mathématiques."

8. Erwin Panovsky, *Idea: Contribution à l'histoire du concept de l'ancienne théorie de l'art* (Paris: Gallimard, 1983), 77.

9. André Chastel, *Marcile Ficin et l'art* (Genève: Droz, 1996), 82.

10. On *Einfühlung* see Chapter 1 note 1.

11. Jérôme Laurent defines this conviction as such: "There is no beauty without violence. The habitual order of the world is suddenly smashed, and new spatio-temporal references are created. The glitter of gold that delights us, does so only by overcoming the monotony of faded colors where our eye tends to lose interest." Jérôme Laurent, *Le Fondement de la nature selon Plotin: Procession et participation* (Paris: Vrin, 1992), 41-42.

12. Cf. Maurice Gandillac, *La Sagesse de Plotin* (Paris: Hachette, 1952), 102.

13. Oskar Walzel, *Vom Geistesleben alter und neuer Zeit* (Leipzig: Insel, 1922).

14. Pierre Hadot, *Plotin et la simplicité du regard* (Paris: Gallimard, 1997), 60.

15. Petr Kral, "La maison en feu" in *Positif* 304, June 1986, 22. Kral has derived his observations from *The Sacrifice*.

16. Cf. Hadot, 1997, 76: "Le mot est prononcé: ce je ne sais quoi, ce mouvement, cette vie qui s'ajoutent à la beauté pour provoquer l'amour, c'est la grâce. L'expérience plotinienne avait éprouvé la Vie comme une contemplation, comme une simplicité concrète, comme une présence. Elle en saisit maintenant le fond. La vie est grâce."

17. Félix Ravaisson, *Testament philosophique et fragments* (Paris: Boivin, 1933), 82.

18. Tarkovsky, "A propos du sacrifice" in *Positif* 303, May 1986, 5.

19. *Holzwege*, GA Bd. 5, 12 Cf. Also Heidegger's *Nietzsche* I, 227.

Chapter Nine

Image and Allegory: Tarkovsky and Benjamin

Tarkovsky's films, though dealing so outspokenly with dreams, do not take place entirely within the realm of sleep, but maintain a constant contact with the waking world. Settling on a middle ground between sleeping and waking, they take place in a kind of morning sleep, or at night when we suddenly wake up and realize that the "real world" around is deeply strange.

The possibility of an abrupt awakening that makes us see the real world as a dream is essential for any aesthetics that tries to overcome the avant-garde. Here Tarkovsky has something in common with Walter Benjamin. Is there an alternative to a modern world, which increasingly sanctions only those theories of understanding that lead to abstract knowledge? Is there not something like an "experience" of the world which, though *being* an experience, still does not cling to romantic theories of *Einfühlung*?[1]

Benjamin re-evaluates the idea of *Einfühlung* though holding aloof corresponding Romantic or positivist projects. In a way, Benjamin follows the strategy of the Russian Formalists: There is an estranged world that we cannot understand by means of common, Romantic, positivist or other rationalist theories of understanding. It is hopeless to develop more detailed or more scientific methods because the world is incomprehensible not because it is too complicated. The "loss of the world" is due rather to a routinization of our understanding of the world, to an understanding that follows too fixed and prescribed lines.

Russian Futurist poetry, literature, and poetics move away from impressionist symbolism and all other concepts which try to make man reexperience the world through more or less sophisticated forms of *Einfühlung*. They do this by developing the device of "making things strange," a device they name *ostranenie* which subsequently became important for Brechtian aesthetics under the German name of *Verfremdung*. "Conventional" art is based on

"reexperience" or "coexperience" which is exactly the reason why it has moved away from the "real world." Conventional art accepts the symbolizer and the symbolized object as preexisting conditions and the person who tries to understand such a work of art has to "duplicate" the artistic expression within the framework of the fixed relationship between symbolizer and symbolized.

Against this the Formalists suggest that every time we attempt to "see" the world we should recreate the symbolizer and the symbolized anew. The discovery not only of art, but of the entire world through man, through his vision and from his point of view should take place on the basis of a disautomatized relationship between man and the world. In other words, for Formalists, the world needs to be "made strange" in order to be felt again as a "world."

Benjamin is more radical than the Russian Formalists because he sees the process of understanding that follows standardized lines of signification as a vice that has not been produced by obscure, pre-modern, traditional thinking but by modernity itself. The dull and worn-out structure of perception that prevents us from seeing the world as it is, is based on the typically modern routine which accepts the "new" just for the sake of the new. This routine needs to be fractured. Still Benjamin echoes the Formalists because he suggests that a fresher and more original understanding of the world can be obtained by "making the world strange."

Benjamin Empathizing the Strange

Benjamin differs from the Formalists in that his idea is not to make strange what has not been strange beforehand but that he develops an approach able to reveal all those moments of the world that *are* already strange. For Benjamin an "understanding of the strange" is opposed to what is most commonly called "scientific knowledge." Knowledge of the strange is the contrary of knowledge of the abstract, of the general, and of all those devices fostered by modernity in order to gain "knowledge."

In a word, Benjamin suggests adopting strangeness as a basic object of understanding. And the safest way to let the world appear as strange is to let it appear as a dream. In his introduction to Benjamin's *Passagenwerk* Rolf Tiedemann talks about those "picture-puzzles" which we have already mentioned as representative expressions used by Wong Kar-wai. Tiedemann writes: "Images took the place of concepts: riddles and picture-puzzles of dreams that hide all that slips through the net of semiotics but which is still worth the effort of gaining knowledge."[2]

In Benjamin's view the world is more "understandable" when it speaks in the language of those "strange" images that we know as the images of dreams. This way of gaining knowledge is not only an alternative to positivism but also meant to overcome other, more traditional devices that put forward the act of "reexperiencing" as a valid criterion for a theory of understanding. This becomes particularly obvious in Benjamin's understanding of history. Benjamin characterizes the philosophy of *Einfühlung* as a discipline that remains unable to

grasp those "images" of history that can help us to understand history: "Fustel de Coulanges recommends to historians who want to reexperience an epoch to shut out of their minds everything they know about the later development of history. . . . [This] is a device of *Einfühlung*. Its origin is the indolence of the heart, the *acedia* that despairs when asked to seize the authentic historical image, which flashes only briefly" (I, 2, 692). The perception of the (historical) world should never lead to a "shining and finally uncommitted knowledge of something absolute" (I, 1, 336 [Der Ursprung des deutschen Trauerspiels]).

Certainly, we need *Einfühlung*, but it should be a kind of *Einfühlung* that experiences those images which just "flash" ("flüchtig aufblitzen"). The world should not be felt through the simplistic device of "substitution," that is, the understanding subject should not put him/herself into the situation that s/he is trying to understand. The images of history, of art, and of life will "flash" and we should try to grasp them by refraining from both empirical and "photographic" realism. Nor should we try to capture them by means of abstract evaluations. These forms of empathy are "pathological." More precisely, "pathological" is what can be considered as the main driving force of all "empathical" theories of understanding: curiosity. Even if we empathize a phenomenon successfully it will always remain unclear who decided *which part* of the world we intended to empathize. Finally, curiosity is part of the structure of understanding that is so dominant in modernity: driven by the dull routine of modern life itself, it depends on the impulse always to go for the newest of the new.

How then should we "feel" the world? Benjamin suggests that we should cease pretending to know which part of the world we want to know and simply desire "knowledge." In that case there remains only one alternative: the world must come to us. The world, at the moment it appears before our eyes in the form of dreamlike images, comes to us; and it come to us by surprise, without involving any curiosity on our part. It comes like the "imaginary" persons that invade the lives of the cosmonauts in Tarkovsky's *Solaris* (1972): imposing themselves upon us and producing, by making us suddenly wake up to the world, *knowledge* about the world.

Dream and Reality

There is no doubt that the ideas of the Russian Formalists went in the same direction. They too suggested that we should make the estranged world even stranger in order to make it feelable again. In the Formalists we find the concept of an "*Einfühlung* into the strange." Shklovsky claimed that when we see a stone within a highly unusual and strange context, it will be experienced as even more "stony." In Formalist film theory cinematic time is no longer seen as an element that can be perceived through *Einfühlung* but is supposed to exist "as such," that is, it exists not as "real time" but as a "strange" quality that can only be experienced as an artistic-technical device.

For Benjamin as much as for the Formalists, *Einfühlung* means perceiving images of a world that *is* strange; and these images should come to us by surprise. *Einfühlung* does not mean to reexperience anything that we might come across within the strange world of estrangement just "out of curiosity." Knowledge about the world is rather a matter of a sudden "awakening" to the real world. However, while for the Formalists the "strange" images are a matter of technical arrangement, for Benjamin the "images" through which the world comes to us, should settle somewhere between reality and dream. It is clear that Tarkovsky's developments of the Formalist heritage come particularly close to Benjamin's ideas about the strange.

Tarkovsky develops a version of anti-realism that conceives of dream as an intermediary between abstractness and concreteness. Instead of being simply "everyday life made strange," the dream communicates reality as something "unreal" which affects us nevertheless at least as harshly as could reality itself. This "logic of dream" is no anti-logic that an author brought forward by "making strange" what he still recognizes clearly as "logical thinking," that is, as a thinking firmly embedded into the framework of an authorial discourse. "Logic of the dream" means that every scene produces its own temporal laws, its own time or, as he calls it, its own "time truth" (120).

"Dream" signifies here not really a "dreamlike" quality obtained by making reality strange. Both Benjamin and Tarkovsky claim that the most simplistic ideologies of how dreamlike languages of the strange can be created have been proposed by surrealism and impressionism. Impressionism can produce "empathically" an idea of what it believes to be strange, it can "empathically" produce dreams about the world. Tarkovsky refuses impressionism as an art which, as he writes in *Sculpting in Time*, "sets out to imprint the moment for its own sake" (192).

Both Tarkovsky and Benjamin negate (conventional, routinized, non-artistic) everyday world without demanding a flight into an illusionary, aestheticised, "stylized" world of dream. They suggest that we "awaken" not in order to enter non-reality but in order to find reality more "real" than before. The waking world confronted in a shock-like manner with the world of the dream becomes a world free of illusions. The structure of the "awakened world" is "aesthetic" not in the sense of a stylized and softened version of a harder and more matter-of-fact reality. The aesthetic world of the dream is as simple and banal as the "medical facts" that Tarkovsky wanted to see, for example, in the "breath of the plague" in Buñuel's *Nazarin* where "the plague" seems to have arisen out of "nowhere" like a dreamlike imagery.[3]

Benjamin holds that awakening takes place when "we succeed in remembering that which is closest and most banal" (V, 1, 491). Awakening from the dream means to awaken from what we thought was reality but which is not. It happens in the way it happens to Adelaide in Tarkovsky's *The Sacrifice* (1986) when she says, after having received a sedative injection: "Now I feel as if I have woken up from some kind of dream . . . it is like living another kind of life. For some reason I have always offered resistance . . . have been fighting against something. I was always defending myself. It was as if there was another 'I' in

me who said: you mustn't give yourself up, don't agree with something you don't want, or otherwise you will die. Oh God, how mistaken we can be . . ."

The Rhythm of Dream

Benjamin does not opt for the empathical production of an anti-reality that takes the form of an equally abstractly constructed idea of the dream. The rhythm of modern art is neither an intellectual anti-rhythm nor an empathically idealistic dream. Instead, modern art should find its tempo through shock-like confrontations of the world of dream with the world of waking.

Tarkovsky opts for "unusual combinations of, and conflicts between, entirely real elements" (1986, 72) as the most efficient means to attain the level of a cinematic dream. Similar to Benjamin, he declares *rhythm* to be the most important formative element of cinema which he opposes to the more mathematical *editing* or *montage* (119).[4]

Benjamin finds an example of such a genuinely artistic rhythm in Baudelaire's idea of "poetic prose." Baudelaire declares that poetic prose "should be musical without rhythm or rhyme, it should be supple and brittle enough to adapt to the lyrical motions of the soul, the wavelike movements of dreamery, and the shocks of consciousness" ("Preface" to *Spleen de Paris*, 6). Rhythm here is a non-rhythm arising not out of mathematical *calculation* but out of a shock-like contact with dreams: "Baudelaire speaks of a duel in which the artist, just before being vanquished, cries out in horror. This duel is the process of creation. Baudelaire has put this shock experience into the heart of his artistic work" (I, 2, 61). The shock-like awakening from a psychic state in which we cannot distinguish between dream and reality represents at the same time an awakening *to* dream. Through the awakening we become aware of the dream *as a dream*, just as much as the awakening represents an awakening from reality to reality.[5]

Dream and Modernity

Benjamin's elaboration of a philosophical "Technik des Erwachens" (V, 1, 490) represents an attempt to see reality as dream and dream as reality. The phantasmagoric world of modernity is a dream but by recognizing itself as such it attains a deeper vision of reality. Benjamin's examination of modernity is supposed to lead, through an on going process of self-reflexivity, to an awakening concerning oneself: "The new dialectical method of historical science presents itself as the art of experiencing the present as a world that is awake. The dream that we call the past refers to this world. To experience the past in the memory of dreams. Memory and awakening are thus closely related" (II, 1, 1191).[6]

The danger of modernity is not present in the form of unusual, revolutionary and new images but in the fact that we fall all too easily into a modern routine of

perceiving these images. While the greatest danger of modernity remains uniformity, we are not asked to combat the images, inventions and politics of modernity as such; we should change our way of perceiving them by making them strange.[7] Dreamlike alienation will be produced through flashing images able to disturb the daily routine of our perception. "The violent extraction of things from their usual contexts . . . is a procedure that is very characteristic for Baudelaire" (I, 2, 670). Therefore, Baudelaire's device of using elements out of context produces dream. Modern department stores confront us with goods that are dispersed and "out of context." The unhistorical, superficial character of the "träumende Kollektiv," the "dispersal" (Zerstreuung) of our children with regard to traditional dream images, a dispersal that we prefer today instead of instructing them in the meaning of these images (V, 1, 490)—all this represents the disease of modernity.

Only the dandy, though being so typically modern, maintains a critical distance towards modernity. Being critical towards modernity without producing a post-modern Utopia, he remains immune against the temptations of the modern cultural industry which tries to make men believe that by consuming their products they will finally overcome the very estrangement of modernity.[8] The dandy lives within the strange world by fully accepting its strangeness, but by perceiving it as a dream. He perceives reality as a dream because he concentrates on those experiences based on the principle of surprise. Daniel Halevy writes that "in our uniformed world one should not diverge but be profound; diversion and surprise, the most arresting exoticism are very close" (V, 1, 556). Instead of refusing the world of estrangement, the dandy tries to perceive exclusively its surprise-like moments; and in so doing he finally develops an *einfühlende* attitude towards modernity. The dandy becomes the prototype of an *einfühlende* contemporary who manages to "enjoy" the estrangement of the world. The possible dreamlike layout of goods in a department store is "felt" by the dandy better than by anybody else. "In principle, *Einfühlung* into merchandise is *Einfühlung* into an exchangeable value. The flaneur is the virtuoso of this kind of *Einfühlung*" (V, 1, 562). However, his *Einfühlung* is dreamlike and produces a juxtaposition of historical images out of context. In other words, the flaneur's perception of the world produces only a drunkenness ("ivresse") of *Einfühlung*.

For Benjamin, time, as a non-abstract concept, becomes "drunkenness" (Rausch) through the dandy's playful attitude; as a result, the world becomes a dream: "The phantasmagorias of space to which the flaneur is committed correspond to the phantasmagorias of time that the player strives for. The game transforms time into a drug." (V, 1, 57 [Paris, die Hauptstadt des XIX. Jahrhunderts])

We are here very close to Tarkovsky's concept of time in film. For Tarkovsky the approach of transforming facts into what is most commonly called "fiction" is based on sophisticated reflections upon the relationship between history and the present. The artistic expression "has to come from inner necessity, from an organic process going on in the material as a whole." (*Sculpting*, 120) "Dream" as a phenomenon of cinematic time arises out of this

"inner," "temporal" necessity since any "time pressure must not be gained casually" (ibid.). In this sense film is the only art that can render reality in the dimension of time. Like Benjamin's dandy, the spectator is supposed not to empathize symbols but to perceive the world on a phantasmagorical and playful level of time and space that is proper to dream.

Allegory

Tarkovsky overcomes cinematic metaphorism and symbolism by transforming time and space into a drug of absolute strangeness. The dreamlike strangeness is absolute because it is in a tautological way grounded on nothing other than itself. (We have noted that the "zone" in *Stalker* does not "symbolize anything, any more than anything else does in my films; the zone is a zone, it's life, and as he makes his way across it man may break down or may come through," *Sculpting,* 200).

For Benjamin the images of the world of modernity that the dandy produces are allegories: "[Baudelaire's] poetry is no folk art, but the look of the allegorician seeing the town is the look of an estranged man" (V, 1, 50). While routinized modernity perceives the world as a universe of non-historical signs, the estranged dandy perceives a world that is composed of allegories through which historical images flash every moment. In an allegory we encounter a "fixed image and a fixed sign in one" (I, 1, 359).

What is the difference between symbol and allegory? Benjamin holds that since Romanticism we have adhered to an extremely simplified concept of the symbol. Romanticism highlighted not only rationalist ideas about *Einfühlung* (which led to positivism) but also an overly rationalist evaluation of the symbol. Benjamin criticizes the "way the romantic aesthetician woos a shining and finally non-committed knowledge of the absolute [which] has installed in the simplest of debates on art theory a concept of symbolization which has nothing in common with the real symbol" (I, 1, 336).

Allegories, on the other hand, are discovered through "reflection" and they take us by surprise while we reflect. The "ponderer" (Grübler), like the flaneur, is a stranger to modernity: being led by ennui rather than curiosity he ponders without knowing what he intends to discover. Then, suddenly he is taken by surprise, struck by a flashing image, an allegory. In that way "the ponderer who looks, startled, at the fragment in his hand, becomes an allegorician" (I, 2. 676, [Zentralpark]).

For the ponderer, the world becomes strange through the shock-like perception of allegories. In the allegorician's hand the thing becomes different. For the allegorician the world of modernity transforms itself into a kind of dreamlike writing. Allegorists can look at something modern (for example a building) and will see, even in the most modern of buildings, the flashing image of a historical ruin.

Benjamin wants the world to be perceived as allegories or *living* symbols. His aim is "to bring the new world into the space of the symbol" and the child,

for whom the whole world appears like a dream, sees even non-historical signs as allegories, because for the child the distinction between history and the present does not exist: "The child can do something the adult cannot do at all: recognize the new" (V, 1, 439). Tarkovsky holds that Leonardo da Vinci and Bach "[saw] the world as if it would be for the first time, unburdened by any experience, and they str[o]ve to reproduce it in the most meticulous way they c[ould]. Their look is comparable to that of strangers."[9]

Tarkovsky's idea of the "immediacy" of expression is identical with Benjamin's anti-symbolism. Tarkovsky said: "The fairly widely held view of cinema as a system of signs is essentially mistaken. I see a false premise at the very basis of the structuralist approach. . . . I classify cinema as an immediate art form which needs no mediating language" (176). The "immediate" perception of reality should function through allegory-like metonymies containing flashing images. The metonymy is not produced, as per normal, by simply showing an object instead of its sign. Through a close-up, the object turns out to be more than a sign, it leads to an allegorical dream about itself. Tarkovsky's cameraman Yussov said that "when we are filming the thing in question, say an old tobacco box or a powder box, we film it in a way so that the patina of time becomes visible, the 'sealedness' of the object: through the destinies of its previous owners."[10]

Here like in Benjamin's philosophy about the allegory, the reality perceived as a dream is more real than "normal" reality. In that way, the "illusionary" characters that people the space station Solaris are allegories in the sense that they come from the past into the modern world of the space station. However, their historicist and dreamlike character makes them more real and more relevant for reality than is reality itself. Another example is the burning house in *The Sacrifice*. This scene might be dramatic to begin with. However, the very moment it gets too dramatic we "awaken" to it anew because the telephone is ringing inside the burning house. The scene has become less dramatic and more real and also more dreamlike.

Both Benjamin and Tarkovsky refuse to reproduce or stylize the past. All there is, is dream and allegory, through which history is "expressed." Through the perception of flashing images able to twist the regular rhythm out of its routinized spin, the allegorician fractures the regular, naively progressive rhythm of modernity.

It remains to say that Tarkovsky's allegorical use of cinematic images accords with Benjamin's reflections on photography and cinema. For Benjamin, both photography and cinema are representatives of the flat images produced by modernity. The non-historicist crowd that is always going for the newest of the new, forms an absolute consciousness of the most relevant "style," of "fashion" and of all the other items that Benjamin sees increasingly spreading in modernity. The "mass" forms an absolute and impenetrable block of *Einfühlung* into which abstraction from the present—favoring allegories of the past—has no chance to enter.[11]

Tarkovsky's alternatives are allegorical, metonymic close-ups that communicate through the device of awakening. This "immediate art" he wishes

to see opposed to a "semiotic art" of formalist cinema that works through montage. For Benjamin cinema will remain "photographic as long as it bases its devices on nothing other than the "art" of montage. In *Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit* Benjamin expresses his misgivings concerning a cinematic art of montage. Concerning the cinematic work that is produced inside the studio Benjamin holds that "the artwork comes here into being at best through montage: every single piece of which is the reproduction of an event that is not a work of art as such, and neither will it be one in the context of photography" (I, 2, 449).

Benjamin is in favor of an allegorical kind of photography, examples of which he finds in the early photography because here he can perceive something like an aura: "In the fleeting expression of a human face seen in early photographs, the aura shows itself for the last time. This is what makes their melancholic and thus incomparable beauty" (I, 2, 445). Tarkovsky would say that in these photos a single shot has time; that they contain a kind of "dynamic of the mood."

Tarkovsky's metonymical cinematic art, by means of which he tries to overcome symbolism, and through which he also combated the sign character of cinema, moves towards the aim that Benjamin is searching for. His anti-symbolism does not lead to a semiotic art of signs that is to an emphasis on the *constellation* between images, but to a metonymical concentration on the images themselves. It leads to the creation of flashing dream images that *represent* reality instead of denoting it. It leads to dream images which, though utterly unreal, come to express reality itself (*Sculpting,* 152). In such a tautological way these images claim to be absolutely self-sufficient and only what they are.

Notes

1. For *Einfühlung* see Chapter 1, note 1.

2. "Passagenwerk," in Walter Benjamin's *Werke* I, ed. Rolf Tiedemann (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1983). All of Benjamin's works are quoted from this edition and the numbers refer to the volume and the section of the work.

3. See passage in Chapter 1.

4. These are main theoretical points that oppose Tarkovsky and Eisenstein. In "The Montage of Film Attraction" (1924) Eisenstein writes: "A rhythmic schema is arbitrary, it is established according to the whim or the 'feeling' of the director and not according to mechanical periods dictated by mechanical conditions of the course of a particular motor process. . . . The audience of this kind of presentation is deprived of the emotional effect of perception, which is replaced by guesswork as to what is happening." Sergei Eisenstein, *Writings I* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), 48.

5. Benjamin's aesthetics of the dream has a parallel in his philosophy of history. Historical research must be determined by a search for historical dream images as opposed to an overtly abstract, Heideggerian notion of *Geschichtlichkeit.* The image which Benjamin thinks most worthy of philosophical consideration is a historical impression which "darts past only as an image flashing at the very moment it can be recognized but which then disappears immediately and for good" (I, 2, 695). History should be grasped through these kinds of shock-like, flashing images. Benjamin bases his ideas of

how we should perceive the present, on this particular concept about the perception of history through images which speak to us from the past and which take us by surprise. Modernity is "the world governed by its phantasmagorias" (V, 1, 77), and the historian's task is to present us this modern reality like a world of dream. He should not transform or stylize the world into a dream (this kind of production of superficial kinds of dreams is all too natural to modernity itself); we must awaken to the fact that the phantasmagorias *are* dreams.

6. The historian should try to produce a historical consciousness about history not abstract but filled with images. History is nothing other a consecutive series of images in which new images appear constantly. These images get lost in modernity because in modernity new images appear so regularly that the distinction between the new and the ancient has become blurred. Historicity in modernity has a purely abstract and conceptional meaning. The result is that people are dreaming without knowing that they do so: "The dreaming collective knows no history. For it the current of events is always the same and always the newest. The sensation of the newest, of the most modern, is as much a form of dream as is the eternal recurrence of the same" (V, 2, 678). The mass is dreaming a present dream without being aware of the historical character of the images. A historical consciousness can only be produced by distorting the routinized flow of images. This will happen when the dreamers awaken, that is when they recognize their images as images of a dream. Then they will realize the "newness" of the images through their relationship with something historical. Suddenly the world will be a dream and strange: "In the dialectical image the 'has-been' of a certain epoch is always that which has-always-been. But as such it appears only to the eyes of a certain epoch: it is the epoch in which humanity rubs its eyes and recognizes the dream image as such. It is in this moment that the historian takes over the task of dream interpretation" (V, 1, 580).

7. More concretely: We should try to deal with them in a new way. We should try "to interpret the 19th century, its fashion and advertisements, buildings and politics as the effects of its dream visions" (V, 1, 492).

8. About the effects of the "Kulturindustrie" on estrangement Adorno wrote: "it permits people to perceive as being close and as belonging to them, that which had been alienated from them and which will be ruled heteronomously afterwards when given back." Theodor Adorno, *Ästhetische Theorie* in *Collected Works*, Vol. 7 (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1972), 33.

9. Tarkovsky, *O kinoobraze* (1979) reprinted in *Iskusstvo i kino* 12, 2001.

10. Valentin Mikhalkovich, *Andrei Tarkovsky* (Moscow: Iskusstvo, 1989), 12, my translation.

11. This idea of *Einfühlung* and the crowd has been developed by Max Scheler who mentions the phenomenon of "Eins-fühlung" in connection with modern mass-movements: "The Einsfühlung returns to the sphere of the psychic life of the unorganized mass, as described first by Le Bon. Here also takes place first of all an Einsfühlung of all members with the leader . . . and then an additional mutual fusion of the members in a current of affects and pulsions." Max Scheler, *Wesen und Formen der Sympathie* in *Collected Works*, Vol. 7 (Bonn: Bouvier, 1973), 36.

Chapter Ten

Ten Keywords Concerning Filmdream

Surrealism

Roy Armes has classified as "modern" a cinema which adopts the technique of simultaneous presentation of different temporal levels, making the film's narrative structure more complex. Interestingly, Armes does not add surrealist cinema to this group of modernists:

> Instead of evolving a new set of formal conventions, modernism has accepted the fact that the cinema presents all experience—past, present and future—as a single uninterrupted flow. In this we find films showing the past flowing into the present (Bergman's *Wild Strawberries*), past and present fusing to become an indissoluble one (Resnais's *Hiroshima mon amour*) and a present destroyed by an unseen past (the same director's *Muriel*).[1]

There are different degrees of fusing temporal levels, depending on the possibilities left to the spectator to trace back a complex, all-involving structure to an "initial," more fundamental one. But the complications introduced into the modern film are not restricted—as Armes's statement could make believe—to an interaction of different temporal spheres but concern the interaction of virtually all elements. This is why surrealism should be seen as the first movement engaging in such a technique of transgression. The *écriture automatique* is an "absolute event, where *everything is materialized*: [it represents] the discovery of a certain point of the mind from where life and death, the real and the imaginary, past and future, the communicable and the incommunicable, the high and low no longer appear as contradictory," writes Maurice Blanchot.[2] Also in Bergman's *Persona* "film and object, words and mutism, actor and pretended life . . . intertwine and become pure image" (Johns Blackwell, 1986, 5). *Persona* is outstanding because of its hyperactive interposition of elements which is, in

some sense, not so different from the all-embracing perspective adopted by the *écriture automatique*.

Surrealism survived after surrealism.[3] Bergman's international career, for example, started with the use of surrealist ideas. While in early stages of his development he applied "literary techniques," in *Wild Strawberries* he experimented with "oscillations between dreamworld and reality" (cf. Steene, 1970, 24). The dream sequences from this film have been found Murnau-like but also surrealistic.[4] It is, of course, the "coffin sequence" which has been designated as surrealistic because of its special, almost typical "nightmare vocabulary." "The deserted shuttered street, the clock and watch without hands, the glass hearse, the faceless man are all conventions familiar to surrealist painting and literature."[5] Surrealist techniques manifest themselves through a certain degree of abstraction. Also the images of this sequences are no "true film images derived from life and rendered concrete" (Roemer). They remain abstract without creating a concrete, self-contained, cinematic world. "All surrealist directors are somewhat formalist," has said Jean-Christophe Averty.[6] We detect in these "dreams" a pragmatic formalism arranging the "cliche of a nightmare" according to certain rules; and this is what makes them surrealist.[7]

However, in reality, dreamlike strangeness, though able to convey us the strange atmosphere of dreams, is not due to a "making strange" of things. Kawin said that "the film's self-consciousness appears to originate *from within*" (my italics). This means that no outside consciousness has established the style that lets the dream appear as something dreamlike. Kawin elucidates this through a comparison of Bergman's films *Wild Strawberries* and *Persona*:

> Because [in *Wild Strawberries*] the "fantasy" sequences tend not to be stylistically consistent with the rest of the film, the viewer does not get confused, but for this same reason the film fails to achieve the profoundly unsettling quality of Bergman's later work, in which the lines between "dream" and "reality" are gracefully sabotaged (*Mindscreen*, 96-97).

In *Wild Strawberries*, stylized dream sequences appear to be stylized because they have been juxtaposed against other scenes *not* representing a dream.[8] "Dream experience" is here produced through an "enlightenment" process, taking place in the spectator as he, recognizing the interplay of obvious juxtapositions in the film, becomes aware of its entire narrative structure. Once the spectator has obtained this enlightened state of mind he recognizes that this film is projecting him/her into a different world. He concludes that he should accept the scene as a dream.[9]

Other aesthetic effects can obtain the same result. Brigitta Steene mentions the high degree of "stylizations" in Bergman's films effectuated through "dream interpolations." Such stylizations, Steene claims, "make . . . us aware of the archetypal structure beneath the literal narrative level of the story."[10] But it remains doubtful if the experience of dreaming is really based on such an experience of "becoming aware" of stylistic differences or of overall, abstract, structures. In reality we accept a film as a dream by seeing it as a dream in its entirety. We accept the entire logical structure of the dream just because this

structure appears as not having been "invented" through rational (aesthetic) calculation.

When watching *Persona* we are inclined to perceive the film as a "limited system" whose "dreaming mind" (Kawin, 127) appears as an expressive unity. The work of art has become a "mindscreen" and all metaphysical connotations concerning the "stylizing authorship" of a creative power are bracketed as soon as a filmdream is observed from such a phenomenological point of view. Filmdreams are not supposed to "look like dreams" but *are* dreams.[11] Kawin points out that "*Shame* refuses to look like a dream, to fill itself with 'surrealist imagery,' self-contradiction, and other subjective image codes." This mess of a world "is potentially real, if it happened, it could look just this way" (140). The production of a filmdream is here not produced through an aesthetic arrangement of a non-dreamt world, but it is produced by seeing the real world as if it were a dream and by subsequently "reproducing" it in a "realistic" way.[12] The problem is so eminent that the question of dream authorship especially in *Shame* has been focused upon by some critics. James Maxfield admits that he was puzzled by *Shame* because it led him to thinking that "the dreamer had commonly been identified with either God or Bergman" but found out later that it is "Jan's dream."[13]

However, the most interesting input in Kawin's remark is provided by his allusion to surrealism. There is much reason to describe the surrealist approach to dreams as a "construction" anxious to maintain a high amount of rational control. Given the surrealist claim that the "*écriture automatique*" should liberate human creativity from the "slavery of reason," the preceding remark can appear as surprising. However, in film we become aware, probably just because of the film's a priori resemblance with dreams, of deficiencies occurring in the surrealist procedure of producing dreams.

Bazin has said that surrealism used almost constantly Freudism "in a too conscious way as that one could really be surprised to find in these paintings those symbols that have been put there beforehand."[14] Bazin recognizes that dream images and dream symbols do not necessarily create dreamlike expressions. Characteristically, he wants to combat these expressions by means of "realism." However, is dream really a matter of reality?[15] An immense amount of criticism towards dreams made Bazin and Kracauer suspicious of psychoanalytic approaches in film and led them to base their counterarguments on an aesthetics of realism which they tried then, without avoiding a certain (fruitful) contradictoriness, to oppose to an aesthetics of dreams.

Bergman also kept a critical distance towards dreams as aesthetic expressions. Dreams in film, he once said, can too easily result in mere reconstructions of reality lacking the features of that authenticity that can only be provided by reality itself. In other words, if film is similar to dreams, the danger of producing films as if they were "reconstructed dreams" is lurking everywhere: "I am particularly suspicious of dreams, apparitions and visions, both in literature and in films and plays. Perhaps it is because mental excesses of this sort smack too much of being 'arranged.'"[16]

Surrealism and film belong together and there is much reason to say that "all modern cinema . . . suffered the influence of surrealism."[17] Still, it is also certain that the relationship between surrealism and film has almost always been tense. One of the main theoretical problems inherent in surrealist thinking is that "irrationality" can be created by means of reason.

Surrealist cinema was, because of film's a priori resemblance with dreams, much more tempted than other branches of surrealist art (painting or writing) by the search for particularly dreamlike expressions of irreality. Because dreams are the contrary of reality, surrealists often thought that it is enough to destruct reality by dissolving it into "unreal" symbols in order to obtain dreams. However, especially in the domain of cinema many have felt that this "destruction," as long as it refused to work as a more sophisticated kind of "deconstruction" of reality, lead the surrealist aesthetics into a cul-de-sac. Michel Beaujour writes:

> Surrealist film . . . accomplishes a destruction of reality's analogue, it produces vertigo, mocks at contradictions, but everything takes place on the symbolic ground of images. The contradictions of the real turn out to be undamaged as soon as the brackets of imaginary liberty are closed and the lights in the theater are turned on.[18]

It is not enough to mock at logic because such a mockery is still grounded on logic itself; and the central surrealist argument that "irreality should not be confounded with surreality" makes sense only as long as it is based on this presupposition. To produce surreality means to create a new reason able to penetrate into a "reality more true than reality" (to use a phrase by Rimbaud). The surrealist idea to free itself from the tyranny of logic signified to free oneself from the "inferior" consciousness as it exists in our waking life. Logic needed to be deconstructed into a dream logic. But surrealist cinema took this project too easily. Surrealism invested its intellectual power into the elaboration of symbols rather than into the question of how the "higher reality of dreams" can be grasped in its concreteness.[19] The result is a too strong emphasis of abstraction.[20]

Surrealism's symbolist abstraction functions like an intellectual re-stylization of given "real" material. Kracauer pointed to surrealism's inability to create dreams not because its elements cannot be identified as belonging to a sphere of dreams but, to the contrary, because the unambiguous way in which a dream imagery is announced, *blocks*, instead of stimulates, the dreaming capacity of the spectator. Surrealism confronts the spectator with dreams but it does not, as does imagery that remains consciously *between* dreams and non-dreams, invite the spectator to follow the perceived images in a dreamlike way. In order to perceive their aesthetic meaning, the spectator needs to dream or to "dream after" images. Kracauer writes about a still from *Le Chien Andalou*:

> If this shot were integrated into contexts suggestive of camera-reality and the flow of life, it would invite us dreamily to probe into indeterminate meanings. Yet actually we are not permitted to absorb it, for the symbolic function

> assigned to surrealistic images automatically prevents them from unfolding their inherent potentialities.[21]

If cinema's first a priori quality consists in its being similar to dreams, its second a priori quality is to be similar to reality. Only the simultaneous perception of what appears real and of what appears dreamt creates in the spectator the sort of "dreaming mind" able to transform images into dreams. Kracauer's statement points to an aesthetics of dreams which one is disinclined to classify as "realism" and which fits, in fact, into no existing official category of modern art.

Expressionism

The second common source of dream aesthetic in film is, after surrealism, expressionism. Vlada Petric mentions in his historical survey of filmdream the American avant-garde filmmakers John Sibley Watson and Melville Webber. The "expressionist stylization" that Petric observes in Webber's film *The Fall of the House of Usher* (1928) lacks the "oneiric" qualities that Petric believes to be present in Jean Epstein's adaption of the same text (*La chute de la maison Usher*). The expressionist way of apprehending reality through distortions is based on a replacement of the objective with the subjective and is efficient only as such. If expressionism is found inadequate for the expressions of dreams then this is related to the particularities of this very procedure. In expressionism, "distortion" is not in the first place meant to grasp a reality of dreams but a reality which is psychic: "Distortion is the result of the attempt to paint the whole psychic experience, to paint all the associations that the ego may acquire in its relation to an object" Dahlström has said.[22] Only if we suppose dreams to be an entirely subjective phenomenon taking place within the limited sphere of an individual psyche, we accept expressionism as an efficient procedure to depict dreamlike conditions in art. If, however, we see dreams not as a first-person discourse flowing, like direct speech, out of a particular individual, but as a psychic field employing various elements, objective as well as subjective ones, then the images of expressionism will not be accepted as dreams.

It is thus no wonder that Petric also concludes that expressionist stylistic devices, especially those of "photographic distortion," are unable to produce a sufficiently dreamlike effect, though, as Petric also believes, "even today many stylistic features symbolizing dreams processes in the contemporary film can be traced to the Expressionistic shooting technique."[23] If surrealist film can be blamed for its all too rational control of "surreal" images, expressionist film can be blamed for abandoning too quickly any links by which art is bound to reason by leaving the creation of an "irrationality" to a quasi romantic procedure mainly based on *spontaneity* as a creative power.

Lotte H. Eisner pointed out how much expressionist film was tempted by a trap laid out by romanticism as it advertised its superficial insights into psychology as a solid aesthetics of dreams. Not a few expressionist directors were caught in this trap. In her book *The Haunted Screen* Eisner explains that

expressionism "immediately realized that the cinema could become the perfect medium for Romantic anguish, dream-states, and those hazy imaginings which shade so easily into the infinite depths of that fragment of space-outside-time, the screen."[24]

Superimposition

One of the most common devices of creating dreams in film is that of superimposition. Bazin notes the purely semiotic "sign-character" of superimpositions (as well as of slow-motion shots and similar techniques) which corresponds to the decoded character of those dreams which are constructed through symbols:

> In reality, the devices that have been in use since Méliès to denote dreams are pure conventions. We take them for granted just as much as do the patrons of outdoor screenings at travelling fairs. Slow-motion and superimposition have never existed in our nightmares, however. Superimposition on the screen signals: "Attention: unreal world, imaginary characters"; it doesn't portray in any way what hallucinations or dreams are really like, or, for that matter, how a ghost would look. As far as slow-motion is concerned, what it may actually signify is the difficulty we often have fulfilling our desires in dreams. But Freud has entered the picture and the Americans, who are fond of him, know that a dream is characterized far less by the formal quality of its images than by their dynamic sequence, their inner logic . . .[25]

If we agree that the dreamlike character of a film is due to the internal logic of the dream and not to signs which are, conventionally, loaded with a "dreamlike" meaning, we have to admit that such a logic can never be rendered by simply superposing two images. Strictly speaking, superimposed images are unable to render any "logic" because logic is a matter of language and not of pictorial imagination.

Obviously, cinema works with images, which could mean that, whenever cinema intends to create a "logic" (be it a logic of dreams, a logic of psychic perception, etc.), it can do so only by subordinating the "image quality" of its medium to its more linguistic components. George Bluestone, who has devoted a whole book to the problems which arise when adapting written literature for film, explains that the possibilities of cinema to express mental states are very limited compared to those of written literature because "the rendition of mental states—memory, dreams, imagination—cannot be as adequately represented by film as by language."[26] For Bluestone this is also the reason why "spatial devices" like superimposed images remain dissatisfying: "acting upon us perceptually, they cannot render the conceptual feel of dreams and memories. The realistic tug of the film is too strong" (ibid.).

Realism is here played out against dreams. Reality itself is said to lack "language," to lack an underlying abstract system able to create a logic different from the one represented by the "normal" logic inherent in reality already. In

some sense, this argument does not do justice to "realism" at all, at least not to the one suggested by Bazin who criticized the idea that a film should simply be seen as a dream. For Bluestone, the reproduction of a dreamlike experience asks for an explicit linguistic vocabulary. However, as has been agreed upon by many psychoanalysts, dreams are a matter of images and not of language. For Bluestone the linguistically elaborated comment provided by an author is able to install basic "images" into a (linguistically produced) logic which lets those images appear as belonging to the sphere of memory, imagination or dreams. In cinema this "comment" can be provided only with much difficulty.

There is no reason to believe that such a "comment" is really necessary for the artistic production of dreams because the medium of cinema resides within a paradox. The fact of being more "image" than language pushes cinema closely towards dreams because also in dreams images dominate over linguistic expressions. But equally important for a genuine dreamlike experience is a certain logic. Bluestone's comparison of cinema and literature asks for the installation of a certain "voice" in film constantly commenting upon the images from the off and "explaining" that these images should not be understood "as such" but that there could be found, because they exist within a special logical structure, a certain "mental surplus." The mental surplus is provided through "explanation" and lets images, experiences or situations appear as belonging, for example, to a dream.

This corresponds to ideas of formalist film theory, which sees deviations from realism (which is the "norm"), as productions of "extra-narrative" commentaries consciously integrated in the overall narration. David Bordwell characterizes "internal commentaries" in the language of film like this:

> Stylistic devices that gain prominence with respect to classical norms—an unusual angle, a stressed bit of cutting, a striking camera movement, an unrealistic shift in lighting or setting, a disjunction on the sound track, or any other breakdown of objective realism which is not motivated as subjectivity—can be taken as the narration's commentary.[27]

In terms of Bazin's and Kracauer's "dreamlike realism," Bordwell's ideas *restrict* dreamlike experiences. For Bordwell as much as for Bluestone only the "thought" which literature can add to images can produce dreams while the images themselves are only "perceived." Superimpositions and symbols are cinematic attempts to follow the example of literature. When cinema introduces a superposition it attempts to provide a "comment" to an image, saying that "this image is supposed to be linked to another one." Psychoanalytic symbols have more complex functions though they serve the same purpose: images are "commented" through a certain idea and a thought is added to an image. However, both cinema and literature have their own means of expression and the mentioned device of linguistic "explanation" (be it formal devices, superimposition, slow-motion, or symbolism) is not necessarily included in the "linguistic program" proper to film.

There is another sense of superposition. As mentioned, Strindberg's *A Dream Play* can be seen as a product of a supersubjective individual.[28] The

creation of a first-person, autobiographical ego-discourse, simultaneously functioning through the elaboration of a "superindividual" point of view, represents indeed an interesting phenomenon. If the dream discourse is an ego-discourse, which strikes us because of its explicit autobiographical tendency, but if it distinguishes itself through the fact that it creates a clearly "super-subjective" perspective, this means that here ego and a superego rely on a naturally strong interdependence. Dahlström, like many others, found that Strindberg has transposed this idea on the stage. Through a psychological trick the "I" no longer remains the common "I" from the everyday world, which lives, as an objective quantity, within an objective world. On the contrary, it has become purely subjective and turns the perception of the world into a purely psychic experience. The "I" manages to separate itself from itself; it is no longer "just subjective" but it becomes supersubjective. Strindberg was able to create dreamlike expressions on this basis. In a way, the subjective ego has thus been "*superimposed*" with another ego, which is objective (and perhaps a superego), creating a logic of dreams through the device of superimposition. John Milton noted that in *A Dream Play* "the dreamer appears to be the author, superimposed over the structure of the play itself."[29] The decisive difference with the more formalist version of the device of superposition remains that here the superimposition of elements does not "explain" anything: it rather asks for an explanation.

The expressionist technique of the first-person narrative is based on a *Radiation of the I* (*Ausstrahlung des Ichs*), which implies also an objectivation of first-person subjectiveness. This is the device of superimposition and Strindberg used this for the first time in theater. Peter Szondi has pointed in particular to such an "expressionist aspect" of Strindberg. It is a device . . .

> . . . according to which the characters in the Damascus-Triology (the lady, the beggar, Caesar) are ego-radiations of an unknown person, and that the whole piece is contained in the subjectivity of its hero. But this contradiction is the paradox of subjectivity itself: of its self-alienation in reflection, in the objectivation of a singled-out proper "I," the transfer from multiplied subjectivity to the objective.[30]

Bergman's use of "psychological superimpressions" through which he creates dreamlike effects, functions in a similar way. If, for example, a protagonist says by redescribing his personal actions, "I dreamed I was asleep, dreamed that I was dreaming," or if somebody says, in the middle of the film action, "if I could only wake up," this clearly produces a division of the subjective self through self-estrangement. In other words, the acting and narrating subject of the film is objectified or, better, it is objectifying itself, by claiming that she is only an unconscious object acting inside a dream. Dreams are not created through superimpressions but, the other way round, the effect of superimpression is produced through dreams. Only in this way can a certain "logic of dreams" be accepted "as such" instead of being accepted as a non-logic derived from the logic of non-dreams.

Distortions or displacements in dreams using the device of superimposition have attracted also Freud's attention. When formulating a logic of dreams for psychoanalysis, Freud produces a concrete idea of a superimposition mechanism derived from the domain of cinema. In the second part of his *General Introduction* Freud compares the "mixtures" of elements which the dreamer produces in his dreams with the superimposition of film:

> Such a compound person probably looks like A., is dressed like B., does something that one only remembers of C., but in spite of this one is conscious that he is really D. By means of this compound formation something common to all four people is especially emphasized. . . . This jumble of details that has been fused together regularly results in a vague indistinct picture, as though you had taken several pictures on the same film.[31]

The most problematical point in Freud's observations is certainly that he believes this mixture of impressions to be "unclear" and "blurred." There is a fundamental fallacy in Freud's view on the logic of the dream, a fallacy due to certain presuppositions concerning the relationship between the conscious and the unconscious. The images of the unconscious are understood and explained as modifications of the conscious. "Modification" signifies here as in other circumstances the shift from the clear to the unclear. First of all, even here, where this modification becomes a matter of identification and purely logical displacements, the supposition that the language of dreams must be more "unclear" than that of non-dreams is stubbornly maintained. However, just because of this inconsistent link between "logic" and "unclear impression," the logic of dreams cannot be properly grasped. Freud's description of the dream logic is restricted to the visual component and a restriction of this sort is more stimulating for research into the *symbolisms* of dreams than into the existential, ontological character of dreams as a kind of *Erlebnis* linked to a certain kind of logic.

In dreams, a logical structure is never a matter of explanation (it cannot be explained as a purely visual phenomenon coming about through the superimposition of two images). On the contrary, in dreams a logic is accepted as a part of an existential experience. In dreams logic is not really conceived as logic. It is at least not conceived as a formal phenomenon which has, as an abstract structure, been produced by linking concrete elements in a certain order. On the contrary, in dreams, the world of dreams with its particular logic becomes a fact; and logical links can be revealed only from a more elevated, scientific point of view which sees the dreamworld not as a world but, in an objectifying way, as an accumulation of "things" (imaginations, symbols, manifestations of the drive, feelings, etc.). There is no unclearness but only non-determination; and this non-determination needs to be considered as a Being. It is perceived by our consciousness in all its clearness. Metz has noted this very fact in regard to the logic of dreams: "A silhouette can be *clearly* recognized as being (being, not 'representing') two persons at once."[32]

Daydream

A common device supposed to produce dreams is the stylization of the temporal levels of a narrative. Strindberg has introduced this device into dramatic art by creating a "dream mood" in theater, that is, by "letting scenes of the first half of the play recur in an inverted order in the later half . . ."[33] While Strindberg attains, because of the freshness with which he uses this device, an authentic level of amazingly dreamlike expressions, an estrangement concentrating only on the elaboration of the temporal component is less convincing. In his earlier phase, Bergman applied a Strindbergian variation of narrative time but the result was the creation of daydreams rather than of dreams. Ayfre observes that *Wild Strawberries* produces some dreams and adds that these dreams should be distinguished from daydreams which appear in parallel: "At the inside of the real travel account, one can distinguish two centers of temporality, first that of real dreams (*rêves proprements dits*), and then that of daydreams."[34] In this film, daydream is, like dreams, imagined and non-real but it takes place on a temporal level still based in non-dreams. Therefore it cannot fully render the experience of dreams which have their own center of time, and their own temporal references.

While the expression of "daydreams" can be handled through a formal manipulation of temporal levels, the production of "dreams" creates problems exceeding the scale of formalist alienation. One reason for this is that, if dreams are said to contain their own temporality, identifications of the inside and the outside aspects of dreams as a subjective narration which exists in regard to a timely point of view objectively present, get confused. The actual experience provided by the "reading" of a dream narrative is constituted by a kind of "absolute presence" seemingly negating all conscious references to other temporal levels even where we leave the "inside" of the dream and take the position of an observer.

In daydreams such a confused state of mind cannot appear since here the level of "normal time" is well known and sanctioned. This does not mean that the installation of sequences of daydreams would never affect the film in its entirety. By creating two different temporal centers within itself, a film like *Wild Strawberries* can also adopt dreamlike characteristics. Robert Eberwein has shown how the manipulation of temporality in *Wild Strawberries* produces an effect of estrangement in the consciousness of the observer which affects the whole film and not only those scenes that are meant as daydreams. Again the blurring of the limits between the inside and the outside of the dream, between the presence of the "real" and the beyond of the daydream scenes creates an intuitive sense of presence felt by the spectator like an absolute presence. Eberwein writes: "We watch a dreamer see his dreams. We are released from the laws of time and space to enter the filmic dreams, allow the laws of time and space to enter a consciousness and, at the same time, remain aloof, outside."[35] In *Wild Strawberries* the camera occupies two different positions, a subjective and an objective one and pushes the film towards what has been defined as a "supersubjective narrative."[36]

What has been postulated in regard to *Persona* about the ontological possibilities of film dream has a parallel also in dream as a psychological phenomenon. There are dreams and daydreams and both obey different aesthetic and ontological laws. Freud made the reasons why dream and daydream should be distinguished rather clear. In the *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* Freud notes that in dream and in daydream respectively different amounts of intellectual input can appear. In the *Tagtraum* the dreamer does not experience or "hallucinate" but he represents the event of dream: "So erlebt, halluziniert man in ihnen nichts, sondern man stellt sich etwas vor"[37] The act of representation creating images though not yet a proper logic of dream is purely conscious and even identical with thinking. Freud says: "One knows that one imagines, one does not see but think" (ibid.). Also Kraepelin underlines the idea about the "wache Träumen" and insists that the reasonable, directive, quantity present in daydreams is limited because the logical context considered by the daydreamer is artificially restricted by the condition of the daydream itself. The logic (and therefore also the thinking) are here freer than in usual reflections but this logic is only valid in itself; it will become senseless as soon as it is confronted with a larger context of representations. Kraepelin writes: "We are here able to follow the development of an event mentally. Without doubt we are here confronted with the lack or the miscarriage of those general representations which determine the aim of the course of our representations as soon as we 'think' and oppress all deviations from the indicated direction."[38]

In the "night dream," on the other hand, the imaginative act is not consciously controlled; it appears as a passive experience rather than as a conscious action. This sphere of the unconscious within which dreams take place is very important for the psychologist; the lack of knowledge about the dream is an essential characteristic of the dream and its status must be maintained at any cost. Freud declares that even in those cases where a knowledge about the dream exists, there is always an ignorance about this knowledge: "It is very well impossible or even likely that the dreamer knows the signification of his dream but he does not know that he knows it and therefore thinks that he does not know it."[39]

The "night dream" is, contrary to the daydream, not formed by the intellect. Dream is not (still less than the *délire* and the hallucination) a matter of "free imagination" which is simply unreal. Lacan has insisted that hallucinations and *délires* are not "unreal" in the sense that they are cut off from any intellectual control. It is rather the social link that all psychic productions—including dreams—constantly maintain with the waking world which, as has been insisted upon as much by Lacan but also by Bakhtin, produce dreams. If we thus insist that dream—as opposed to daydream—avoids conscious, intellectual stylization, this does not mean that dreams are produced "unconsciously" and "directly" by eluding all contact with the "real" world of reason. Dreams as "stylistic products" contain the concrete elements of a real, social world. Their "style" is determined by reality before the human intellect can interfere in the production of dreams through any of its stylizing gestures.

If psychology has from the beginning been more interested in dreams than in daydreams its reasons to do so were ambiguous. On the one hand dreams were believed to produce, being cut off from the intellect, their own logic whose consideration could provide deeper insights into the human soul. On the other hand, the approach to dreams was very much based on a crystallization of intellectual structures similar to the "reasonable" structures that appear in daydreams (in particular the creation of images functioning as symbols). Believing that the symbolization has not been undertaken on the grounds of pure reason but on the grounds of an unconscious activity ascribed to a superego, one hoped that a deeper insight into dreams would automatically follow as long as the sphere of the dream as the "unreal" was maintained.

In view of this background it is understandable that the activities of surrealism which tried to imitate—or to parody—this very logic of psychology was first condemned so harshly by classical Freudians. The main problem was that the surrealists, by transforming dreams into art, made of dreams daydreams; and this cut off (though the logical consistency of psychoanalytic ideas was fully maintained) the point of the entire psychoanalytic project.

The misunderstandings which have occurred between psychoanalysts and the first generation of surrealist artists who tried to integrate dreams into art are also due to misunderstandings about the respective status of dreams and daydreams. Hesnard wrote a judgment characteristic for the "fundamental difference" between the psychoanalytic and the surrealist approach to the unconscious:

> Psychoanalysis sees in the unconscious a subject for study, for knowledge destined to lead us towards a liberation, that is, the accomplishment of the individual. The attitude of the surrealists which is essentially aesthetic and disinterested, willingly evades the real world, turns its back on traditional worlds of thought and takes delighted refuge in the apparently extravagant chaos of solitary reverie, lost dreams and toxic happiness.[40]

Dreams are supposed to be "human" because the superego grants an uninterrupted link with society. Even when we examine the symbolisms of dreams, we are still aware of man "as a whole" because the anxiety which his superego "puts into" the symbols is caused also by social troubles. The problem remains that "the social" enters dreams only via the purely individualist, stylistic activities of the superego. In this sense the Freudian approach to dreams is not so different from the "solitary daydream" of the surrealists; and the surrealist's mistake was not to parody psychoanalytical approaches but to imitate a practice confined to individualist acts of symbolization. Surrealist dreams, as well as those examined by psychoanalysis, can be classified as "daydreams." It was rather Freud's initial, radical distinction between dreams and daydreams which produced misunderstandings about the role of the (individual) intellect of the dreamer and its exclusion from an examination of dreams.

Christian Metz has said in a passage already quoted, that while the dreamer does not know that he is dreaming, the spectator of a film does know very well that he is at the movies. Metz concludes, in regard to this difference between

dreams and film, that the aim of film is a "remaking the existence of a certain impression of reality." Metz does not believe that film creates a world as such but that the cinematic world can be recognized as a "world that has been made." Given the importance that the difference between dreams and daydreams has in dream theory I would, however, hold that the state of affairs mentioned by Metz should lead to much further-reaching conclusions than the one which are announced by Metz himself. Dreams and daydreams represent, both of them, insufficient models if we intend to define the psychic value of the experience of watching a film. What is needed is a consideration of an interplay between both. Metz's declaration that film cannot be a dream just because the spectator knows that he is watching a film is as narrow minded as is the contrary declaration delivered by some experimental psychologists inclined to say that film is a dream only because laboratory research in sleep has shown that the viewer's inner activities during a phase called "high dream" are compatible with the mental activities we develop when watching a film. These scientific arguments[41] do not contribute to an understanding of the essential relationship between films and dreams. We should thus concentrate on the possibility of a middle state between dreams and daydreams which has, in film theory, always constituted a more inspiring source for the creations of dreams in art than that of pure dreams or "high dreams."

It is possible that the initial surrealist fascination with films was related to the idea of bringing about a dissolve between dreams and daydreams. The bad relationships which surrealism developed later with the medium of film are linked to the surrealists' mainstream tendency to treat dreams as daydreams. For Metz, the ontological reality of films should be looked for beyond dreams and daydreams because cinema is neither an "unconscious" nightdream nor a "willfully produced" daydream. He recognizes the relevance of daydreams as a cinematic phenomenon: "When daydream takes hold of it [the fantasy] we can even establish in certain cases a kind of intentional invention by the subject, which is like the first stage in drafting a film scenario."[42] However, Metz's observations are grounded on the acceptance of the Freudian model of the distinctness of dreams and daydreams, and this endangers the pertinence of his point. In cinema, dreams and daydreams are dissolved and the experience of watching a film can be clarified neither in terms of a dream nor in that of a daydream.[43] Even faced with the most convincing dreamlike effects, the spectator still knows that he is watching a film; and it is for this reason that the event of "going to the cinema" is for him also similar to "having a daydream." It is just this ambiguous superposition of the two which creates the special psychic effect that only a viewer of a film is submitted to. Cinema as an institution tries to convince the spectator that the film is a dream by generously permitting him to know that he is not dreaming.

Susanne Langer defined cinema as an art that has introduced the "dream mode" as its main artistic expression, a mode that finally enables cinema to establish itself as an independent medium. Film, Langer thinks, is, because of its "virtual" character, no daydream. Daydreams are willful imitations of dreams. Films, however, work otherwise.

> [Film] is not any poetic art we have known before; it makes the primary illusion—virtual history—in its own mode. This is, essentially, the *dream mode*. I do not mean that it copies dream, or puts one into a daydream. Not at all, no more than literature invokes memory, or makes us believe that we are remembering.[44]

The dream is here seen as a reality in itself. Dreams are not "intentionally" or "consciously" stylized from reality into non-reality.[45]

If daydreams are different from dreams because they are controlled by reason and not by the superego, this does nevertheless not annul the existence of another characteristic which dreams and daydreams have in common: both are manifestations of wishes. Freud has made this very clear: "Now these daydreams are actual wish fulfilments, fulfilments of ambitious and erotic wishes with which we are familiar; but they are thought, and though vividly imagined, they are never hallucinatory experiences."[46] Though also dreams can live without the impetus of a wish, in daydreams these wishes have a chance of becoming "imagined" in a quicker and more direct way because no counterdemands either of the ego or of the superego can reject or delude the suggestion of the daydreaming *id*. It is not amazing that orthodox psychoanalytic analyses of film tend to classify film dreams often as wish fulfillments. This might be true for many films but in regard to art films this represents a position given to criticism.[47] Film as a wish fulfillment represents an apt formulation only in regard to films which clearly declare that they function as a daydream. In these films we can make out a daydream-like narrative structure; but this structure remains incompatible with the basic phenomenological truth about film dreams as artistic phenomena. The structure of the daydream is convincing mainly in Hollywood films. Already Hugo Mauerhofer said that "Hollywood is but the industrialization of the mechanical worker's daylight dream."[48] Films as machines of desire can be easily structuralized; their "form" is easily located because any unequivocal motivations caused by equally obvious "secret" wishes can be "lined up" in a structure. The narrative structure of a daydream is never complex. Dudley Andrew has said about the "daydream" cinema of Hollywood or of even lower genres:

> To treat films as mechanisms of desire is to involve directly their formal aspects. . . . Instead of enumerating and interpreting motifs, as do the psychoanalysts of plot, we can explore the way any film (and every film) creates dams and detours, and sustains viewer identification and psychic valences. The film experience resembles a fun house attraction, a wild ride, the itinerary of which has been calculated in advance but is unknown to the spectator. . . . As might be expected, the study of this process has depended almost entirely on the Hollywood cinema, even on the lower echelon genre cinema.[49]

While desires might be the main issue for an analysis of daydreams, for the analysis of dreams they are not. This is not only so because in dreams desires of the id are *verfremdet* in a more complex way by the ego and the superego. From

an aesthetic point of view, dream scenes or dream films are fascinating because they take place in a sphere which seems to exist beyond any desire! We can derive a desire from a surrealist symbol; from a dream scene of Bergman or Tarkovsky we won't.

Robert Curry has shown that dreams often appear as such because of a certain absence of desires. This is evident, though Freud would argue that in dreams desires are not absent but only more difficult to recognize because the successful acts of *Verdrängung* and the dream work have alienated these desires. Still I do not think that Freud's claim can make Curry's invalid. Curry claims that dreams often show "a vividness, originality, and insightfulness that quite escapes us in our waking lives. If we compare our dreams to the fantasies of waking life, the latter reveal at a glance their stereotyped features and lowly origins in our desires and fears."[50] While daydreams have an almost inherent tendency to become stereotyped manifestations of desires, dreams exceed the simple strategy of "fulfilling a wish." Consequently, they let "desires" appear banal and bound to waking life. Curry alludes to a certain indifference proper to dreams, an indifference which participates, on the deepest level, in the formation of the dream discourse and which helps to create the dream's style. Daydreams, on the other hand, react on desires; and this is why they appear neither as realities nor as dreams. Dreams take place "elsewhere" and just because of this they are more "real" than (everyday) reality. Dreams manifest a disautomatized reality; they do not work in the service of either a preconditioned desiring machine or of a dull world of everyday life. This reality of dreams *is already disautomatized*, but it has been disautomatized neither by a stylizing work of human reason, nor by a desire. Dreams appear as a strange entity which fascinates and attracts us not because, as it is the case with daydreams, we recognize an "interest" in the symbols and images. Such an interest exists only within the context of our automatized desires of the everyday world. The task of film dream is to create "places" which have not been constructed by an architect given to daydreams but which exist through certain aesthetic presuppositions. The challenge represented by the definition of such a "place" is as big for psychology as it is for aesthetics. What is in question is the formulation of a new theoretical path based neither on a content-oriented consideration of individual desires, nor on a "desire-free" formalism.[51]

The Uncanny

Right at the beginning of his essay on "The Uncanny" Freud alludes to a general conflict between psychology and aesthetics. Freud declares that the psychoanalysts' concern in aesthetics would be so small because their psychoanalytical examinations take place in "different layers of psychic life" (in anderen Schichten des Seelenlebens) which is too far removed from the "inhibited, muffled emotions dependent on so many constellations and which represent most often the material with which works aesthetics."[52] In view of the background of this conflict, Freud suggests an examination of the uncanny. The

uncanny represents an exceptional and privileged object for scientific research because it bridges a gap between psychology and aesthetics or even between natural science and the humanities. Freud makes an unusually strong effort to examine the uncanny within an interdisciplinary context established by psychology and aesthetics. The uncanny is a phenomenon which frightens; but to be uncanny does not simply mean to be frightening. For Freud the uncanny represents a subcategory of the frightening in general. The uncanny manifests, contrary to the "simply frightening," a frightening condition arising within a sphere of familiar things. When objects in our home suddenly start moving around, this makes the home "unhomely" which is different from being frightened by a grimace in a ghost train. Given the necessary link Freud establishes between the uncanny and the familiar it is right to say that the process of becoming uncanny follows a structure of a disautomatization. It signifies a "making things strange" of those phenomena which are normally protected by a layer of automatized familiarity. The source of the disautomatization is, obviously, unknown. The disautomatization of a familiar, routinized condition by an unknown force creates a special structure of experience that we know as the uncanny. In the uncanny strangeness arises "all alone," having been produced neither by intellect nor by desire. Also, the structure of the experience of the strange is here not produced, like in the daydream, through free and unlimited imagination. The uncanny contains a solid amount of necessity. In order to appear as uncanny, an experiential phenomenon needs to be convincing, that is, linked to absolutely necessary laws; otherwise it can be simply dismissed as being due to contingency. The uncanny always appears as a modification of a necessary, familiar condition; and the modified, uncanny, state of this condition needs to possess an apparent degree of "normality," of necessity and—paradoxically—of familiarity coming close to that of the "homely" one. The uncanny always exists as an overlapping of normality and non-normality and is convincing only through this logical superposition. What is important in regard to the self-sufficient structure formed by a paradoxical overlapping of normality and strangeness is that the strange needs to have become strange by itself. To be uncanny is a state of Being and not one of construction. Disautomatization in the uncanny is "self-disautomatization."

Freud alludes to the phenomenon of automatization as an aesthetic experience by mentioning Jentsch who found that in the writings of E.T.A. Hoffmann one can distinguish the device of creating uncertainty about whether a character is a machine ("ein Automat") or a living being: "In telling a story one of the most successful devices for easily creating uncanny effects is to leave the reader in uncertainty whether a particular figure in the story is a human being or an automaton . . ." ("Das Unheimliche," 238). In Hoffmann's text the uncertainty about automatization is a reliable creator of the uncanny. Further, by exposing a classical motive of *Unheimlichkeit* as a "contingency which appears as a rule," Freud develops on the logical structure of an uncanny experience. If we receive when traveling the number "62" on the same day as the number of our boat cabin, of our train seat, and of our hotel room, we will certainly state

that here contingency claims to be a rule. The person involved in this experience will find it uncanny and, overwhelmed by it, might be inclined to attribute a hidden meaning—an allusion to his future age of death, for example—to these coincidences. This shows how closely the uncanny and dreams are linked, though Freud does not insist on this link.

Bergson pointed out that in our dreams we encounter an infinite number of coincidences; consequently, this structure of contingency (which still appears as a "normal" necessity) should be considered as an essential characteristic of dreams. Given the interplay of contingency and necessity, the structure of experience of the uncanny is unformalizable in terms of a formal stylistics. There is no formal rule about the use of images, dissolves, etc. representing a structure of the uncanny. At the same time no symbols are involved. Nor is the uncanny due to the "stylizations of a desire." Freud himself points out that a certain story by E.T.A. Hoffmann called "The Sandman" cannot simply be classified as the delirious emanations of a narrator. Freud is most fascinated by poet's making it "doubtful if this is the first delirium of a frightened boy or a report supposed to be real and taking place in the world of narrative" (239). Any equation of the delirium (and also of dreams) with the imaginary is relativized here in regard to Hoffmann's procedure of making things strange. The uncanny is supposed to be clear and distinct and not at all dissolved or marred by psychologically conditioned, perceptive deficiencies.

Almost identical things can be said about the aesthetics of film dreams. Dreams cannot be produced through dissolves, fades or other devices taken from formal registers, but films follow a structure of experience proper to that of dreams and similar to that of the uncanny.

How would a film director reproduce the uncanny experience of the person who receives the number "62" on too many occasions? One possibility to adopt this "story" would be to follow up a storyline by emphasizing the important receipt of the number "62" every time by means of a disautomatizing device (for example of uncanny music). At the moment the protagonist is getting seriously worried about the accumulation of coincidences, the director can use more intense stylizing devices usually attributed to an atmosphere of the uncanny (dissolve of the panel with the number in order in demonstrate psychic tension, etc.). Another way to stage the event is to engage the spectator in an action claiming to be primary and constituting the narrative level of an absolutely "normal" life. The events of receiving the numbers could then be mentioned almost in passing. In the second case the spectator reexperiences the strangeness in an "authentic" way. This "reexperiencing" process is far removed from an aesthetics of empathy but the procedure is rather that of dissolving the boundaries between dreams and reality. In Bergman's *The Silence*, Anna, who is strolling through the unknown foreign city, buys a newspaper written in a foreign language and glances at the incomprehensible headlines. Suddenly, in large letters, the name of J.S. Bach appears. Bach had been introduced before in a significant dialogue between the room waiter and Anna. Bach's name had thus only recently created a familiar basis of communication. Its discovery in this

newspaper obviously written in a language spoken by strangers creates an effect of the uncanny.

If modern cinema's main characteristic is, as Roy Armes has said, to overcome formal conventions by presenting past, present and future experiences as an "uninterrupted flow," the interplay of necessary and contingent structures is almost unavoidable. Another important fact is represented by the special status which style has in these films. In these films which are not structured in a "necessary" way and according to a timely logic, the "stylistic integrity" does not depend on a present (normal) point of view from which other sequences are stylized. Style rather produces itself. If we consider the almost literal parallel which exists here between style and the phenomenon of the uncanny as it appears in dreams, we see that our discourse on dreams, style and the uncanny has a very systematical interest. Belá Balázs, for whom stylization is always a "deviation from authentic, objective reality" has nevertheless, at least once, suggested a widened conception of style. Looking at style in the creative arts and comparing it with the nature-like status that it has in the craft traditions, he seemed to experience style itself as a uncanny phenomenon. What here is rule and what is necessity?

> . . . we find ourselves faced with a paradoxical problem. If style is a subjective element of presentation, how is it then that the traditional folk styles have always been the most impersonal, most generally valid elements of art? What is the relationship between the arbitrarily stylizing, reality deforming formalism of extreme subjectivism and the naive stylizing tendencies of folk art which so often result in abstract ornamentation? Why is the one arbitrary subjectivism and the other impersonal, universally valid, objectively valuable?[53]

The paradoxical character of style (which concerns also the style of film) could have entered the aesthetics of cinema earlier.

Dream Transfers

Examinations of film declaring to adopt a Freudian point of view sometimes end up as what Paul Ricœur called "bad psychoanalysis: "biographical psychoanalysis." Bergman's film dreams, for example, are for many an expression of madness that can be best "explained" by attributing symbols and motives to Bergman's biographical data. Buntzen and Craig, for example, establish as one of the results of their analysis of *The Hour of the Wolf* that "Johan's hallucinatory world is a nightmare version of the dark wardrobe and the castrating little man [Bergman] was subjected to as a child," from which follows that "Johan is paranoid."[54] Statements like this are not instructive and manifest essential misunderstandings of, first, the relationship between dreams and life and, second, the relationship between art and dreams. The use of Freudian insights into the psychology of dreams should rather focus the definition of those transfers leading in artistic creation from life to dreams and from there to art and vice versa. From the point of view of any theory, the idea to reproduce dreams in art

is involved in such a complex network of relationships that clear statements about its aesthetic value can be made only with much difficulty. It is not obvious which kind of relationship the reality (or non-reality) produced by a dreamlike work of art has with the reality (or non-reality) present in complex phenomena like dreams.

Dreams exist on at least two levels which have, both of them, equal rights to claim that they represent the reality (or non-reality) of dreams: the manifest and the latent dream content. To these two must be added, as is well known, a third reality which is the dream as it is remembered after awakening. When we speak of a dream we often refer to all three levels at the same time without distinguishing them clearly. In the *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* Freud distinguishes the levels of manifest and the latent dreams, and refers at the same time to the importance of establishing relationships between both:

> We shall call that which the dream relates, the manifest content of the dream; that which is hidden, we can only reach by the analysis of ideas we shall call latent dream thoughts. We may then consider the connection between the manifest dream content and the latent dream thoughts . . .[55]

Obviously, latent dreams exist only in the form of "thoughts" (Traumgedanken) whereas the manifest dreams are represented by a more concrete "dream content" (Trauminhalt). Freud's conception of dreams as due to a *Wunschgedanke* is obvious also in this basic distinction. At least in this sense, dreams and daydreams are not different from each other. Dreams represent (exactly like daydreams) a transfer (Umsetzung) of a thought into an experience (Erlebnis). Freud characterizes this process also as a "dramatization."[56] The interpretation of dreams proceeds then, as is well known, into the "opposite direction" by concluding from the experience to the thought that has been dramatized. While this "reverse dramatization" is relatively easy to do in, for example, children's dreams, in most dreams there appears, however, a number of additional difficulties. One of the main difficulties is that the transfer will not be effectuated "piece by piece," by transforming one latent thought into a corresponding experience, but that thoughts and contents are first rather randomly split up into several sub-elements which will form various interrelationships. The *Umsetzung* of thought into experience takes place only then, when the elements have already created an organic whole composed of latent as well as of manifest elements. Freud writes:

> Comparism will show that the relation between the manifest and latent elements is not simple, certainly not of such a sort that a manifest element is always substituted for the latent. There must rather be a quantitative relationship between the two groups, according to which a manifest element may represent several latent ones, or a latent element be represented by several manifest elements (100/131).

In spite of this complication Freud's scheme of how dreams are produced remains remarkably close to that of daydreams. Certainly, in dreams there is no

reasonable control of the *Umsetzung* of thought into dreams and this is due to the complex body formed by relationships between elements. The dreamwork develops a dynamic of its own. However, Freud's focus is not at all on the dynamism but it is directed to those strategies able to reduce the complexity of more direct readable structures of symbolization. The dynamism must be controlled, and in the name of a scientific psychoanalysis it cannot be permitted to represent a power able to reproduce itself again and again and all alone. Though there is a disautomatization of latent thoughts in dreamwork, and though it must be seen as dynamic, Freud is far from declaring this dynamic to be a self-disautomatization. Were he to attribute too much importance to the dynamic that the dreamwork can develop by itself, he would endanger the scientific project of crystallizing the reasonable logic on which the alienating process is founded which causes the shifts leading from latent thought to the manifest dreams. Though self-disautomatization *does* take place, the psychoanalyst devotes his efforts to the identification of reasonable acts of disautomatization which transfer, through an act of *Verfremdung*, a latent thought into a (symbolizing) experience.

The *Verfremdung* transforming latent thoughts into dream experiences works like a kind of inverse stylization passing not, like stylization, from the concrete to the abstract but from the abstract to the concrete. Given Freud's scheme of dreamwork dominant at the beginning of the century it is not amazing that the first film directors intending to transpose dream experiences on the screen tried to do this by duplicating Freud's system. When reproducing dreams they went in the opposite direction, from the concrete to the abstract, producing dreams in a stylizing way by seeing concrete life "through" a certain abstract idea. What is true for thoughts and experiences in dreamwork is also true for images as well as for rules. Not only the images that we perceive in dreams have, in a Freudian perspective, gone through a process starting with "original" thoughts and ending with a manifest dream (undergoing, in between, several acts of censorship from the ego and the superego) but the "rules" of the dream, the rhythm and order of sequences, that is, the formal layout, have gone through the same process. The "dream as it is remembered" has moved, as Freud declares, the "authentic thought" still one step further from the "dream itself." This complication makes it even more difficult to retrieve initial thoughts representing the key to the dream as such:

> For the dream which is remembered is not the real one, but a distorted substitute, which is to help us approach the real dream by awakening other substitute formations and by making the unconscious in the dream conscious. Therefore if our recollection of the dream was faulty, it has simply brought about a further distortion of this substitute, a distortion which cannot, however, be unmotivated (91/118).

There is a remembrance of the dream passed as well as a manifest dream, though the consideration of both leaves us unsatisfied because we believe that the authenticity (*das Eigentliche*) of the dream has not yet been attained. We have not yet attained the authentic dream which is no dream at all but only a

thought which we consider to be authentic only because it concentrates in itself certain explanations (reasons) which reveal why the dream (the manifest one or the remembered one) was as we have dreamt it. Freud's research for *Eigentlichkeit* passes, in a self-evident way, from the concrete to the abstract. On several levels, a research into "dreams" is understood as a research into abstract ideas supposed to constitute the point of departure of any dream.[57]

The psychoanalyst is not interested in dreams but in an abstract thought while the film director is supposed to produce "dreams as such." Of course, the director can, especially if he is influenced by Freudian tendencies, also be interested in information concerning the latent thoughts existing behind every dream and he might also be willing to introduce those thoughts into dream sequences by means of abstraction (for example, stylization). However, this project will most probably end up as an unsuccessful attempt to produce dreams on the screen by duplicating an intellectually established dreamwork. What will be produced are only dreams existing in terms of an abstract authenticity. However, the authenticity of a dream, if it exists, is (at least in film art) not constituted by thought and especially not by those thoughts that have been intellectually "reconstructed" by a psychoanalyst.

The film director might recognize this danger and decide to capture the "concrete dream" and not the abstract thoughts behind it. Here also the Freudian model will confront him, if he maintains it, with essential difficulties. He has to decide at which point he wants to "cut into" the evolutionary process of dreamwork which is, in Freudian terms, a constantly advancing production starting with a *latent thought*, passing though the *manifest dream* and finishing with the *dream as it is remembered.* Apart from this, even if the director decides to depict the "manifest dream," he has to decide if he wants to depict it before the censorship of the ego and the superego or (perhaps for matters of "authenticity") afterwards. One can decide only with much difficulty what "authenticity" is supposed to mean here. There are many reasons to say that the director should recognize once for always the impossibility of focusing on limited aspects of dreams. He should rather abandon the idea of an evolutionary structure of dream production as a whole.

The consideration of "dream thought" and "dream content" in film studies can lead to different kinds of schematizations. The script can, for example, be seen as a latent dream content to which one opposes the film as the manifest one. Semiotic analyses of films can content themselves with such a classification of dreams (and film) as a "signifier" supposed to signify non-manifest dream thoughts. Christian Metz has declared that "the manifest dream, the dream as such,—dream content for Freud, in opposition to 'dream thoughts'—is a signifier for the interpretation."[58] This idea suggests, however, that dreams (as well as films) are easily interpretable as long as we manage to trace their signifiers back to the signified dream thoughts. This makes sense only as long as we declare any film to be a dream, as long as we declare that film is a dream just because the spectator watches images, is passive, etc. However, if we really concentrate on the dream as a particular kind of experience which a director has tried to transfer to the screen, in that case the semiotic model of dreams-films

and its systematic relationship with latent thought becomes inefficient. This has not gone unnoted by Metz, though the importance he attributes to this fact is a subordinated one. (This is mainly due to Metz's view that it is not desirable to transfer dreams on the screen anyway because the artistic deficiencies which cling to this phenomenon make it unacceptable as art.) Similar to Susanne Langer who rejected the claim that dreams can be art because dreams are only a "natural self-expressive function," won a without any "intellectual advance,"[59] Metz also believes that dreams as manifest contents appearing as such are not art because they do not leave us a chance to reestablish the link with the helpful latent dream thoughts:

> The manifest content of a dream, if it were strictly transposed to the screen, would make an unintelligible film. A film, I may add, truly unintelligible . . . and not one of those avant-garde or experimental films which, as the enlightened audience knows, it is appropriate at once to understand and not to understand (Metz, 1976, 88-89).

Metz distinguishes the "manifest dream film" from avant-garde cinema and that kind of cinema which we have classified as the cinema of the daydream. Metz's point underlines our observations concerning the absurdity of the intention to depict of a dream only a certain phase of the entire process of the dreamwork, for example only the "manifest content." Metz is right in declaring that to watch a "manifest content" does not make sense as an aesthetic experience, not even in the form of a hermetic, self-sufficient work; and this makes it different from daydreams. Surrealism and daydreams still *do* offer explanations enclosed to the dream expressions in the form of a conscious, decodable amount of reasoning. Though in the real "dream" the decoding process is much more hidden, this does not mean, however, that a presentation of dreams can, as does a presentation of an artificially isolated "manifest dream," dispense with any reason. The sense of the dream, and also its authenticity, can flow only out of the links which the spectator establishes himself between the different "phases" of the dreamwork. In other words, in any aesthetic presentation of dreams the different phases of dreamwork must be presented simultaneously. An isolated presentation of, for example, "manifest dreams" will end up as a reasonable aesthetic calculation similar to that of daydreams.

Dream Colors

Should dream sequences in film be shot in color or in black and white? The use of black and while or color for a film dream can have a stylizing effect. This is especially true when both options are used alternatively in the same film. Shifts from color to black and while often signify the past or dreams. The color option is based on stylistic conventions in a sense of a temporal-aesthetic grammar, as writes Dudley Andrew: "While some film makers have resorted to using color for the present tense scenes and black and white for past or conditional (dream) tenses, this is clearly a sophisticated convention added to cinema rather than an

indigenous aspect of the language itself."[60] Here black and white is a signifier and is not in the first place supposed to have a self-expressive function. Still it is obvious that the choice of black and white for past and dreamtenses is not coincidental. Black and white might also signify the faded-out colors of things resting in our memory for a long time. In that case dreams appear as a memory of a dream. Also the direct experience of dreams as a present event can be well rendered by black and white because the use of color is due to a perceptive deficiency on the part of the dreamer. However, first it is not convincing why dream discourses should be linked to a past tense, and second it is not justifiable to attribute dream expressions to a lack of expressiveness subsequently translated into a lack of colors. There are statements confirming the contrary. Fellini insists, in spite of the most generally accepted opinion that dreams are dreamt in black and white, that black and white dreams are impossible because it is just the colors which function as signifiers of the most important clues: "It is absurd to say that one can dream in black and white. The color is an integral part of the language of dreams. In dreams the colors translate ideas, concepts. Every color carries a message."[61]

The topic of colors in dream sequence cannot be reduced to a simple conventionalism. While fade-outs and superimpressions appear as standardized signs announcing, as Bazin said, "attention, dream," the deliberate use of colors as well as that of slow motion is significant for the status of the dream itself. The director who uses slow motion in a dream sequence, for example, might not really be convinced that we are dreaming in slow motion. At the same time he might not think that his deformation of the temporal level is without any link with the dream reality itself. He might still believe that dreams are very well expressed through slow motion. Something similar can be observed in the use of color in dream scenery.

Strindberg counts among the few people supporting Fellini's view on dreams and colors. Already Strindberg's contemporaries noted that his *Dreamplay*, though most people's dreams were believed to be colorless, "revel in colors."[62] Strindberg went against the current when insisting that in *Dreamplay* the sunflowers are yellow and the fishbox is green. It would be unreasonable to think that a scientifically minded author like Strindberg used this kind of device only intuitively or even by coincidence without reflecting upon its psychological implications. Ebbe Linde has designed an interesting "solution" of the problem which matches well with Strindberg's own ambitions. Linde explains dreams as a mixture of black and white and color expressions, and dreamlike reality is supposed to come about through a deliberate use of both: "Colors appear only by choice, isolated and alone, like in the case of the blue hair ribbon on a hand-colored photograph. This is why the colors do often have a dark glimmer or are blinding, like a real luster and a strong pronunciation of emotion."[63]

Also Wong Kar-wai's films (*As Tears Go By*, *Happy Together*, and *In the Mood for Love*) recall hand-tinted photography, which creates a clear dream effect of nostalgia but also of the avant-garde.[64]

Dreams are black and white but the symbolizing function of colors is not excluded because coloration appears "in points." Theater is here even in a technically better position than cinema. Bergman's use of black and white which has a "pronounced color effect"[65] might be linked to this tradition. Colors have lost here their status as colors. Or, in dream films colors are disautomatized because they represent only "a variation" of black and white photography. Their expressive force develops within the grammatical context of photography which has decided to be black and white. Colors are here colors and at the same time non-colors. The exceptional status of dream reality becomes here clear. Reality has not passed away and then been retrieved, in the "paler" and faded-out form of a memory of the dream that we remember. The possibility of expressing itself in the form of a clear and concrete experience justifies even the (punctual) use of color. Still, these colors cannot claim the status of colors of the present; in some way they are not colors at all. They are expressive elements functioning inside a sphere neither present nor past. The dreamtense is not a conditional tense of a "could be" as produced by daydream.

The black and white tendency of dreams cannot be ascribed to a *verfremdende* censorship of the superego or the ego. In that case, colors would even try to compete with the black and white which dominates dreams. Here, however, in dreams, colors are integrated into a dreamtense and this is why their intensity is not linked to temporality.

Dream Realism

If we turn away from formalism, realism becomes an object of interest. In a way, this is amazing since normally reality is opposed to dreamlike expressions. For Bluestone film is too realistic to be able to produce dreams. Similarly, for post-surrealists like Bazin and Kracauer cinema is supposed to look for its genuine expression within a kind of realist expression efficient only because opposed to dreams.

Still, realism can represent an alternative in regard to cinema and dreams and—a paradox which has often been noted—this becomes obvious even in Bazin and Kracauer as soon as they leave the polemical level on which they are generally trying to overcome the symbolist atmosphere of surrealism. Our arguments concerning the relationship between dreams and language are still relevant here. If dreams need to be "explained" in and by literature, then cinema should try to depict dreams "directly" and as "realistically" as possible so that no comment will be needed. Everything here points in the direction of an approach (which is also proper to Bergman) which tries first to understand reality as dreams, and then to depict it realistically. A statement by Kracauer provides probably the earliest definition of "dreamlike realism" and functions as an apt *mis au point* of the aesthetic idea that we have been treating in this book. Kracauer writes about dreams:

> Perhaps films look most like dreams when they overwhelm us with the crude and unnegotiated presence of natural objects—as if the camera had just now extricated them from the womb of physical existence and as if the umbilical cord between image and actuality had not yet been severed. There is something in the abrupt immediacy and shocking veracity of such pictures that justifies their identification as dream images.[66]

It becomes here particularly clear how much such a production of dreams is opposed to the idea of a stylization of reality. The realistic character of the dream elements is compared to those objects that we can find in nature. Kracauer's dreamlike realism shows us a way out of the dilemma crystallized above. The fundamental question was whether it is possible to overcome a common view which opposes, in films, an abstract logic to concrete images. In "dreamlike realism" the concrete images can create a logic of dreams. In order to handle this paradox properly we need to recognize the link that it maintains with another paradox that has been mentioned already in regard to Bergman's *Shame*. Here a film which was supposed to be a dream was not allowed to look like a dream. There are several ways to trace this paradoxical phenomenon back to reasonable definitions. One possibility is to insist that a dreamlike film sequence always resides between the sphere of dreams and reality. This is how it can happen that the experience of dreams is made at moments where a dream does "not look like a dream." More precisely, the dream experience will be made at those moments where we are asking ourselves: "is it is a dream" or "is it reality?" In cinema those dreams which can be too clearly recognized as premeditated dreams are rejected as dreamlike stylizations or as symbolisms. This does not mean that they are not artistically valuable but they are not dreams. Dreams are produced through the "existential" confusion, which lets the limits between dreams and reality appear to be blurred.[67]

Freud thinks that the interpretation of dreams functions through a reverse procedure which "undoes" the *Verfremdung* imposed by dreamwork. He obviously adopted general ideas about the *Verfremdung* and stylization typical for his time and which persisted even in impressionism. The impressionist project consists in the "undoing" of an (artistic) *Verfremdung* by letting the world appear (on the screen) in the way it is perceived by the mind. By reducing all willful artistic acts of alienation to a minimum, impressionism thought that it can describe reality "directly"; impressionism decided to express reality "as the mind perceives it." It used fade-outs of colors.

The project of realism was directed by similar intentions: here also one decided to reduce the *verfremdende* effect effectuated by the human mind to a minimum by using colors and forms which are "realistic." Reality is no longer depicted as the mind sees it but as it "really is." Freud's conception of the *Zurückführen* (tracing back) of the alienating devices of dreamwork must be seen in this context. By inverting the *Verfremdung*, Freud hopes to obtain an insight into a reality supposed to be original and more "real" than the reality dreamt. That this reality is, in the end, rather abstract and consists mainly of different *dream thoughts* can be seen as Freud's particular input.

A film is a realistic phenomenon which is why the aestheticism applied in painting is invalid for film. Kracauer thought that even the most realist painter is unable to produce a "realistic" scene. Even the most realist painter "stylizes" reality, and he does so through his realism. Film, on the other hand, is able to capture reality directly "as it is." Kracauer's realism is not based on calculations with possibilities of literal reproductions but on the capturing of a certain spiritual quantity supposed to be enclosed to the reality:

> Falling prey to an interesting misconception, Emile Vuillermoz champions, for the sake of "realism," settings which represent reality as seen by a perceptive painter. To his mind they are more real than real-life shots (die Realität selber) because they impart the essence of what such shots are showing. Yet from the cinematic point of view these allegedly realistic settings are no less stagy than would be, say, a cubist or abstract composition. Instead of staging the given raw material itself, they offer, so to speak, the gist (einen Extrakt) of it. In other words, they suppress the very camera-reality which film aims at incorporating (Kracauer 34/62).

Here the problem of realism as it appears in the art of film gives decisive clues to a theory of dreams. The atmosphere, the stylistic layout of the reality (be it material reality or a reality of dreams) cannot be grasped through a *Zurück-führung* of stylizations. Kracauer's analysis shows that realism's avoidance of a stylization is another kind of stylization. Only realist *film* working according to Kracauer's definition is able to grasp a non-stylized reality. It grasps reality together with the stylistic layout it owns *already*.

Dream Rituals

Dreams can be considered as carriers of motivationally neutral information,[68] that is, as expressive quantities not "dramatized" by dreamwork. Vernon Young's statement about Swedish films is interesting in this context:

> The Swedish filmmaker deems it unnecessary to dramatize the motivations of his characters. We are asked to take for granted that, being people, they will behave in prescribed ways, usually disheartening. They discover that "life" is empty, never asking if it is not they who are empty. Man and wife will inevitably hate each other: this is a given; affection is incestuous or one summer long; suicide is the only alternative to failure of comprehension the older generation (age thirty, fifty or seventy) is always obtuse or cruel.[69]

About some of Strindberg's plays (especially *Miss Julie* and *The Stronger*) it has been said that "the virtue of all these plays is the intensity of the revealed experience," and that they testify to "the unforgettable power of a savage insight into motive and situation."[70] Strindberg's celebrated "insight into motives" appears so "savage" because motivations of the characters are not elucidated in a conventional way. In the hands of a genius like Strindberg, this "savageness" appears as "an intensity of revealed experience." In the hands of another

Swedish genius, namely Ingmar Bergman, the logic of "undramatized action" could develop into a tremendous plus for the advancement of cinematic art (Young himself puts forward the example of *A Passion*).

It is usually said that theater is dramatic and that cinema, once it is really independent from theatrical expressions, is necessarily "undramatic." Only a cinema which is not theater can develop the particular language through which the dreamlike discrete and self-contained actions, that some people believe to be typical for cinema as such, are expressed. Undramatic cinematic actions are opposed to those actions charged by the director with an amount of dramatic expressiveness. This is the reason why critics are inclined to call the theater a "place for rituals" and prefer to reserve the cinema for more individual and intimate aesthetic experiences. Dudley Andrew insists on this distinction, and draws a clear borderline between dramatic, theatrical rituals, and, interestingly, cinematic dreams when writing: "Although both film and play audiences exclaim, 'tonight we are going to the theater,' they in one case going to a place of rituals (theater) and in second to a 'window on their dreams' (cinema)."[71]

However, at the moment cinematic dreams can appear like unmotivated and non-dramatized movements, it is better to call cinema the place of rituals and no longer to consider it as a place where actions are calculated, staged and stylized by a director. Some modern directors, increasingly insisting on the self-awareness of cinematic form, have used ritualization as a means of distanciation in order to avoid techniques of simple mimesis. Roy Armes crystallized a remarkable effort in a modern director like Melville who "distils a style in which behavior becomes a ritual and the action an expression of pure myth."[72] Modern cinema elaborates a spirit for the "essential" which can adopt the status of a stylistic mark, as Armes says about Melville: "All defined time and place may be pared away so that the habitual expression of ritualized violence now occurs in an equally ritualized ambience" (56).

Film might be in a better position to explore the "ritualness of action" than any other art. Unmotivated, ritualized action is introduced into art as a means of *Verfremdung*. In many modern films and especially in those films reminiscent of dreams, "ritualization" appears as an important device, causing an estrangement as effective as the classical devices of dreamwork. There is no dramatization (as in dreamwork) but its contrary: ritualization. While analysts of *Persona* who are looking for a *Verfremdung* or even a "polyphonic montage" (Johns Blackwell) remain unable to seize the underlying aesthetic strategy of the film completely, a reference to ritual as a comprehensive model for the structure of the film turns out to be more convincing. P. N. Campbell decided to characterize *Persona* as a "cinematic minuet of a sort, or in which partners advance and retreat, pairs of partners change or are unchanged in relation to each other, each partner or pair independent of the moves of the other."[73] *Persona* has been recognized by many people as a "dream-film. This dream is not a dramatized dream content (tracing undramatized dream thought), but its non-dramatized artistic expression contains all possible information about itself and can be understood only "as such."[74]

The "unmotivated" situations produced in modern films, like, for example, those of Melville, and especially in those films tending towards dreamlike expressions, do not strive towards a definable finality. To some extent, the ritual can be defined as a game. Both in rituals and in games we find repetitive movements not obeying an exterior finality. Games and rituals create their own sphere of being, incompatible with the sphere of the "outside" real life. But there is also a difference between games and rituals: Within most games there exists a certain internal finality, meaning that the players strive towards a "solution," most often represented by the fact that both parties are trying to win the game. Rituals do not manifest such an internal finality.

Claude Levi-Strauss has insisted on these points: "Every game defines itself through a whole body of rules which make a practically infinite number of games possible. The rite, however, though also 'played,' looks more like a privileged game, held in between all possibilities, because it results from a certain balance between both parties."[75]

In rituals, the existence of a competitive moment is only *pretended*: to perform a ritual can mean that the performers are pretending to play a game in a competitive way without really doing so. In a way a ritual is "pretending to play" or perhaps even better, playing at playing. In rituals, the play meets its own mirror image, an effect creating the distanced kind of reality of the ritual. The ritual is a more "distanced" or "estranged" kind of game.

We recognize here a link with dreams. In nightmares, actions can appear as absurd because the scene is dominated by a "fake competitiveness." These scenes are even typical of dreams, and both Bergman and Strindberg referred to them. Borg's examination by Alman in the *auditorium-maximum* in *Wild Strawberries* is based on such an absurd competition. To be obliged to play a game under extremely unfair conditions, is a Kafkaesque experience, and can, by its nature, evoke the atmosphere and the mood of a dream. At the same time, the fact of fighting against almighty partners provokes, in anthropological terms, the shift from game to rituals. Very often, one introduces a certain competitiveness into rituals by inventing an "almighty" partner, against whom the player of the ritual is supposed to "play" (against the dead, the Gods or the spirits). This means that the introduction of a certain "absurd input" into a self-contained, rule-following activity like the game transforms games into rituals.[76]

In the ritual we are still playing a game, but the symmetrical frame of the game has been made asymmetrical. In the ritual, "rule-following" has been pushed *ad absurdum* because rules can here no longer claim to be rules. They are non-rules because grounded on no "motivated" finality. The ritual is governed by a "de-dramatizing" effect, which is the reason why the ritual, even more than the game, creates a reality of its own which does not require an explanation through dramatization.

This ritualized reality is also reminiscent of the reality of dreams. Looking at Levi-Strauss's observations, we are even inclined to think that rituals sometimes appear as games not played but dreamt. To participate in a ritual is not playing but playing at playing. For this reason, rituals can also evoke the experience of playing a game in a dream. An effect of estrangement is produced

not in the first place on a "stylizing" and aesthetic level, but on a purely structural, experiential one, which establishes, for example, an asymmetry where a symmetry would be expected or establishes a symmetry where an asymmetry would have been expected. In competitive games we obtain a "result" only as long as we are able to declare at the end of the game that one party has been more successful than the other one. If such a result cannot be obtained, then this might be acceptable as a rare coincidence. However, if this finality is inverted, that is, if we declare openly that the sense of the game is to establish symmetry instead of asymmetry, then the entire act of playing becomes absurd. According to Levi-Strauss, this is equal to saying that the game has become a ritual: "The case of the Gahuku-Gama from New-Guinea, who have learned to play football, but who play for several days, as many games as it takes to make the score of the games lost and won games balanced. This is treating a game as a rite" (ibid., 46).

It is also reminiscent of a game taking place in a dream. The fact of not playing but performing the game like a theater play demands a twist in the minds of those involved: one has agreed that one is only playing at playing. The superposition of two realities, the fact of following rules that are rules of a game remaining valid only within the performance of a game—all this is immediately linked to the structure of a dreamlike reality. It strengthens our claim that dreams are not formalized bits of reality, but that the reality at their origin was real and unreal at the same time; and this has been the reality of rituals.[77]

Bergman's *The Face* deals with rituals. Magicians carry out rituals, which, as they quickly inform us, are only "games." We learn that within these games "various kinds of apparatus, mirrors and projectors" are used. The subject of the film is a ritual. What will happen when this ritual is filmed? The result is obvious: the ritual has been "transformed" into a dream. In the further course of *The Face*, the ritual is intensified: its game-like, dynamic power is heightened until, finally, everything literally turns into a dream. This dream is not the dream of "lowered" life-intensity, but a dream whose dreamlike appearance renders the status of reality in a more intense way. In the end, the ritual becomes so real that it leads to murder. Some time later, Ottilia does not even dare to decide if what happened was reality or dreams!

Another example: In Bergman's *The Rite*, the judge Abrahamson affirms that he is just "obeying instructions" and that he is just "an instrument." He claims that "we live under the law and the law is necessary." A law which does not work in the service of a certain idea, but which is "just a law" unto itself, and in an abstract way, is a non-law. Living under such absurd conditions has the decisive consequence of turning life into ritualistic play. This can also appear as a dream. If we perceive it as a dream, however, this does not at all mean that it will help us to escape reality because at the end of this ritualistic play, we encounter cruelty. The judge violates every law he pretends to represent. However, this is no cynicism, but a necessity as the judge himself explains: the law "rebukes, humiliates, judges" and strives towards the satisfaction of only one thing: "the lust of cruelty."

Though in rituals and dreams, violence can be clearly felt as violence, this violence does not have the oppressive function that it has in real life. Strangely enough, its function is even liberating! A liberating effect of this kind exists only in rituals and dreams. Bergman says that films "fulfill a highly useful function in ritualizing violence. [In film] people can live out and experience it. I believe the spectator achieves a kind of liberation from watching these violent acts."[78] Some of Bergman's film dreams follow an aesthetics of dreams as much as of rituals. The ritual, having reached its climax, can end up as an act of cruelty. The dream of Isaac Borg in the *auditorium-maximum* of the polyclinic, for example, reproduces ritualistic actions. The interrogating Alman, by carrying out this ritual so properly, makes the whole experience cruel. This cruelty, which at the same time contains the liberation from itself, is particular to dreams and to rituals because here a "playful aspect" of violence comes about by letting violence appear within the sphere of disinterestedness. This is an important aspect of ritual violence, and especially of violence in film art.[79] The experience that we undergo when watching these strange acts of violence is that they leave traces in our memories reminiscent of the traces left in our minds by our dreams. It is certainly no coincidence that Bergman (like Tarkovsky) is fascinated by events constituted by "unmotivated actions." Bergman considers these events to be model cases of cinematic "drama":

> Three little children go out for a walk together—two little girls aged four, with a little boy of two. They take a skipping rope with them. They put it round the neck of the two-year-old and tie the ends to couple of trees—just high enough for the boy to have to stand on tiptoe. And walk away. And we don't know what it is that causes these two to agree to do such a thing. . . . There has been a whole series of such events. Unmotivated cruelty is something which never ceases to fascinate me; and I would like very much to know the reason for it.[80]

This "story" told by Bergman in an interview, manifests a ritual-like character. There is a self-sufficiency in this "ritual" which produces an intimacy that no outside observer is able to disturb. Not even a voyeur could "reexperience" this action as violent. In this "act" there are no roles to play and no "experiences" to be empathized. The entire action is so pure and so innocent that it appears like a dream at the very moment it takes place.[81]

The scene Bergman described is de-dramatized and ritual-like. The fact of playing unfolds autonomously, without the player being asked to provide a particularly self-conscious surplus of imagination.[82]

In dreams (as well as in rituals) play has a particular function. Rule-following does not only suggest the adherence to a formal code, but it suggests at the same time its very function as an act of creation. This creation unfolds itself on the "inside" of the film, of the dream and of the ritual. In other words, in aesthetic play like that of cinematic dreams, (creative) contents and form are inseparable, since they appear together. The director avoids any impression that life has been transferred (through an act of creative imagination) from reality into the play. The film is supposed to appear as if it has flown out of an (innocent) game, and claims to be nothing other than a game.

Dream Certitudes

In his *Système des beaux-arts*, the French philosopher Alain (1868-1951) writes about a particular experience that we can undergo when remembering things long past:

> When objects are known, familiar and not ambiguous, reverie turns away from them, and the stray look will always search for its visions beside and somehow behind us. Sometimes one says that the images of fantasy are weak, but this is a bad description. My peasant house, today in ashes and ruins—I still believe I see it, but not feebly or foggy, as if I would have to look carefully in order to see it. On the contrary, such attention makes it disappear; but a gesture, a movement, a brief emotion present it to me beyond my straight look, and that's all. I only remember having seen . . .[83]

Alain condemns dreams or, more precisely, reveries, and he does so mainly for their lack of clarity. Still something extremely attractive continues to exist in dreams for Alain. The memories of things that were once familiar can come to our minds "clearly." However, in order to permit such a clear vision, we need to transfer these things from our memory to our consciousness in a "direct" way. We must evoke them by avoiding any attentive or voluntary act of "imagining." Our forced attention "destroys memory." Alain considers reverie as a half-conscious evocation of past images, as an inconvenient means for the successful and clear memorization of the past. Reverie will never produce anything but nebulous impressions. Even worse: passive and uncreative as it is, it is unable to produce something new. Reverie moves along the worn-out rails of our all too banal memories, constantly bordering on boredom. Reverie will never take us by surprise.[84]

The "brief emotion" through which Alain perceives the house of his parents could not have been produced by reverie, because the images came to him by surprise. Their appearance resembled that of Isaak Borg's strawberry-gathering cousin, who suddenly starts to exist while Borg is lying on the grass. Or those living images of human beings who people Tarkovsky's space station *Solaris*. These images arriving by surprise and making us ask: "are we dreaming or are we awake," produce a unique feeling of estrangement (or even of *Unheimlichkeit*)—and this is different from seeing images lacking clarity.

Regrettably Alain classifies the very experience he is trying to crystallize as not only opposed to reverie but also to dreams. This is a mistake. Bergman describes an experience extremely similar to Alain's, but for him this experience comes close to dreams: it is the experience of watching a film. Bergman suggests that cinema's identity with a "true dream" makes it particularly efficient as a communicator of psychic experiences, which are direct because they successfully elude the shaping power of human intellect. And this characteristic makes dreams and film-dreams different from reveries:

> [In literature] the read word is absorbed through a conscious act of will linked to intellect; and only then does it address our imagination and feelings. . . . But

> when we experience a film presentation we consciously produce a readiness for illusion, cut off our will and intellect. . . . The image-narration directly hits our feelings with no stopover in the intellect.[85]

We recognize a Cartesian input in Alain's reasoning about dreams. Whenever a certitude about objects is needed, a certitude so evident that it does not need to be established by discursive reasoning, a certitude applicable in any context, we are tempted to look for it only in waking life but never in dreams. For Descartes this argument represents one of the highlights of scientific methodology. Only waking life, Descartes thinks, can give us evidence about "truth" without letting the impression have a "stopover" in the intellect (as Bergman would have put it). In the *Sixth Meditation*, Descartes lays down that the "immediacy" of knowledge (thus the fact that both Alain and Bergman refer to) can also be present in the form of a "feeling." But it can appear only in waking life and never in sleep:

> But when I perceive objects with regard to which I can distinctly determine both the place whence they come, and that which they are, and the time at which they appear to me, and when, without interruption, I can connect the perception of them with the whole of the other parts of my life, I am perfectly sure that what I thus perceive occurs while I am awake and not during sleep.[86]

Alain's reflections are linked to a more general concept of imagination which (as Alain himself insists) can be verified on the grounds of Cartesian philosophy. For Alain imagination is evil as long as it is not linked to a certain content. Empty, formal imagination, existing beyond concrete content, is "mad and unregulated by nature" and in reverie, it acquires unhealthy dimensions. Reveries are too liberal because they follow the impulses of a "freestyle form" without being answerable to any rationally controlled, concrete content. Should reveries ever produce more "serious" results of imagination (for example those of art), they will have to accept the active and rationally controlled introduction of content; and this is possible only in waking life and not whilst dreaming.

Alain's Cartesian version of aesthetics is directed against reverie as much as against dreams. For Alain, it is important that "the reader who looks carefully at Descartes' teachings will perhaps understand that imagination needs objects. Therefore art is a remedy against reverie, which remains erring and sad" (20-21). In other words, whatever we imagine, we should avoid "fantastic creations" (21) because they will cause a "délire," which is the contrary of art (28). Reveries as well as dreams are speculative activities; their alternative is "concrete," reasonable, non-dreams.

Alain's ideas are typical for any rationalistic elaboration of a psychologising philosophy, and especially of the French one.[87] "Dreaming" is understood as an abstract, theoretical activity running the risk of losing contact with "the real." For Alain, dreams are typical for "the lazy spectator for whom the sight of things is often only an occasion to follow diffuse and inconsistant reveries and who will soon be lost in a circle of mechanical discourse."[88] However, to suggest as an alternative to this sort of dreams not the introduction of concrete contents into their empty form but to see the experience of real dreams as a

whole as an alternative model of understanding—this idea actively questions several modern suppositions current since Descartes.

First of all, it questions the opposition of form to contents. Dreams are not equal with formal reveries. At the same time, neither do they represent concrete contents. Dreams are not the formalized version of a non-formal dream content which, exactly like the *délire* of the madman, ask to be traced back by an art critic or a psychoanalyst by de-dramatizing a manifest content. Alain's suggestions about the relationship between *délire* and art fit perfectly well into this Freudian system. Alain believes that a madman is not an artist because his *délire* is too "formless." The madman commits the error of "trying to have his actions determined by vain images while the artist, as it seems, has his images determined by what he is doing, I mean by the object that takes form under his hands, or by an incantation or by a well-measured declamation" (30). Art needs form-giving stylization, not just the production of a *délire*.

Dream-art as a "direct approach" is an alternative that neither Descartes nor Alain have thought of. Bergman simply wants "to show what real sleeping dreams look like" (Bark). The experience of dreams is here artistic as such and "aesthetic dreams" become a new category for psychology and art.

Notes

1. Roy Armes, *The Ambiguous Image: Narrative Style in Modern European Cinema* (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976), 237.

2. Maurice Blanchot, "Poésie, condition humaine, révolution sociale" in M. Bonnet, *Les Critiques de notre temps et Breton* (Paris: Garnier, 1974), 161-62.

3. Cf. André Pieyre de Mandiargues, "Témoignages" in Y. Kovacs, *Surréalisme et cinéma* (*Etudes cinématographiques* 38-39), 1965, 485.

4. Norman Holland finds Borg's dream "surrealistic, sooth-and-chalk sequence, much in the manner of Murnau" ("A Brace of Bergman" in *Hudson Review* 12:4, Holland, 1959-60, 571). Yves Kovacs believes that Bergman has at least twice in his career appealed to surrealist symbolism: first in *Prison* which "oscillates between brutal realism and Freudian symbolism" and second in *Wild Strawberries* (cf. Kovacs, 1965, 186).

5. Michael Roemer, "The Surface of Reality" in R.D. MacCann, *Film: A Montage of Theories* (New York: Dutton, 1966, 259).

6. Jean-Cristophe Averty, "Témoignages" in Y. Kovacs, *Surréalisme et cinéma* (*Etudes cinématographiques* 38-39), 1965, 153.

7. Vlada Petric has pointed out the characteristic of psychological intensity produced by different dream scenes, an intensity due not only to the scenes themselve but also to the relationship that they maintain with the context in which they are embedded: "The nightmarish introductions to *Wild Strawberries* the daydream sequence in *Persona* and—above all, Johan's hallucinations in Hour of the Wolf—aptly demonstrate how specific cinematic devices, properly used, can enhance the dramatic conflict occurring in the character's mind" (*Films and Dreams: An Approach to Bergman* [South Salem: Redgrave, 1981, 57]). However, the dreams mentioned by Petric have not been designed, all of them, in the same way and the differences they manifest are representative for Bergman's development as an artist. This is true not only for the elements clearly signifying dreams but also for the general expressive sphere created through an aesthetics of dreams.

8. Bergman has changed since. Though dream sequences in Bergman wear common traits, there are different aesthetic principles underlying them. Some critics have stated that a change of attitude towards films and dreams becomes obvious in Bergman at the moment he begins to see films not as phenomena which include dream sequences but as dreams as such. This point is very important and Marsha Kinder has settled it at the time of *The Hour of the Wolf* which marks for her "the turning point where Bergman realizes that all his films were dreams" (Kinder, 1981, 28). It is certainly right to say that the break with surrealist imagery which we have observed already, is linked to a change of mind in regard to the ontology of film. Kinder writes: "[Bergman] shifts from coded surrealistic experience of dreams to a richer phenomenological experience of dreams, [and] moves his audience from an external observation and analysis of the events to a fuller participation inside the hallucination" (ibid.).

9. There is the possibility of interpreting this adoption of new, more phenomenological ideas about dreams as a break not only with surrealism but also with modern devices in general which are "construction," "stylization" and also psychoanalytical establishment of symbols. If Bergman's realization of film as dreams is, as Kinder thinks, to be settled at the year 1968, this "awakening to dream" was obviously preceded by a period of reshaping of modernist "constructivist" techniques which could have begun in 1961 with *Through a Looking Glass Darkly*. It is here that we can observe Bergman's deliberate neglect of modernist devices. This shift should be emphasized because the contrast between the two phases of Bergman's work is impressive. Claude Perrin has analyzed the change of aesthetic attitude and written about *Through a Looking Glass Darkly*: Bergman se débarrasse . . . des nombreux effets et artifices qui abondaient dans *Skepp till Indianerland* ou *Törst* retours en arrière démodés, précédés de langage avant-gardistes . . . l'intensite de l'oeuvre, ne devant rien à la construction, au découpage, au rythme est, en conséquence, beaucoup plus sinueux, libre, ouvert. D'autre part, Bergman ne cherche pas, par un retour fréquent aux mêmes détails, par l'utilisation d'objets lourds de signification . . . à nous préciser le message de l'oeuvre." (Claude Perrin: "Såsom i en spegel ou la recherche de l'unité" in *Etudes cinématographiques* 38-39, 1965, 51). Kinder's noted shift from surrealism to phenomenology was thus preceded by a shift from constructivism to a phenomenological language; and Bergman was speaking this non-modern and anti-symbolist language already in 1966 when he released *Persona*. We will thus be obliged to see also "deconstructive operations" (Boyd, 1983, 16) like the "dispossession of the author" as inscribed into a strategy refusing formalistic, rhythmical schemes as well as a whole package of other avant-garde devices already five years before *Persona*. The continuous development culminates in Bergman's realization that all his films would be dreams (1968).

10. Brigitta Steene, "The Isolated Hero of Ingmar Bergman" in *Film Comment* 3:2, 1965, 69.

11. Freud has had a way of expressing this difference between "rational" dreams controlled by a waking mind, and "real dreams" unfolding themselves exclusively within their own sphere. The *Wachtraum*, or *Tagtraum* is for Freud a rationalized dream whereas *Traum* follows it own logic.

12. Bergman himself liked to characterize the production of film dreams in a way coming close to this procedure. Being asked, for example, where his ideas come from he affirmed that "it is just like to remember a dream" (Newman, 1968, 58). We should not understand such a statement in the sense that Shame claims to be Bergman's dream. On the contrary, it is the aforementioned problem of dream authorship which becomes relevant here on the one hand, and it is linked to Kawin's attempt to define the ontology of the "dream called *Shame*" on the other.

13. James F. Maxfield, "Bergman's *Shame*: A Dream of Punishment" in *Literature and Film Quarterly* 12:1, 1984, 35.

14. André Bazin, *Qu'est-ce que le cinéma? III* (Paris: Cerf, 1961), 25.

15. In the world of surrealism there is probably only Buñuel who would have answered this question without any hesitation in the affirmative by claiming that "a film is the story of a dream. A dream is recalled because of the realistic nature of cinema" (Quoted from Eberwein, 1984, 170). But Buñuel is an exceptional person: he is, as many have said, the only surrealist artist who was able to materialize surrealist aims within the domain of film. However, not everybody can find a way out of the opposition of dream against reality as easily as Buñuel by simply equating them.

16. "Preface" of the English version of *Face to Face*, quoted from Librach, 1980, 94).

17. Pieyre de Mandiargues, 1965, 48.

18. Michel Beaujour, "Surréalisme ou cinéma?" in Kovacs, 59.

19. Cf. Alain Virmaux, "L'idée du film concu comme rêve n'est d'ailleurs qu'une étape sur la voie d'un cinéma véritablement surréaliste. On avait pris l'habitude de presenter comme un 'rêve' tout film, toute sequence qui débouchait sur l'irrational. Cela devenait un alibi, une manière de faire accepter certaines audaces, bref, une facilité." "Une promesse mal tenue: Le film surréaliste 1924-1932" in Kovacs, 108-9.

20. Cf. Christiane Blot and André Labarrière, "Trop souvent ésoterique, la production cinématographique surréaliste n'a pas su éviter l'écueil de l'abstraction. . . . Que le surréalisme est reste plus au niveau de l'esprit . . . qu'au niveau du monde concret qui est le notre." "La dimension sociale du cinéma surréaliste" in Kovacs, 265-66.

21. Siegfried Kracauer, *Theorie des Films* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1973), 256. Engl.: *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960), 190.

22. Carl Dahlström, *Strindberg's Dramatic Expressionism* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1930), 15.

23. Vlada Petric, *Films and Dreams: An Approach to Bergman* (South Salem, N.Y.: Redgrave, 1981), 28.

24. Lotte Eisner, *The Haunted Screen* (London: Thames and Hudson, 1969), 40. A work often mentioned in the context of both surrealism and expressionism is Dreyer's *Vampyr* (1932). Here the role of "reality" is neither that of dead material nor the subjective expression of an individual mind. If we believe Kovacs, a dreamlike aspect is here due to a subtle manipulation of both reality and dreams. "La valeur du film de Dreyer tient uniquement dans l'économie des moyens, dans l'observation attentive d'une réalité quotidienne, banale en soi, mais proprement magique des qu'elle est isolée de son contexte par l'objectivité de la caméra" (Kovacs, 193). Reality is captured through isolation from its context: the unusual point is that it can nevertheless still be recognized as an everyday reality. The mysterious climate in this film might, indeed, be to a great extent due to this constellation. A "disquieting" atmosphere is created—and this is remarkable—through "observation" more than through photographic distortion. Though Dreyer's film works also with "conventional" devices like that of superposition, *Vampyr* needs to be considered as outstanding.

25. André Bazin, *Qu'est-ce le cinéma? I* (Paris: Cerf, 1958), 28: "En réalité, les procédés utilisés depuis Méliès n'étaient que pure convention. Nous les prenions pour argent comptant avec la même bonne volonté que les clients des cinémas forains. Le ralenti et la surimpression n'ont jamais figuré dans nos chauchemars. La surimpression à l'écran signifie: "Attention, monde irréel, personnage imaginaire," elle ne représente en aucune manière ce que sont réellement les hallucinations ou les rêves, encore moins ce que serait un fantôme, . . . les Américains . . . savent que le rêve se charactérise bien moins par la qualité formelle des images que par leur enchainement dynamique, leur logique interne . . ." I am using the translation of Bert Cardullo which appeared in *Film-Philosophy* 6:1, 2002, under the title "The Life and Death of Superimposition" (1946).

26. George Bluestone, *Novels into Film* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957), 47.

27. David Bordwell, *Narration in the Fiction Film* (London: Methuen, 1985), 209.

28. Dahlström, 89.

29. John Milton, "The Esthetic Fault of Strindberg's 'Dream Plays'" in *The Tulane Drama Review* 4:3, 1960, 115.

30. Peter Szondi, *Theorie des modernen Dramas* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1956), 41: ". . . demzufolge die Personen der Damsskustrilogie (die Dame, der Bettler, Cäsar) Ich-Ausstrahlungen des Unbekannten sind, das Werk also als Ganzes in der Subjektivität seines Helden beinhaltet ist. Aber dieser Widerspruch ist die Paradoxie der Subjektivitat selbst: ihrer Selbst-Fntfremdung in der Reflexion, im Gegenständlichwerden des ins Auge gefassten eigenen Ich, das Umschlagen der potenzierten Subjektivität ins Objektive."

31. Sigmund Freud, *Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse* (Leipzig: Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag, 1922), 188. English translation used (though sometimes slightly altered: *A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis* trans. Stanley Hall (New York: Horace Liveright, 1920). German text: "Eine solche Mischperson sieht etwa aus wie A, ist aber gekleidet wie B, tut eine Verrichtung, wie man sie von C erinnert, und dabei ist noch ein Wissen, dass es die Person D ist. Durch diese Mischbildung wird natürlich etwas in den vier Personen Gemeinsames besonders hervorgehoben. . . . Durch das Übereinanderfallen der miteinander verdichteten Einzelnen entsteht in der Regel ein unscharfes, verschwommenes Bild, so ähnlich wie wenn Sie mehrere Aufnahmen auf die nämliche Platte bringen."

32. Christian Metz, "Fiction Film and its Spectator: A Metaphysical Study" in *New Literary History* 8:1, 1976, 89, Metz's italics.

33. Martin Lamm, *August Strindberg* (Stockholm: Bonnier, 1942), 156.

34. Ayfre, *Conversion aux images?* 281-82.

35. Robert Eberwein, "The Filmic Dream and Point of View" in *Literature and Film Quarterly* 8:3, 1980, 201.

36. Bergman's alienation of temporal laws plays with the paradoxical relationship between subjectiveness and objectiveness in filmic narration and for this reason it comes close to the strategy of the *caméra-stylo*. As a *Verfremdung*, the *caméra-stylo* is effective as a machine supposed to produce the estrangement of an objective world as well as self-estrangement, a condition provided in *Wild Strawberries*.

37. Freud, 1922, 99.

38. Kraepelin, 98: "Wir sind hier imstande, die Entwicklung des Vorganges in unserem Innern zu verfolgen. Ohne Zweifel handelt es sich um das Fehlen oder Versagen jener Allgemeinvorstellungen, die beim 'Nachdenken' unserem Vorstellungsverlaufe sein Ziel bestimmen und alle Abweichungen von der vorgezeichneten Richtung sofort unterdrücken."

39. Freud, 1922, 102-3.

40. A. Hesnard, *Freud dans la société après-guerre* (Genève: Montblanc, 1946), 118-19: "La Psychanalyse voit dans l'inconscient un objet d'étude, de connaissance, menant à une fin de libération, donc de perfectionnement de l'individu. Toute autre attitude, essentiellement esthétique et désintéressée du surréaliste, qui s'évade sciemment du monde réel et se détourne des mondes traditionnels de pensée pour se réfugier avec délices dans le chaos apparemment extravagant de la rêverie solitaire, du songe éperdu et de la béatitude toxique."

41. Charles Tart describes the "high dream" as "the great intensification of sensory activity and the dropping out of ordinary intellectual activity to the point where the dreamer no longer experiences the usual split between knower and the known." Quoted from Petric, 8.

42. Metz, 1976, 95.

43. By this particularity already is concerned the a priori condition of cinema which, because of the state of consciousness it produces, constantly claims to be dream and daydream at the same time. Even in Strindberg's theater the effect of dream was, paradoxically, supposed to be produced not through the straightforward depiction of dream images but by evoking a "half-reality" which resides between dream and non-dream: "The reality is half-reality of dreams, not indeed poetic dreams of beautiful maidens, ethereal love, arid castles in the air, not dreams of escape from the hard realities of life, but dreams in which the realities come to us in a distorted arrangement of observed reality" (Dahlström, 1930, 129-30). The project of "distortion," which is in Strindberg as far removed from modernist, Brechtian ideas as it is in Bergman, began to be elaborated, in a Swedish tradition, in a contradictory way as a distortion of reality nevertheless able to reproduce a "realistic" effect of observed life. Bergman has developed this artistic potential for a medium which owns ideal possibilities for the realization of such theoretical presuppositions. He gradually pushed cinema from the level of daydream to the level of "dream as such."

44. Susanne Langer, "A Note on Film" in R. D. Maccann, *Film: A Montage of Theories* (New York: Dutton, 1966), 200.

45. Many people have noted that Langer's dream mode has entered rather directly into the cinematic practice of Bergman. Parker Tyler is among those people who have noted the compatibility of Langer's concept with Bergman's films but at the same time he points out that Bergman, after having subscribed to the idea of dream mode, willingly turned away from all surrealist aesthetic tendencies. This observation is not understandable: "Bergman, in effect, is whimsically parodying the Langerian dream mode, but not in order to make a Surrealist construct; rather, to inflect the meaning of the ordinary word of 'physical reality' which he now proceeds, paradoxically, to report" (Tyler, "Masterpieces by Antonioni and Bergman" in G. Mast and M. Cohen, *Film Theory and Practice: Introductory Readings*, Oxford University Press, 1974, 51). However, a cinema which turns consistently away from the image of the daydream cannot become surrealist. The paradoxical relationship between "realism" and "dream report" which Tyler crystallizes is, indeed, one of the most essential points about Bergman's dream films. A part of the dream mode Tyler traces thus very correctly back to parallels he finds in Kracauer's realism. However, the conclusion should be that this paradox is inherent in non-constructive dream art in general and this already since Strindberg. And only in this way it represents the essential foundation of Langer's dream mode.

46. Freud, *General Introduction*, 105 (German: 104): "Diese Tagträume sind nun wirklich Wunscherfüllungen, Erfüllungen von ehrgeizigen und erotischen Wünschen, die uns wohlbekannt sind, aber es sind gedachte, wenn auch lebhaft dargestellte, niemals halluzinatorische erlebte." Cf. also 137-38.

47. It is amazing that James Maxfield has tried to establish this argument even in regard to a film by Bergman. In an analysis of *Shame* he declares that "film as dream has the classical Freudian function of a wish fulfillment" (Maxfield, 35).

48. Quoted from Altman, 265.

49. Andrew, 1984, 143-44.

50. Curry, 1974, 85.

51. Some film directors were in advance as to the aestheticians. Northern Europe has played a prominent role here. Not only Bergman developed a certain Strindbergian idea about dreams and art but also Dreyer elaborated the cinematic possibilities for an expression of strangeness. Dreyer's attempts manifest a strong concern for style which "infuses the work with a soul—and that is what makes it art" ("A Little on Film Style" in *Cinema* 6:2, 1970, 9). This is also one of the reasons why they exceed expressionist film techniques. A comment by Ayfre on Dreyer's achievement in the domain of film aesthetics focuses an underlying strategy of letting film subsist beyond the devices of

expressionism and formalism. Strangeness is, as Ayfre finds, created by renouncing all psychologically minded forms of "reverie." Dreyer's treatment of strangeness provides clues for the establishment of a phenomenology of modern film in general. Though some of Dreyer's films are reminiscent, because of the vocabulary used, of expressionism, in general Dreyer's cinema of the strange is not restricted, in an expressionist way, to an expression of what Lotte Eisner has called "Romantic anguish." We note a parallel between the dream mode in modern cinema and Dreyer's special "stylistics" of the strange: "Une logique interne de l'univers qu'il a crée fait qu'on ne peut pas interpréter les événements étranges qui s'y déroulent, comme étant des émanations de l'inconscient, les rêveries d'une imagination débridée ou l'expression d'une schizophrenie latente. Main on n'a pas affaire davantage à une réalite esthétique purement formelle qui ne vaudrait que par sa cohérence et son harmonie, par les beaux équilibres d'ombre et de lumière, par l'intensité des situations dramatiques ou par la merveilleuse souplesse du rhythme. Il ne s'agit pas seulement pour Dreyer de construire de belles architectures vides" (Ayfre, *Le Cinéma et sa vérité*, Paris : Cerf, 1969, 177). In Dreyer's films there exists a certain atmosphere, a "place" in which we observe actions, or also a certain "style" evoking an impression of strangeness. Ayfre notes that in Dreyer this atmosphere is produced by avoiding strangeness through the creation of an effect of empathy, or basing it on the successful arrangement of form. For Ayfre the "logic" of Dreyer's films is neither psychological nor formal.

52. "Das Unheimliche" in *Gesammelte Werke* XII, 292.

53. Bela Balázs, *Theory of the Film* (New York: Arno Press, 1972), 272.

54. Lynda Buntzen and Carla Craig, "The Hour of the Wolf: The Case of Ingmar Bergman" in *Film Quarterly* 30:2, 1976-77, 27.

55. *General Introduction*, 96. German: "Wir wollen das, was der Traum erzählt, den *manifesten Trauminhalt* nennen, das Verborgene, zu dem wir durch die Verfolgung der Einfälle kommen sollen, die *latenten Traumgedanken*. Wir achten dann auf die Beziehungen zwischen manifestem Trauminhalt und latenten Traumgedanken . . ." (125).

56. *Gesammelte Werke* III, 666.

57. Fliess openly admits that psychoanalysts would not be at all interested in dreams but only in thoughts behind dreams. "No, the dream as such is not knowable; and we would not gain if it were. It is, after all, latent thought and not manifest content that we attempt to retrieve and to restore to the patient who owns it, whether fully awake or partially so as a dreamer" (Fliess, 75).

58. Christian Metz, *Psychoanalysis and Cinema: The Imaginary Signifier* (London: Macmillian, 1983), 30.

59. Susanne Langer, *Feeling and Form* (London: Scribner, 1953), 168.

60. Andrew, 220.

61. Frederico Fellini, "Journal de rêves" in *Positif* 158, 1974, 3.

62. Gunner Ollén, *Vandring I vaken dröm: Kring Strindberg's ett Drömspel*, (Stockholm: Svensk Litteraturtidskrift, 1964), 4.

63. Ebbe Linde, "Drömspelen hos Strindberg och Kafka" in *Bonniers Litterära Magasin* 1946, 764.

64. Cf. Stephen Teo, "Recalling hand-tinted photography before color photography was developed, this technique of using washed out colors in an age when much more realistic colors are a technical possibility lends a feel of the avant-garde to the film." *Wong Kar-wai* (London: British Film Institute, 2005), 25.

65. Höök quoted from Philipp Mosley, *Ingmar Bergman: The Cinema as Mistress* (London: Marion Boyars, 1981), 17.

66. Kracauer, 224: "Vielleicht erscheinen Filme dann am meisten als Träume, wenn sie uns durch krasse und ungeschminkte Gegenwart natürlicher Gegenstände überwaltigen—als hätte die Kamera sie geradc eben dem Schoss der Natur abgewonnen

und die Nabelschnur zwischen Bild und Wirklichkeit wäre noch nicht zerschnitten. In der jähen Unmittelbarkeit und schockierenden Wahrheitstreue solcher Aufnahmen liegt etwas, das ihre Identifizierung mit Traumbildern rechtfertigt."

67. The reintroduction of formalist means (the fact of letting the film appear as a "film in a film") must be mentioned in this context as well as its reevaluation in a post-formalist light. One of the first examples of a cinematic dream based on such a strategy is Alain Resnais's *L'Année dernière à Marienbad.* Resnais himself underlines a special view about dreams and how it has been applied in Marienbad: "C'est un film qui se place entièrement sur le plan des apparences. Tout y est équivoque. D'une scène on ne peut pas dire si elle se passe aujourd'hui, hier ou il y a un an, d'une pensée, si elle appartient à tel ou tel personnage. Realité et sentiments, tout est remis en question, le qui est rêve et ce qui ne l'est pas" (quoted from Ayfre, 1964, 335). Here film is a dream. Interestingly, Ayfre's comment concentrates on Resnais's rejection of formal devices like that of superimposition. In *Conversion aux images?* Ayfre writes: "Il est significatif à cet égard que l'on ait renoncé à tous les artifices de syntaxes cinematographiques (flous, halos, fondus au noir ou fondus enchaînés) qui étaient devenus la convention habituelle pour indiquer sans ambiguité un passage du present au passé ou à l'imaginaire. Au fond, ces univers de la mémoire ou du rêve etaient toujours vus par des gens de l'exterieur ou raconté reflexivement par l'interesse avec toujours, par conséquent, une clef les annonçant comme tels" (Ayfre, ibid.).

68. Cf. Alan Hobson, "Dream Image and Substrate: Bergman's Films and the Physiology of Sleep," in Petric, 1981: "The view that dream is bizarre owing to the work of the censor which must disguise threatening dream thoughts into the bizarre imagery in dreams may also be discarded. Many of the bizarre features of the dream can instead be confidently ascribed to the usual operating properties of the nervous system during dreaming sleep. Finally, Freud's central hypothesis—that every dream represents a wish fulfillment—can also be questioned. That dreams may sometimes express wishes is not to be denied, but the dream state is also quite capable of carrying negative and motivationally neutral information."

69. Vernon Young, *Cinema Borealis: Ingmar Bergman and the Swedish Ethos* (New York: Avon, 1971), 279.

70. Raymond Williams, *Drama from Ibsen to Elliot* (Oxford University Press, 1953), 109-10.

71. Andrew, 148.

72. Armes, 1976, 48.

73. Paul Newell Campbell, "The Reflexive Function of Bergman's *Persona*" in *Cinema Journal* 19:1, 1979, 82.

74. Kawin suggests that the recognition of this particular constellation of creation, action and expression must have consequences for studies of films as well as for dreams: "I would like to close by suggesting some implications of this connection between dream and film for film criticism. One of the oldest battles between artists and critics is that of intentionality. A critic might invent a complex explanation of the meaning of a passage or sequence that the artist will insist was done that way simply because 'if felt right.' I suggest that critics start to believe artists when they say such things, perhaps keeping in mind the difference between riding a bike and explaining how it works, or between dancing and watching one's feet while counting" (Kawin, 1981, 16).

75. Claude Levi-Strauss, *La Pensée sauvage* (Paris: Plon, 1962), 46.

76. Levi-Strauss has analyzed this phenomenon, and emphasizes the structural differences between game and rituals accordingly. Levi-Strauss thinks that what is essential to game is the establishment of a certain symmetry between the two competing parts, a symmetry that must be accepted by both partners. In rituals, on the other hand, this symmetry is consistently negated. It is because of this negation of symmetry that the

ritual will, in the end, appear to be more "unreal" than the game. Levi-Strauss writes: "In the case of the game, symmetry is given; it is a structural symmetry because it flows out of the principle that says that the rules be the same for both sides. Asymmetry, on the other hand, is caused; it inevitably flows out of the contingency of events, no matter if due to intention, coincidence or talent. In the case of the ritual, it is the other way round: one imposes a asymmetry that is preconceived and postulated between the profane and the sacred, the initiated and the non-initiated" (*La Pensée sauvage*, 48-49).

77. Bergman has claimed that film produces "real dreams [and] lightly stringing games" (Jörn Donner: *The Films of Ingmar Bergman: From "Torment" to "All These Women,"* New York: Dover, 1972), 15.

78. Interview in *Movie* 16, quoted from Mosley, 150-51.

79. This becomes particularly obvious in the film *The Rite*. Livingstone has noted about this film that the group of actors called *Les Riens* "are imprisoned . . . by their relation to a sacred order in which they have no faith. Repeating its gestures, expressing themselves always in its terms they ceaselessly act out of profane ritual, wearily performing the spiritual exercises of disbelievers: even nonbelievers often play." Paisley Livingstone, *Ingmar Bergman and the Rituals of Art* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1982), 160. It seems as if Les Riens are capable of committing violent acts only within a state of indifference—here unmotivated violence equals ritual violence.

80. Stig Bjorkman et al., *Bergman om Bergman* (Stockholm: Norstedt, 1970), 40.

81. The importance which a certain intellectual attitude might have played for Bergman's development as a director should not be underestimated. Bergman, as he once declared, was in his youth profoundly impressed by Eino Kaila's book *Psychology of the Personality* (*Personlighetens psykologie*, Helsinki: Söderström, 1946). In this book, the author lays down, as Bergman later reported, that "man lives according to his needs—negative and positive," and to learn this represented a "tremendous experience" (cf. Richard Blake: *The Lutheranian Milieu of the Films of Ingmar Bergman*, New York: Arno Press, 1978, 17-18). For Bergman, the Finnish philosopher Eino Kaila was trying to "extend holistic views even to the life of the drives in its full breadth" ("Inledning" to Kaila, 1946, 2). *Psychology of the Personality* had an exceptionally strong impact not only on Bergman but also on almost an entire generation of young Nordic people. The book brings forward the idea that, since life itself must be seen as a holistic phenomenon, the relevance of irrational drives also necessarily (and in an amazingly self-evident way) affects the sphere of man's "civilized" personality. It seems that insight (the fact that "man lives according to his needs—negative and 'positive') made a strong impression on the young Bergman." The idea Kaila is trying to express is related to the present anthropological examinations of the ritual.

82. I would like to elaborate on the difference between playing and playacting. Whenever we are playing a game, it is not necessary for us to imagine anything about the actions of the game beforehand. On the contrary, spontaneity of actions is crucial to the dynamics of play. In play-acting, on the other hand, imagination plays a central role. Mikhail Bakhtin extensively analyzed the difference between playing and acting. Bakhtin claims that for play-acting, we always need a certain amount of imagination, we need to imagine the things that we are going to play. Play-acting needs images of play but these images can be produced only while the player is still on the outside of the play. Once he is inside, he will be captured by the game itself and thus be unable to be creative in the real sense of the word—will only be able to play (to follow rules). Of course, we might also use a certain amount of imagination in games but the important point is that this imagination will be produced within the game; it will never be the imagination of "something." In games imagination is empty and formal because it exists only as a part of the playing of the game. Bakhtin explains the anatomy of creative imagination thus: "The actor both imagines a life and imagines it in his play-acting. (If he did no more than

imagine it, if he played merely for sake of experiencing this life from within—the way children play—and did not shape it through an activity that approaches it from the outside, he would not be an artist" (Bakhtin, *Art and Answerability*, Austin: University of Texas Press, 1990, 78). The main task of Bakhtin's "imaginative" actor is to transform game into play-acting by filling an empty form (a form which up to this point resembled that of children's games) with artistic, imagined contents. Bergman and other modern directors try to transgress the distinction between an "inside" play of acting persons, and a calculated action "imagined" by an outside creator. Bergman once said in an interview: "I believe that every serious work of art must contain an element of Play. . . . I think that in this feeling of play we can find a stimulating feeling which helps to give form to beings to situations. We live the passion of the one who holds a mirror and discovers that which the mirror reflects" ("Nouvel entretien avec Ingmar Bergman," in *Cahier du Cinema* 215, 1960). The act of "giving form" to characters, to situations, etc., flows out of an aesthetic game, and therefore the game of the action is seen as intimate and self-contained. For this reason it consciously distances itself from conventional ideas about play-acting: "Playing, from the standpoint of the players themselves, does not presuppose any spectator (situated outside their playing) for at whom the whole event of a life imagined through play would be actually performed; in fact, play imagines nothing—it merely imagines. The boy who plays robber chieftain experiences his own life (the life of a robber chieftain) from within himself: he looks through the eyes of a robber chieftain at another boy who is playing a passing traveler" (ibid., 74). Bakhtin wishes to find "something" in the play that can be imagined while playing. The existence of a material that provided by a conscious creator is essential for aesthetic activity as such. In other words, for Bakhtin, the distinction between the formal, abstract body of the game, and art as an aesthetic, contents-oriented activity, is categorical. Therefore he also insists on the distinction between contents and form: "The actor is aesthetically creative only when he produces and shapes from outside the image of the hero into whom he will later 'reincarnate' himself" (ibid., 76). However, what happens in dreams, and in those films which try to reproduce nothing but dreams?

83. Alain, *Système des beaux-arts* (Paris: Gallimard, 1926), 30.

84. The philosopher Maurice Guyau, a contemporary of Alain, clarifies the characteristic of reveries and the deficiencies of reverie as a mental state: If style, instead of wearing itself a groove on the surface, simply followed those grooves that are already traced, it could advance much more easily: it would glide without being pushed. One has said: the slope of memory, the slope of reverie. In fact, following memory means letting oneself go gently like down a slope, it means waiting for a certain number of ready images to come one after the other, in a line, smoothly. The experience which Alain attempts to communicate, and which he believes to be remarkable in aesthetic as well as in psychological terms is different. Guyau, *La Genèse de l'idée du temps* (Paris: Alcan, 1902), 52-53.

85. "[In literature] det lästa ordet absorberas under en medveten viljeakt och i förbund med intellektet, först, så småningom drabbas vår fantasi och känsla. . . . Då vi upplever en filmföreställing, åstadkommer vi medvetet en illusionsberedskap, kopplar av aår vilja och intellekt. . . . Bildberättelsen träffar oss direkt i vår känsla utan mellanlandning i intellektet." (Bergman: "Varja film är min sista film," in *Filmnyheter* 9-10 May 1959, 3.)

86. Descartes, *Meditation sixième*. In *Œuvres et lettres* (Paris: Pléiade-Gallimard, 1953, 334): "Mais lorsque j'aperçois des choses dont je connais distinctement et le lieu d'où elles viennent, et celui ou elles sont, et le temps auxquelles elles m'apparaissent, et que, sans aucune interruption, je peux lier le sentiment que j'en ai, avec la suite du reste de ma vie, je suis entièrement assuré que je les aperçois en veillant, et non point dans le sommeil." English trans. John Veitch (1901).

87. Maurice Blondel condemned all philosophers who try to "construire des plans, des reves," and attempt to "former des systemes . . ." (Blondel, *L'Action* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1949, 4).

88. "Le spectateur oisif, qui ne trouve souvent occasion, dans la vue des choses, qu'à poursuivre des rêveries diffuses inconsistantes, et bientôt perdu dans un cercle de discours mécanique" (ibid).

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